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Five Years

This is the twentieth issue of the Newsletter, marking five years of the Thai-Yunnan Project. With limited resources we have, perhaps, not done too badly. Without doubt the major contribution of the project has been the Newsletter which now has a growing circulation of over 400. Given our resources this is perhaps about our limit. But, we have emphasized over the the years, that we have no objection to the copying and further distribution of the Newsletter and its contents. All we request is that due acknowledgement is given.

This is the first issue which is being published with financial support from the National Thai Studies Centre and this support means we can guarantee publication till the end of 1994. Over the last few issues we have also had to exercise greater editorial control over space. Contributions come in at a very reasonable rate and our printers, let alone our finances, enforce limits over the size of each issue. Nevertheless, contributions are always very welcome, though there may be a slightly longer delay than in the past before they can be published.

Despite misunderstandings by some about the region of our interest, we have always been concerned not only with the Kingdom of Thailand and the province of Yunnan, but with the whole region which brings together the cultures of Southeast Asia and those areas of the Peoples Republic of China which have long connections with these cultures. This has meant that over the last five years we have paid attention to the minorities of Yunnan, Burma and its borders and Cambodia. Given the ferment in the region, much space has been given to politics, and - though we have been open to all points of view - there is little doubt that we have been much concerned about the determination of SLORC in Burma to ignore the verdict of the 1990 election and the determination of the Khmer Rouge to frustrate attempts at creating peace in Cambodia. We have not been unwilling to identify the implications of Chinese policy and some Thai interests in support of these Burmese and Cambodian factions. This issue contains a precis of the translation of an interview with a senior Thai military official which throws some light on the problem.

This issue also has three papers on the subject of names and ethnicity - in Laos, Cambodia and Yunnan. We are
particularly happy to publish these papers because it re-emphasizes our general concerns about the ongoing intellectual, as well as contemporary, concerns about the region. We have published articles on a range of topics, archaeology, literature, environment among many others. We hope our readers will continue to keep us supplied with contributions on the whole spectrum of knowledge in relation to our region.

* * *

Reply to Doug Porter

Kevin Heppner

I cannot let Doug J. Porter's article in the September Newsletter, wherein he attempts to justify aid to the SLORC junta in Burma by UN Agencies, go unprotested. Having lived in the Manerplaw area of Karen State for almost 2 years, I have witnessed first hand the SLORC's true idea of 'Border Area Development'. It involves mortar and air attacks on civilian villages where there are no opposition troops, extortion of villagers' labour, livestock, and belongings under threat of shelling their villages, forced relocation of tens of thousands of ethnic civilians in the border areas to death camps, rounding up men, women, and children as forced munitions porters and human minesweepers, the use of thousands of villagers and camp internees as slave labour at army camps and construction projects, routine summary executions, massacres, torture, and gang rape by SLORC officers - the list is virtually endless. Since 1968 the Burma Army has publicised a policy called Four Cuts, which involves attempting to control the ethnic armies through direct, brutal, and unprovoked attacks on ethnic civilians in the border areas. This policy applies not only to current fighting areas, but to ethnic regions throughout the country, as proven by this year's exodus of almost 300,000 Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh, and last year's ceasefire extorted from the Palaung State Liberation Party by rounding up 100,000 Palaung civilians into camps and systematically executing them until the PSLP signed an agreement.

The main problem with Mr Porter's article, as with the UN aid, is that it is based on the horrendously wrong premise that the SLORC is actually interested in 'developing' the border areas. The SKIRC's interest in these areas can be summarised as twofold: the production and trafficking of narcotics and the exploitation and export of timber and minerals. They pursue these activities solely with the aims of fattening the swiss bank accounts of SLORC Generals, and funding their huge military buildup to suppress all voices of dissent in the country. In pursuing these aims, the people of the border areas are only seen by the SLORC as a useful pool of slave labour, or as an obstacle to be eliminated. I have recently been interviewing border area villagers who have been among the tens of thousands the SLORC has sent to death camps. In these camps no food or medicine is provided, yet soldiers patrol the perimeter and refuse to allow the villagers to leave, deliberately starving them to death in order to decrease the ethnic population in the border areas. The SLORC has also declared entire border regions off limits to the villagers whose families have lived there for centuries, issuing orders that any man, woman, or child seen in these regions is to be shot on sight as a 'rebel'.

Mr Porter omits to even discuss such happenings, admitting that questions may be raised about the 'just-ness' of the SLORC's rule but passing this off as irrelevant, as long as the UN Agencies manage to build a few schools, dams and roads while they prop up the SLORC. But who will operate those schools once they're established? The same SLORC which has an official committee rewriting the history of Burma from scratch, which has massacred thousands of students in the streets and prisons, sent all University professors to re-education camps and made them swear to control their students or go to prison, which has changed primary school curriculum to emphasise Discipline above all and contempt for all non-Burman languages and cultures, which has sent troops into high school classrooms to round up porters for military offensives. And where will the power from those dams go? To SLORC Army camps and Army enterprises. The UN is funding roads and bridges giving SLORC troops better access from their garrison towns into ethnic opposition controlled areas. UN-funded agricultural programs are used to generate profits for local military prerogatives. At least on Un-related cattle breeding project in southern Shan State involved SLORC troops confiscating all cattle from area villagers, then grabbing the villagers themselves for slave labour on the project. UNICEF medicines are common on the black market, having been confiscated from hospitals by military officers; karen troops have also found many UNICEF supplies in captured SLORC Army frontline camps. A contact who worked with UNICEF in Rangoon a few years ago tells me that UNICEF officials there have always been aware that their school-building
materials were being sent to build Army barracks. The nature of the SLORC junta is not irrelevant to UN Aid; rather, it should be the central issue in the entire discussion.

The SLORC has particularly taken to heart the UN's request that 'community participation must feature in the...execution of development activities'. Reports coming in from all corners of the country attest that all roads, bridges, and other such projects are being built by ethnic villagers rounded up as slaves. This includes UN projects and roads being built for foreign oil companies. At the same time, SLORC troops make repeated rounds of area villages, beating money out of the villagers as 'fees' for the projects. Then on completion, the SLORC media broadcasts the opening ceremony, where SLORC Generals announce the projects as great gifts from the Army which the villagers have enthusiastically built on a 'self-help basis'. However, those who built them are unlikely to ever derive any benefit: the roads are used to transport troops and equipment into opposition areas, and villagers seen later on such roads are often shot on sight as 'saboteurs'. In many cases, many are also later rounded up to sweep the roads for mines in front of military convoys.

Hundreds of ethnic villagers from Karenni (Kayah) State have escaped to describe horrific conditions of slavery on the Loikaw-aung Ban railway to southern Shan State. They describe dozens dying, routine rifle butt beatings, rampant starvation and disease and the enslavement of women and children as young as 12 to carry and break rocks. The SLORC's Working People's Daily has even published photos of hundreds of slaves working on this railway, captioned that these poor subsistence farmers are 'enthusiastically contributing their labour' for several months of the year. When asked about the slavery, SLORC's Lt. Col. Than Han of the Border Areas Development Committee said 'We are doing it for them. But for the present people must suffer by putting in labour'. He adds, 'Every day people are dying. It's a normal thing'. [See Reuters/The Nation, Bangkok, Oct. 14/92]. This is the very same Border Areas Development Committee to which Mr Porter says the UN Agencies give the bulk of their support, and to which they have announced a commitment!

The UNDP and other agencies have been made fully aware of these facts on several occasions, but instead of distancing themselves from the SLORC's Committee, their response has been to refuse to disclose any specific information on what projects they're involved in. A veil of secrecy has descended around their offices in Bangkok. Now Mr Porter says that the UN Agencies actually want to Step up their activities in collusion with the Border Areas Development Committee, but laments that they are being hindered by nations of the international community with 'domestic constituencies to appease'. Please note, Mr Porter, that those 'domestic constituencies' are the peoples of the world, most of whom care more for Humanity than for the UNDP's 5 year plan, and that the Un Agencies are supposed to be working for those peoples, not against them.

Instead, while the world cries for justice in Burma, the UN Agencies in 1991 declared a 'broad-ranging and long-term commitment' to the SLORC's Border Areas Development program, and Mr Porter speaks of planning a 20 year involvement, strange considering the SLORC calls itself a temporary government. While committing themselves, the UN Agencies have insisted that they will only give aid to areas 'where security conditions do not impede operations'. To the SLORC mind, that means the Army should mount offensives to capture more territory if they want to get more UN Aid. Such moves are not unprecedented: the SLORC has previously mounted full offensives against certain Kachin areas in northern Burma specifically aimed at securing those areas for oil exploration by Amoco.

In Shan State, Mr Porter suggests that 'the Un presence is contributing to the maintenance of peace in the area. One can justifiably question the justice of this peace...'. One certainly can, Mr Porter. In fact, if you ask the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, the Shan villagers breaking rocks on SLORC roads projects, the tens of thousands of Karen villagers starving to death in SLORC camps, or the Burmese students still being tortured in Insein Prison, they will surely tell you that SLORC control of an area means anything but peace. As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi put it, an institutionalised reign of terror. The civil war in Burma can never end as long as this reign of terror lasts. And it is about time that the UN Agencies were called to account for their role in prolonging it.

* * *

Interview with the Commander, First Region, Thailand
The Bangkok journal Khaw Phiset 15-21 January 2536 (1993) published a long interview with Lieutenant-General Chettha Thanajaro, Commander of the First Region, by Piyanat Vorasiri and Uaiporn Taechutrakul. Much of the interview concerned the consequences for Thailand of the disturbed situation on the Burmese and Cambodian borders. Unfortunately we do not have space to publish an extended translation.

When asked if the continuing insurgency in Burma would increase Thailand's problems General Chettha replied that if an agreement was reached between the warring parties or if the minorities were suppressed, that Thailand would suffer the consequences. He said 'I don't not speak as a diplomat who may be understood to support a buffer state which may be seen as suitable for the time, suitable for a particular situation'. The rather convoluted answer does suggest that General Chettha thinks buffer states on Burma's borders are in the Thai interest. On the question of increasing military supplies to the Burmese military and the Chinese road to the Gulf of Martaban he said, 'If they should use it for military purposes we have plans for defence against it.' He claimed there was international agreement that troops would not be stationed within five miles of the border - but this was not adhered to - 'So we could place semi-military forces (laughs) such as the Border Police in between'.

On the Khmer border he was ambivalent - suggesting that fighting in Cambodia was to Thailand's advantage though 'We too want peace so that we can contest each other in the economic field'. Questioned on his attitude to UNTAC he said that they do not recognize Thailand's role in Cambodia working for peace since 1979. He asks whether Yasuji Akasi does not have a political agenda of his own within his own political system [for the advantage of Japan]. He says Singapore, Australia, Taiwan, among others, have traded with Cambodia - so why should only Thailand be excluded.

The question of Vietnam is indirectly raised with the comment 'They look to destroying the Khmer Rouge and then striking us'. He acknowledges that he helped open up trade in Cambodian timber but only when approached by traders. He guaranteed them security and reports his thinking as 'We should start logging in Cambodia, the price should be very cheap. Let it be truly Khmer timber, don't let them cut ours'.

Questioned as to Thailand's support of the Khmer Rouge he claims that Thailand is friends with all four factions, though the fact of proximity to the Khmer Rouge may involve a closer relationship. On UNTAC allegations that the Thai military is not co-operating, he claims that the mix-up regarding flight plans was due to the UN refusing prior discussion.

The interviewer cites Professor Kraisak Choonhavan [son and adviser to former Prime Minister Chatichai] as saying the army is still suspicious of Vietnam. General Chettha says that it has always been Vietnam's intentions to invade Thailand. It is only that during the last ten years their economy has been too weak for such an enterprise. Trade is all very well but the military is responsible for security and Vietnamese intentions have not changed. Asked whether Vietnamese attitudes cannot change he says it will take time, but he also says the aims of the two nations are different. Vietnam has always been an aggressor, Thailand never; but Thailand has never been defeated. Thus despite Vietnamese buildup during the communist period, he remains unafraid.

* * *

Report of the Preliminary Joint Survey Team On Opium Production and Consumption In the Union of Burma (1964)

[Part 2]

(ii) Opium consumption and addiction.

41. The use of opium for non-medical purposes is prohibited by law in all parts of the Union except in the Shan State. In the latter, there is no limitation or control on opium consumption in areas which are situated east of the Salween River. In the Northern and Southern Wa States, west of the Salween River, opium consumption is permitted through licensed opium shops, the licences being auctioned each year. Details of the licensed consumption, number of licences,
42. In the Kachin State, opium consumption is prohibited, but possession of opium up to a certain quantity is permitted in the Hill Tracts. However, the consumption of opium for non-medical purposes and addiction to opium is known to be widespread in the Hukawng Valley and the Triangle Area of the Kachin State.

43. In Burma proper there is no licit use of opium; but it is estimated that there are about 22,000 addicts who get their supplies from the illicit traffic.

44. The Team was aware that there are many and widely divergent views on what constitutes an addiction; and the point at which drug use becomes drug addiction depends to quite an extent on the orientation of the observer, that is to say, whether he looks at it from, for instance, the pharmacological, forensic, social, political or moral point of view. The Team tried to obtain reliable data for estimating the consumption and extent of addiction of opium in Burma. However, it was not possible to ascertain at what stage use of opium could be regarded medically as addiction and how many users could be regarded as addicts, especially in areas where opium consumption is widespread.

Conservative estimate would place about 80 per cent of the adult population in Kokan and Wa in the category of habitual users of whom a significant proportion could be considered as addicts. In the Shan State, west of the Salween River, opium licences are at present allotted quotas on total estimated addicts in the district and at the rate of two viss per head a year. This is a drastic reduction in a very short period of time from the quotas previously allocated by the Sawbwas; nevertheless, in the absence of adequate treatment programmes, it may be assumed that the previous demand is being met illicitly either through or outside the licensed shops.

45. In the Kachin State, there is admittedly wide consumption of opium in the producing areas; there is also an illicit traffic in opium which is directed towards that part of the country from the Shan State. Some estimate of addiction in the Kachin State is contained in Part III of this report.

46. The Compulsory Registration of Opium Consumers Act, 1955, is not yet in force. The Team was informed that the Government is attempting to obtain data on addicts throughout the Union. It was reported that this was a difficult process in some areas under present conditions, and it would take considerable time before accurate data could be obtained. In the absence of reliable date, the Team considers that a figure of 150,000 opium addicts in the Union is conservative, and that habitual users of opium must be about two to three times that figure. The Team hopes that registration of addicts, following the wishes of international bodies, will soon be undertaken by the Governments.

47. Opium consumption in the growing areas is generally widespread for several reasons. It is used as a panacea for many maladies and afflictions of the poverty-stricken cultivators, especially in cases of malaria, venereal disease, dysentery, diarrhoea, fevers, coughing, body aches, etc. In the absence of available and cheap medical facilities, the people have no choice but to turn to opium in their misery. Opium is also a part of ceremonies and is offered to friends during visits. In the cold season, absence of adequate clothing and nourishment is somehow compensated for by the familiar opium pipe in the company of neighbours and associates. The Team is of the opinion that eradication of the opium habit, particularly among the people that grow opium is, of necessity, a long-term affair and should be undertaken gradually.

Adequate health and welfare services, dispensaries, hospitals, need to be established in the affected areas, better living conditions, particularly as regards work and food need to be built up. In due time, treatment of a large number of so-called 'social' addicts could be relatively simple and could be done on a mass basis. Propaganda has to be directed especially in the case of the young generation, to the end that the opium habit becomes socially unacceptable. The Team noticed that advances had been made in health services in the frontier districts, under the Frontier Areas Administration and hoped that they would be extended as soon as feasible. It was of the opinion that the Government's effort would find ready support from international agencies, such as the WHO and UNICEF, particularly in campaigns against endemic diseases, malnutrition and in protection and education of children, and hoped that all avenues of assistance would be explored in conjunction with the representatives of the respective agencies.

48. On the subject of licensed opium shops in the Shan State, the Team noted with satisfaction that their quotas had been drastically reduced in comparison with the Sawbwas' regime. Furthermore, the authorities were obtaining a
better idea of the addict population which would facilitate registration and treatment in course of time. On the other hand the Team thought that tighter control should be exercised on the operation of the licensed opium shops, especially with respect to the transport permits for purchase of opium in the Kunlong area, the entries of smokers in the shop registers and the use of opium by smokers outside the shops. The Team also considered that juveniles and children should not be permitted entry into opium shops where they observe at close quarters what appears to be a socially acceptable habit. As soon as possible, the Government should establish registers of addicts and accurately as possible which would then enable a tighter control of the activities of licensed shops. The Team understands that the goal of the Revolutionary Government is to do away with these shops when possible. Perhaps the Government might consider the feasibility of refusing Government employment to addicts.

49. With regard to treatment of addicts, the Tadagale Mental Hospital in Rangoon has limited facilities for withdrawal under medical supervision. There are a few social workers to follow up on the cured addicts. In addition, general hospitals in the districts can treat some addicts upon their request. There is no provision for compulsory treatment of addicts. The Team was informed of the training programme for doctors in addict treatment that had been recently established and the second batch of doctors has been attending the course during the Team's stay. The Team thought that the treatment facilities at present available in Burma were rudimentary and hoped that the Government would give greater attention to building up the services in this regard. The Team considered it important that treatment facilities should be provided for all persons who wished to be cured as no compulsory treatment is advisable for the present and efforts should be made to encourage them to come forward. Drug addicts have no clear insight into their conditions, little incentive to abstain and little motivation to seek treatment. It is now universally recognised that the addict is a patient who should be treated medically and not punitively. In respect of after-care and rehabilitation of cured addicts, the Team suggests that greater use be made of official and voluntary social and religious organisations and that special efforts be made for employment and housing of such patients. Finally, the Team thought that better organised propaganda against the opium habit needs to be established with adequate training and preparation in a continuous programme over a number of years and full utilisation of all means of communications, such as press, radio, pamphlets, posters, etc. Such education and propaganda should, in the first instance, be directed at teachers, Government officials, social workers, voluntary social and religious organisations, etc. That is, those cadres of society which are entrusted with the care and welfare of others, especially the young. If need be, the assistance of international bodies such as UNESCO, UNICEF and WHO could be utilised.

(iii) Illicit Traffic

50. The large-scale opium production in the Union has, as a consequence, trafficking from the areas of production to consumers inside and outside Burma. As mentioned previously, the opium traffic near the growing areas involves significant numbers of Chinese. However, the participation of peoples of many races along the traffic routes is also observed.

51. Hitherto, the task of the enforcement authorities has been partly complicated by the existence of uncontrolled production, possession and consumption in one part of the country, viz. the Shan State, and restrictions in the rest of the Union. This difficulty also arises with respect to the Kachin State where possession of opium in the Hill Tracts is permitted up to a certain quantity per person. The Team was informed that elements of Union administration had only recently been introduced in the Shan State and that any attempt to go much faster in the present situation might not be politically wise.

52. The main agency for the suppression of the illicit traffic in Burma is the Excise Department. However, the jurisdiction of this Government agency does not as yet extend to the Shan State. In the frontier districts, the FAA exerts what control it can on the movement of opium, but in the present condition its possibilities in this regard are limited.

53. It is the Team's impression that the opium traffic that stems from the producing areas, particularly in the eastern and north-eastern frontier regions of Burma, would naturally flow into neighbouring countries. The important factors which would determine the quantities so involved are demand and illicit prices. The Team learnt that last year one seizure of 10,000 viss of opium had been made in Kengtung district. Often opium is moved by large caravans with groups of up to 250 armed irregulars and pitched battles have been engaged. The Team was also informed that KMT
irregulars who roamed the jungle mountains along the Burma-Thai border areas were mainly engaged in smuggling of opium and other contraband. In some respects the border smuggling was facilitated by the temporary insurrections in the country. The Team was pleased to learn that there is friendly co-operation with the border authorities of Burma's neighbouring countries in the control of smuggling. In this connection, the Team would like to bring to the attention of the Government Resolution 2(XVIII) on the subject of illicit traffic in the Far East which was adopted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (see Annex).

54. The smuggling of opium into Burma proper is controlled by Excise Officers and the Police. Check-posts at major transport routes carry out regular searches and suspect places are raided. A difficulty experienced in this increasing combat with smugglers is the insufficiency of equipment, particularly transport and communications equipment. The training of enforcement staff would also assist in improving its efficiency. The Team thought that the Government might wish to explore all avenues of international assistance in this regard and might also wish to consider possibilities of bilateral assistance. Training seminars and fellowships e.g. the forthcoming ICPO Seminar in November, 1964, should not be overlooked, however limited the facilities.

(iv) Legislation and administration

55. Burma is party to the following international narcotics treaties: International Opium Convention of 23 January, 1912, Agreement concerning the manufacture and use of prepared Opium of 11th February, 1925, International Opium Convention of 19th February, 1925; Convention of 13th July 1931; Agreement for the control of Opium smoking in the Far East of 27th November, 1931 (with the reservation which accounts for the situation in the Shan State); 1948 Protocol. Acceptance of the 1953 Protocol is still under consideration. The Union of Burma has ratified the Single Convention, 1961 on 29 July, 1963.

56. The Team thought that in view of the special position of the 1936 Convention when the Single convention, 1961, comes into effect and following the wishes of international bodies, the Government might wish to consider ratifying or adhering to the 1936 Convention. As the 1953 Protocol is in force, the Government might consider ratifying or adhering to this treaty till such time as the Single Convention comes into effect.

57. The following is the list of laws and regulations covering the control of narcotic drugs in Burma:

Opium Act, 1879 - Amendment 1909;
Opium Act, Part 2 - 1910;
Burma Excise Act (Gunja) 1917;
Dangerous Drugs Act Rules 1931;
Amendments 1949, 1953, 1956, 1958;

All these amendments have to deal with penalties. The 1958 amendment provided for the confiscation of vehicles engaged in illicit traffic.

The Opium Dens suppression Act, 1950;

The Compulsory Registration of Opium consumers Act, 1955 (not in force);

For the Shan State, the Opium Act of 1879 applies to some townships such as Lashio (near Burma proper).

The Act covering the Shan State, apart from these exceptions is the Shan State Opium Order of 1923 (west of the Saleeen river).

The Kachin Hill tribes Regulations, 1889 (applies to the Hill Tribes in the Kachin Hill Tracts).

58. The Team was informed that work is well in hand for co-ordinating and streamlining the different pieces of
legislation in force at present. It assumes that, if need be, such work will be carried out in co-operation with the UN Division of Narcotic Drugs and the PCOB/DSB.

59. There is a de facto central authority for the control of narcotic drugs, the Excise Department. This dates back to the days when opium was an excisable commodity sold by the Government. The Excise Department is in charge of the control of international trade, internal distribution, communication with the international bodies and the fight against internal illicit traffic. For communication with ICPO, there is in the Police Department, a 'Narcotics Division' which is a correspondent of ICPO. Also the Customs Department handles the control of licit traffic on the international shipping and airlines. The police and customs may arrest traffickers and seize narcotics. At present, the Frontier Areas Administration has responsibility, inter alia, for the auctioning of licences and issue of permits for transport of opium from areas of production to the licensed shops.

60. The Team has noted that the present Burmese Opium Enquiry Committee also advises on action to be taken by the executive authorities in specific instances. It is of the opinion that to facilitate programming of the anti-opium drive of the Government, a central, Union-wide agency would be necessary. In this connection, the Team would like to think a permanent administration or small co-ordinating body within the framework of the Revolutionary Government would be established in the near future to supervise the anti-narcotics activities in the various fields. Such a body would also be a point of contact for international or bilateral co-operation as may be required from time to time.

(v) Substitution of opium production by other useful crops

61. The substitution of opium production by other useful crops was frequently brought to the Team's attention. It observed the experiments being carried out in the various centres it visited, and it discussed the implications of poppy substitution with officials and representatives of peasants, traders, etc. In view of the importance of the question, the Team thought it useful to set down some general principles for guidance in the field of action.

62. Suppression of cultivation of the opium poppy presents great difficulties because it grows easily and can be grown in remote places, and it cannot easily be substituted. Agronomically, no other crops are as adaptable as regards climate, soil and water requirements. Economically, no other crops show the same high returns per capita and per hectare, high value in relation to transport costs and other advantages.

63. The discovery of crops which are suitable substitutes both economically and agronomically, in order to compensate farmers for the loss of a valuable source of income is a question of a long-term research programme. What is essentially needed is (i) a systematic survey of all possible alternatives so as to identify those which are technically suitable; (ii) field trials of the most promising; and (iii) follow-up with management advice and assistance at the farm in order to introduce the substitutes which are considered to have the best chance of success.

64. At the same time as this technical investigation is being carried on, there needs to be economic investigation designed to show the effects on, particularly, farm income and labour requirements of possible substitute crops. Such an economic investigation would be rather wide ranging, since it would have to take into account not only such matters as the investment implications of a change in cropping patterns (extra fertilisers, different seed, different irrigation and/or implements), but also institutional and marketing problems and, possibly, questions of international trade.

65. An important example of a technical survey which could be useful in the future, the Team considered, would be experimental cultivation on two or three defined plots of land of seeds of oil poppy obtained from countries where this type of plant is cultivated (mostly in Europe). The interest of poppy oil cultivation is the high productivity of seeds, and oil from it, for which there is a world market and which is needed by the population. As a by-product, the capsules can be used for extraction of alkaloids, morphine and codeine. Furthermore, the harvesting can be done by modern machines.

66. The Team thought that there were several other possibilities of growing marketable crops which might be worth experimenting, even though their value could not be equivalent to opium growing. For example crops such as wheat, maize, linseed, groundnut, soybean and sunflower and some medicinal crops such as pyrethrum, turmeric, mustard and ricinus should be experimented. While recognising that there were marketing difficulties, the Team considered that experiments with different fruit trees should be made. In this connection, at Hopang and other places, a beginning had
been made and it was hoped that such efforts would be continued and extended. It was essential that diversity should be aimed at and within the overall socialist planning the question of self-sufficiency, marketing and costs should be kept in mind. In Kunlong frontier district, there was food shortage for about 7 to 8 months each year, and the Team thought that some attention should be given to the possibility of increasing the rice yield per acre in the limited paddy areas available by utilising fertilisers and better strain of paddy.

67. The Team thought that demonstration farms should play a double role, that is, collecting data from cultivators about their difficulties and distributing the knowledge gained from experimental stations. To promote extension work, some of the demonstration farms should be established in close co-operation with local cultivators. Perhaps for each ten-village tract there should be one demonstration farm. The utilisation of rural development agents would speed up the progress. Such agents should be selected from the local people in view of language differences and trained in the experimental station and demonstration farms. They should be trained in advanced agronomical techniques especially with respect to local crops and in advanced methods of livestock-keeping and home domestics. As opium is cultivated at different altitudes ranging from 700 ft. to over 7000 ft., experimental stations should be opened at different places and should conduct research into crops of tropical and sub-tropical climates. There should also be a distribution and multiplication of better breeds of livestock such as hogs, chicken, etc.

68. The Team agreed that suppression of cultivation of opium poppy and the introduction of substitute crops are complementary in the sense that the one takes income away from the growers while the other returns it. The less is done about making up the loss of income, the more difficult it is to suppress poppy cultivation. But however successful the search for substitute crops, there is bound to be an interim period of adjustment which may give the Government considerable economic, social and political problems. In this connection the Team would invite the Government's attention to the World Food Programme administered by FAO. The detailed working out of action under this programme can, of course, only be done in the light of the conditions prevailing in the field

(To be continued)

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Chao-Tzang Yawngwe's comments on the 1991 UN report has had to be held over. We hope to publish an updated version in June or September [ed.]

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5th International Conference on Thai Studies School of Oriental and African Studies, London 5-10 July, 1993

Panels

1. Thai literary traditions: classical and regional literatures in Thailand (Dr Manas Chitkasem, Department of Southeast Asia, SOAS)

2. Perspectives in Thai music (Dr David Hughes, Centre of Music Studies, SOAS)

3. Thai Buddhism: contemporary issues and historical context (Dr Tadeusz Skorupski, Indology, SOAS; Dr Prapod Assavavirulhakarn, Eastern languages, Chulalongkorn; Dr Suwanna Sath-Anand, Philosophy, Chulalongkorn)

4. Minorities policy and practice in the Tai speaking region (Dr Andrew Turton, Anthrop. and Sociology., SOAS)

5. Minorities within Tai/Thai political systems: historical and theoretical perspectives (Dr Andrew Turton)

6. New light on old Thai law texts (Andrew Huxley, Law, SOAS)

7. The Tai languages in the 20th Century (Dr M.R. Kalaya Tingsabadhi, Linguistics, Chulalongkorn)
8. Regional issues in the art and archaeology of Thailand (Dr Elizabeth Moore, Art and Archaeology, SOAS)

9. Source materials on Thai history c. 1600-1855: reappraisals and discoveries (Dr Dhirawat na Pombejra, NIAS, Meijboomlaan 1, 2242 PR Wassenaar, The Netherlands)

10. The Thai economy in the 1930s (Dr Ian Brown, History, SOAS; Prof. Sompop Manarungsan, Economics, Chulalongkorn)

11. Villages in Thailand: a critical reassessment (Dr Jeremy Kemp, Eliot College, University of Kent, Canterbury)

12. Economic growth and environmental change in Thailand (Dr Jonathan Rigg, Geography, SOAS)

13. Who benefits from Development in Thailand? (Dr Dr Michael Parnwell, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hull)

14. The relationship between political and economic power at the intermediate levels in Thailand (Dr Ruth McVey and Prof. R.H. Taylor, Political Studies, SOAS)

15. Political and Social Transitions in contemporary Thailand (Prof. Surichai Wun'Gaeo, Political Science, Chulalongkorn)

16. The social and cultural context of the AIDS epidemic in Thailand (Hans ten Brummelhuis, Anthropological Sociological Center, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Dr Vichai Poshyachinda, Institute of Health Research, Chulalongkorn)

Please write directly to the panel organizer if you wish to contribute to any of these panels.

Papers are also invited on other aspects of Thai studies. Please inform the Organizing Committee of the provisional title of your paper if you fall into this category.

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The Conference Lectures

Professor Chetana Nagavajara (Silpakorn University) 'Literature in Thai life: reflections of a native'

Professor Yoneo Ishi, (Sophia University) 'The pre-Ch'ing Ayutthayan-Chinese trade relationship and its impact upon the development of a "port polity" in Siam'

Dr Craig Reynolds (The Australian National University) 'The shape of modern Thai intellectual history'.

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Ian xang: the name of the classical kingdom of Laos, its inception and its reception by neighbouring countries.

Mayoury and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn

It is surprising that people who in everyday life seem to be particularly allergic to accuracy, let alone mathematical precision, decided to choose a numeral to enshrine the name of their country. The Lao coming from South China in the first century to settle in the realm they occupy today, used to refer to their country as Lan Xang Homkhao, i.e. 'A Million Elephants and of the white Parasol [of Sovereignty or Kingship]'. However, French savant Louis Finot
certainly rendered ecstatic by the bliss of Laos could not help rendering the numeral name of Laos as 'la ville des centaines de milliards de Naga' [the town of hundreds of billions of Naga (Pali for 'elephant')].

Focusing first on the meaning of the name, this study will therefore investigate the feedback from neighbouring countries to such a name.

The cousins of the Lao in Chiang Mai (today Northern Thailand) also preferred a numeral Lan Na [A million ricefields] in the title of their settlement while those sheltering in the present-day North-West of Vietnam called their country Sip Song Chao Thai [The twelve Thai princes].

The name Lan Xang was borne by several Laotian kingdoms of the Mekong Valley. It originated from the name given to the progenitor of Lao unity who was enthroned in 1353 under the title of 'Phagna Fah-La-Thorani Sisatanakhanahut' and commonly known as King Fa Ngum. The word Sisatanakhanahut is none other than the Pali name for all stately or religious activities of the Lao vernacular word Lan Xang, while the Lao chroniclers of the Nithan Khun Borom which is the first Lao (or Thai) annal ever recorded, prosaically referred to Muang Lao (the Lao country) for the country, and Thai Lao for the people. The dating of this name of Lan Xang is indirectly confirmed by the Chinese annals in which the name of Lan Xang did not appear before the Ming dynasty, which began in 1368. This name was then integrated into the name referring to the Lao kings as well as to their country. The name of Lan Xang was used until the eighteenth century when the country was divided into four rival principalities and a number of princedoms.

The Lan Xang kingdom at the height of its power encompassed virtually all present-day Laos today populated by 2.5 million and virtually half of north-eastern Thailand now inhabited by more than 20 million Lao, thus stretching over the two shores of the Mekong and including the whole Mekong Basin.

The name of Lan Xang is an enduring one, and up until the 1950s some authors still referred to Laos as the country of Lan Xang Homkhao. This was not only a matter of lingering nostalgia, but also a matter of pride as David K. Wyatt states: the name of Lan Xang Hom Khao 'carried associations of cultural kinship among the Lao people that bridged local isolation and divisions, and it enabled the Lao to maintain their self-respect vis--vis their Vietnamese and Siamese neighbours'. The thirteenth century invasion of Laos by the Vietnamese went wrong, as did the repeated invasions by the Siamese, and both only succeeded in occupying the country (or parts of it) from time to time.

The emotional connotation of the name Lan Xang was echoed in a puzzling way by Laos' neighbours who did not concur necessarily with the Lao on the number 'One million elephants' that the Lao claimed as the name of their country.

The Vietnamese called Lan Xang simply the country of Ten Thousand Elephants, thus scaling down the number from a million, and at the same time removing the symbol of sovereignty or kingship epitomised by the White Parasol which was included in the name. It is arguable that Lao chroniclers also left out any reference to the White Parasol; however, this was not from political malevolence but from carelessness. In reverse, Vietnamese chroniclers used the name Lan Xang in reference to Laos for more than four centuries after its usage had ended, and also clung obstinately to the name Ai Lao until 1786, maintaining that at that time Lan Xang was not used by the Lao themselves. This Vietnamese spelling of the name of Laos may not have been accidental for the Vietnamese had a habit of renaming countries just as the Chinese court did, in an ethnocentric vision of international relations. Upholding the Chinese model, the Vietnamese renamed the Lao principality of Xieng Khouang as Tran-Ninh, the Lao kingdom of Luang Prabang as Nam Chuong and Cambodia as Nam Vang, all names which define the direction of Vietnam as the centre.

The name 'Ten Thousand Elephants' given to the Lao kingdom by Vietnam may not have been an accidental pruning of the numeral from one million to only ten thousand, with the stripping of the White Parasol the symbol of sovereignty or kingship. The Vietnamese took control at least symbolically by assigning different names to neighbouring countries. In contrast, the Burmese court called Laos 'Linzin' or 'Laenzaen', a transliteration of Lan Xang. Once again the numeral was scaled down; the Lao King, Setthathirat the only Southeast Asian monarch not to bend before the Burmese conqueror was known among the Burmese who invaded his realm in the sixteenth century as the one who was the 'Possessor of 100,00 Elephants', and not of one million elephants.

The name Lan Xang was well known to foreigners who lived in Bangkok, such as Jeremias van Vliet who wrote about...
'Langsiangh' in 1647. However, the meaning of the name is still confused and this clouded the report by Western savants as exemplified by Lieutenant-Colonel James Low a fluent Thai-speaking English officer who wrote 'Lanchang signifies "Ten Thousand Elephants"', and on the next page, 'Lanchang or One Million Elephants'. Henry Yule, a British resident in Burma, translated the name as 'A Million of Elephants'.

Whatever the precise number, it seems evident that Laos was a country well-supplied with elephants as reported, for instance, by the British envoy to Siam and Cochin-China, John Crawfurd, and the geographer Elise Reclus. At that time Vietnamese chroniclers also took note of this when they recorded that Laos was a country with plenty of elephants and had provided the court of Hue with 300 elephants. Elephant figures are shown on the oldest identified Lao money. Elephants were the key factor in ancient Southeast Asian military technology and warfare, and may have strongly influenced the Vietnamese court of Hue's move from a policy of non-entanglement towards Laos upheld since the beginning of the Nguyen dynasty to one of interference after Chao Anou's defeat by Siam in 1827. As Alexander B. Woodside pointed out, 'Elephants were the key to military mobility on land in Southeast Asia, as they were not in China. The search for a reliable "elephant market" obsessed Vietnamese military planners. It probably part of the motivation behind Minh-Mang's incursions into Laos and Cambodia in the 1820's and 1830's'.

For Laos, as well as for neighbouring countries, this apparently futile game of renaming Laos was no more than a mere contest of wills and a crude revelation of the very volont de puissance, the crude power game. The intensive de-laoisation of the right and left bank of the Mekong River in the late nineteenth century by Siam suppressing the term 'Lao' saw a conscious shifting in the spelling and meaning of the name of the Lao country of Lan Xang to Laan Xang, 'playground for elephants', seemingly coined by the Siamese High-Commissioner in Luang Prabang. The change was then spread by those in service in Siam, such as H. Warrington Smyth.*

* * *

Some Approaches to the Classification of Small Ethnic Groups in South China*

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The problem of the classification of south Chinese ethnic communities, who still retain close ethnic ties with mainland Southeast Asia, is of great interest, and not only for Chinese ethnographers. The population of south China is fragmented, as in other regions of Southeast Asia, into a large number of ethnic collectivities which belong mostly to the Miao-Yao (Hmong-Mien), Mon-Khmer and Tai-Kadai linguistic groups. In the past thirty years they have passed through many changes, the legacy of which is still quite heavy.

Chinese government has so far acknowledged fifty-five non-Han ethnic minorities which were given the somewhat enviable status of 'minority nationalities' (shao-shu minzu). This number, however, does not comprehensively account for the ethnic diversity of China. Some of the minzu are composed of several tens of different ethnic groups, and there are other ethnic collectivities besides the official nationalities, especially in south China.

The first problem in classifying ethnic collectivities is the categories of ethnic identification. First, there are three aspects to be elucidated: ethnic, national and state China is one of the very few countries in the world that has an official definition of ethnic group or 'nationality' (minzu): it must have common language (gongtong yuyan), residing both historically and at present in a defined, common territory (gongtong diyu), with common economic base (gongtong jingji), sharing blood and tradition, and possessing a common psychological sentiment (gongtong xinli suzhi) expressed in a common culture (gongtong wenhua tedian).

Chinese authors largely use two terms: minzu and shaoshu minzu. Both are political rather than ethnic categories which imply the relationship between the majority Han and so-called non-Han 'nationalities'. This has resulted in fifty-six minzu being recorded in official statistical summaries of the PRC, which means the Han nationality plus fifty-five
'shaoshu minzu'. These minzu were successively confirmed by the State Council of the PRC in 1956-79. But they cannot represent the actual ethnic situation. The classification has been a problem for Chinese ethnographers and is very different from Western classification.

It is clear that both minzu and shaoshu minzu cannot be used for terms of categories of ethnic identification. The former includes various taxonomic levels equivalent to the Western terms such as peoples, peuples, nation, nationality, Volkerschaft etc. Chinese ethnographers have been searching, since the 1930s, for new terms. Thus, such terms as zutuan, zulei, zuti were created, but these terms obviously have never been accepted on a wide scale. Even in Western publications on China such terms as 'minorities', 'ethnic minorities', 'national minorities' or 'minority nationalities' are used, always implying the official fixed number of fifty-five shaoshu minzu. Rarely are the terms 'ethnic group' or 'ethnic minority group' used to express the ethnicity of different 'peoples' in China.

In south China there is a tendency towards greater-group formation and the fusion of smaller ethnic and cultural groups, one of four major trends in the development of south Chinese ethnic groups since 1949. In 1953 more than 400 ethnic names were reported (over 260 of them were from Yunnan), while in 1964 only 183. By 1956, however, the State Council of the PRC had confirmed fifty-one selected 'minority nationalities' as having the status of minzu, and over the next few years another four were confirmed. This created a curious situation. In the 1970s there were only twenty-one minzu living in the province of Yunnan who had 138 ethnic names and 157 ethnic names given to them by neighbouring ethnic groups. Since the 1950s some ethnic names have disappeared or changed: the Minzjia became the Baizu, the Shuijia the Shuizu, the Tu Qinghai ren the Tuzu (Monguor), the Solun and the yakut were incorporated into the Evenki, and the Benglong became the De'ang.

There are many examples of inaccuracy of official 'national minorities': the Yi are made up of groups such as the Sani, Lolo, Asi and many others. The ethnonym Yi was applied, in the late 1950s, to a large number of diverse people living in Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou, and to a small number in Guangxi. This minzu, like other southwestern official 'national minorities' are widely diverse in their language, customs and habits. The Yao illustrate another confused ethnic classification. The Yao are one of the important 'nationalities' of south China; found in more than 130 counties in the provinces of Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou, and Jiangxi.

Table I: Some of the ethnic groups of the Yi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Endonyms (endonyma)</th>
<th>Exonyms (exonyma)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mien</td>
<td>Punu, Lakkia, Kim Mun, Yau Min (or Dzau Min), Byau Min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punu, Lakkia, Kim Mun</td>
<td>Yau Min</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Miao</td>
<td>Black Miao (Hei Miao), Green Miao (Qing Miao), Big and Small Flowery Miao (Da and Xiao Hua Miao)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hmong</td>
<td>Tai L of Xishuangbanna Tai Na of Dehong (or Tai khorn), Simao and partly Sipsongpanna, and other local ethnic groups in Yunnan and Sichuan (e.g. Tai Ke, Tai, Tai, Tai Yorn, Tai Sai, Tai Khaw, Thu Li )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aboriginal people living in Hainan today are known to the Chinese as 'Li' which is the Chinese pronunciation of the native name Lhai. but only some of their groups use that name (or a variant such as Thhai, Dai, Tsai, or T'ai); others call themselves Ha, Gei, Mo:iefau, Hy:i:n, Zi:n. The Li 'language' is really more like a collection of related languages. Also, a number of ethnic collectivities, mostly in Tibet and Yunnan, have not been reliably classified to date, as demonstrated by Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yuehua (another spelling of Lin Yaohua) in their recent essays. In the past decades there were many changes in the ethnic composition of the south China population.

Some of the ethnic groups were unified in greater ethnic collectivities by scientific analysis and according to 'the will of ethnic minorities'. Thus, after 1949 the different ethnic groups of Zhuang, living in Guangxi, Yunnan and Guangdong (Puzhuang, Puthai, Pumang) were unified into one Zhuang 'nationality'.

Also, after 1953 another two ethnic groups (Punung, Pusha) were also incorporated into the Zhuang. Some people of the Han nationality who had migrated into regions inhabited by ethnic minorities in the past, such as Chuanqing ('the black-dressed people') and Chuanlan ('the blue-dressed people') in Guizhou, were not recognized as an independent 'nationality'. There were also so-called 'Pingwu Tibetans' (Pingwu Zangren) on the border between Sichuan and Gansu, Dregu in southeastern Tibet, Sherpa in south Tibet, Kucong in south Yunnan, Khamu in the counties of Mengla...
Muang La) and Jinghong (Chiang Hong) in Sipsongpanna and many other small groups (such as Benren, Kongge, Sanda, Chaodao, Ake, Kalao, Bajia, Buxia, Buguo, Jieduo, Giarung, Xifan) which need further investigation. Sometimes the number of their population reaches several hundred-thousand people, as in the case of Chuanqing and Chuanlan or certain Tai-speaking Ong-be in Hainan.

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see page 9

Table II  Yao Ethnic groups o

the kentung hor luang - before and after

In Newsletter No. 16 Thawi Swangpanyangkoon referred to the destruction of the Khn royal palace by SLORC on 14 April 1992. These photographs, with Acharn Thawi in the foreground, record this act of vandalism. The photograph above was taken in April 1991, the one below on 14 April 1992.

ON SOME CAMBODIAN WORDS44

Serge Thion45

In 1978, Pol Pot wrote in the Black Paper: 'Youn is the name given by Kampuchea's people to the Vietnamese since the epoch of Angkor and it means "savage". The words "Vietnam" and "Vietnamese" are very recent and not often used by Kampuchea's people'.

This is not a futile exercise in semantics. In the spring of 1992, United Nations authorities (UNTAC) realized the Khmer Rouge radio was launching frantic attacks against Vietnamese immigrants. There was the distinct possibility that the Khmers Rouges were trying to spark pogroms to further their political aims. In a letter of 14 August, Mr. Akashi, head of UNTAC, strongly objected to the propagandist use of racist crudities and of the 'derogatory' word yuon. Khieu Samphan, (telegram, 20 Aug.) brushed aside the remark and advised Mr. Akashi 'to do a more complete and more responsible research on the origins of the words yuon and Vietnam'. He added that under Vietnamese occupation, use of the word yuon could be punished by two years jail, which is a pure invention. He then suggested that the UN, by forbidding use of the word, was condoning the Vietnamese supposed 'strategy of Indochinese Federation'. This typical Khmer Rouge paranoia is shared by many non-communist Khmer politicians and intellectuals.

All press commentators, without exception, have asserted that the ordinary name used by Khmers to refer to their neighbors is pejorative. This fits perfectly with the assertion, also repeated a thousand times, of hereditary antagonism that divides them. Not very convinced, I questioned various Cambodians. Apart from the word 'Viet' which is a foreign word (like 'Kazakh' or 'Apache' in English), there is no other word besides 'yuon' in the old Khmer language to refer to the Vietnamese. Moreover, no one finds the word pejorative in itself. It designates in a neutral way - but the connotation obviously reflects sentiments of the speakers towards the Vietnamese.

This view is confirmed by a Khmer writer who cannot be suspected of pro-Khmers Rouges leaning, Mr Hann So, editor of the California based non-partisan bulletin called Sampaajann Khmaer Khmer Conscience. In his Summer 1992 issue (VI, 3), he writes: When the Khmer call the Vietnamese 'yuon', it is not pejorative at all. From one generation to another, the word 'yuon' is the only term known by the Khmer. They were never told of using any other word. For them, 'yuon' means a native of Vietnam. They never knew that it meant something else. The foreign press was the one that raised this issue that a Khmer is not aware of at all. It is the same thing with the use of 'Siam' when speaking of the Thai, or 'Akeang' when referring to the Americans. All these words become so common in parlance that nobody pays attention (p.8).
Nevertheless, it could be of interest to address Mr Samphn's demand and, for the benefit of others, look into the origins of the word. All we know is that the word is quite old. Though I do not know if it is mentioned in the Angkor inscriptions (Cambodia and Vietnam did not have a common border then since Champa was between them), the antiquity of the term can be accepted. It exists in Thai, in Burmese, and in Cham. Edward Schafer, in The Vermilion Bird, writes: 'In a few villages of Binh Thuan in southern Vietnam, no longer in touch with their former Chinese neighbors, are the remnants of the once rich and powerful Chams, now trifling enclaves among the Vietnamese, whom they contemptuously style yu'o'nt that is, Yavana (to use the Sanskrit original), or, ultimately, "Ionians" a term suggesting subnormal, devilish men'.

These inhabitants of Iona, or Ionaka (i.e., Ionia, the oriental Aegean coast of Greece), cropped up abruptly on the borders of the Indus, brought there by Alexander the Great in 326 B.C. The commotion was felt in the rest of the subcontinent, although there was more negotiation than warfare. We know that Alexander finally decided to turn back and return to Babylon, where he soon after died of malaria. These intruders were not your ordinary barbarians; they came with an organized army, a script and a government, not to mention the arts which produced the magnificent Gandara sculptures. Alexander left but the Greeks remained and organized Greek-style kingdoms in what is now Afghanistan and part of Pakistan. These Yona were well known by the Indian rulers and there are several mentions of them in the oldest historical text of India, the Edicts of Ashoka, carved in Pali on rocks and stone pillars (3rd cent. B.C.). Yona came to mean 'foreigners' in Indian usage, or, more precisely, non-Indian foreigners. We also know that the word expanded to Southern India, far from the Northwestern area where Greeks were, for a time, a familiar sight. Indian cultural influence in Indochina mostly came from Southern India.

Louis Frédric's Dictionnaire de la civilisation indienne, does not support Schafer's assertion that Yavanas are devilish. It only says the word applied to all foreigners in Northwest India and mentions a king Yavandhipa in the Mahabharata. It mentions also 'yavani' as a militia of female foreign slaves in charge of policing lords' palaces and harems, until the 16th century, when eunuchs were put in charge.

Transplanted onto the Indochina coast, where they 'civilized' what the Chinese called 'the naked tattooed savages', the pilgrims and merchants from India quickly realized that to the North lay a threat to their trading posts and settlements, the threat of an organized force equipped with an army, a script, a government, a technology, a body of art, etc. The term Yona fitted them like a glove. The first Indianized people, the Mons and the Chams used it.

In Champa, it designated the Chinese colony of Giao Chi before it freed itself to become Vietnam, around the tenth century A.D. We know that the Chinese army made many incursions in response to Cham attacks. In the common cultural flux of Hinduization, the Cambodians most probably borrowed it from the Mons living in what is now the central plain of Thailand and adopted the term which was already detached from the area to which it originally referred. The ignorant writer of the Black Paper, absorbed in his desire to show that the Cambodians have hated the Vietnamese from time immemorial, could certainly not have known that he was repeating a term historically marked by ambiguity, i.e., both admiration and fear, and born out of the clash of two civilizations that were different but equally full of themselves.

But we may go further. The word Ivn (In) seems, in early Antiquity to have meant the whole of Greece, at least before the Ionians moved to the eastern shore of the Aegean sea, from their original abode in the North of the Peloponnesus, according to the tradition. 'Ionian islands' (Corfu, etc.) are on the west of continental Greece (Hellad). Greek traditions, that modern historians see no reason to reject, says that Ionians (the supposed descendants of a common ancestor called In) lived in the North of Peloponnesus peninsula, then moved to Attica, where the city of Athens was to rise, and finally crossed the sea to establish twelve new cities, which rose to fame because of their trade and the birth of philosophy. Other Mediterranean people then took the habit to call the Greek-speaking people 'ionians'. Persians called Greece Yauna and Hebrews Yawan (sometimes written Ja'van, cf. Gen., X, 2). In the Bible, Yawn is expanded to include all Greek-speaking populations, and even all the pagan people (Dan, 8, 21 10, 20 Zac, 9, 13). In other Semitic languages, our same word is present, usually in plural form, yonanawi, as in Arabic, Syriac (Aramean) and Ge'ez, the Ethiopian Church's language (see Dillman's Lexikon, col. 1 422).

This has gone on to this day since the Turks, though they chased the Greeks from Ionia in 1922, after the Greco-Turkish war, still call Greece (without Ionia) Yunanistan. In a further irony, the old Greek legends (see Strabo, 383)
attributes to In, the eponymous ancestor of the Ionians, the utopian division of society in four classes, the fourth of which is made of ‘guardians’ (phylakes), of which Pol Pot offered an impressive realization.

As a matter of reciprocity, the Greeks of Alexander the Great borrowed from the Persians the name of the river (and province) which stood at the Eastern border of the Persian Empire. They thus named Hindu (Persian pronunciation) what the Indians called Sindhu (The river Indus), or Hind, and later India, what is still locally known as Sindh. But of course Indians never called themselves that way, except under British influence. It took 25 centuries to convince the Indians that Alexander knew better how they should be called...

In order to give Khieu Samphn a complete reply, it should be added that the word 'Vit' is an old Chinese word meaning, at the beginning of Chinese history, 'beyond', used to name the tribes living 'beyond, across the Yang Tse Kiang', probably first the fishing communities living in what is now the area of Shanghai, and later along the coast of Fukien. Tradition says that some of these tribes later migrated to Tonkin. The local populations, before the advent of Chinese colonization, 2000 years ago, were known as Au-Lac, again Chinese words. 'Nam' is the Chinese nan, the South. But the original meaning of the word has long been forgotten and 'Vit' is now understood by the Vits themselves as the name of the people. In the olden times, they often used the word kinh, which means the capital, the seat of power, and hence the subjects of this power. (This is the same word as in Peking, Nanking, Japanese kyo, as in Tokyo.)

But the fact is that the word 'Vit' is now part and parcel of the Khmer vocabulary and may be used as a normal ethnonym. Khmers generally ignore that the word yuon just meant 'foreigner'. It is only because of recent history that this word is now tainted with anguish and despised. The defense of Khieu Samphn is not innocent and any propaganda based on hatred is sure to produce results which may be catastrophe to everybody.

Yona Art

We tried to explain the origins of the word yuon. The word has been borrowed by several cultures of mainland Southeast Asia from India, where it designated the Greeks of antiquity, Yona, meaning 'Ionia', a region of Greece, on the Asian side of the Mediterranean sea. The name of a part had become the name of the whole, as is often the case.

The Greeks came directly in contact with India after Alexander the Great had subdued the powerful Empire of Persia in 331 B.C., that is 2323 years ago. The political and military genius of Alexander was his capacity to blend Greek and Oriental (Persian) ideas, people, soldiers. His enterprise lasted for centuries after him precisely because of this capacity to mix and merge together ideas coming from several traditions.

One of the most interesting results is, under the influence of the Indian King Ashoka, the spread of Buddhism in the Greco-Persian kingdoms neighboring India. Ashoka had a systematic policy of sending missionaries. He had held the third Buddhist Council and wanted to expand Buddhism in the West of India. In what is now the valleys of Afghanistan, Buddhist preachers were well accepted. But local converts, deeply impressed by Greek culture and art, started to do something entirely new in the realm of Buddhism: they created statues. A mixture of Greek and Indian aesthetic rules produced what is now called the Gandhara art which flowed back to India, creating a tradition of carving Buddha images and a set of conventions by which it could be recognized. These conventions later spread across the whole Buddhist world, to China and Japan in one direction, and to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia in another. Now, Buddhist devotees praying in front of a Buddha image in a pagoda should have a grateful thought for those yuon, meaning ancient Greeks, who provided them with this graceful embodiment of their faith.

The words Kambuja, Khmer, Champa

An old tradition explains the word Kambuja as the country of a venerable sage called Kambu, who is supposed to be the originator (mula) of the Khmer royal race. This is written in the Baksei Chamkrong inscription, dated 947 A.D. Descendants of Kambu were supposed to unite a 'solar' race and a 'lunar' one, maybe a coded way to describe the ruling families of Chen La and Fou Nan, two Hinduized kingdoms occupying, at the beginning of our era, the lower course of the Mekong. The story is obviously related to the need of legitimacy of the kings of what was, at the time of the inscription, Kambuja, which was the successor state after the disappearance of both Chan La and Fou Nan.
Kambu is given as a descendant of the founders of Fou Nan, an Indian brahmin called Kaundinya and the daughter of the king of the Ngas (water spirits with snake bodies), a quite interesting union indeed. The trouble for the Khmer story is that it also appears in Cham inscriptions. It seems to be a local adaptation of an Indian legend, given as explaining the obviously mythological origins of the powerful Pallava dynasty of South India (3rd-9th centuries). But Cds thought this legend was created before the first century A.D., at the beginning of Indianization. The myth was maybe an explanation of it.

There is nothing to support the existence of a historical character called Kambu, a word which does not look very Khmer either. The myth should be overturned. From the name Kambuja, the name of a man Kambu was invented. At the time countries were often called by the name, or the title, of the rulers. Hence the need to give a meaning to the word Kambuja that Khmers could not understand, thus providing a political etymology.

But no Kambu is known in Indian literature whereas Kambuja or Kamboja are well attested, and a long time before Indians set foot on the shores of Indochina (an area which was neither Indian nor Chinese before the second or the first centuries B.C.).

Kambuja is not a Khmer word but it obviously comes from Sanskrit. In fact Khmers do not use this word very much in a casual, non-political way. They rather speak of 'srok khmer', the land, the territory inhabited by Khmers. The Arab navigators who sailed in this area a long time ago used to call the country Kumar, an obvious rendering of Khmer and not of Kambuja.

As for the word Khmer, there is no certain origin. Another Mon-Khmer speaking people, living in Northern Laos in an area quite close to that of the ancestors of the Khmers, call themselves the Khmu, which means 'the men'. It is quite possible, but not proven that, the Khmer also means 'the men'. On the other hand, Kambuja is the name of a people known in Indian texts, for instance in the Edicts of Ashoka (3rd century B.C.). Curiously enough, it seems to belong to the same area as the Yona. The fifth Rock Edict mentions them together. The king says he is sending his emissaries of the Law (dhammamahamatta) to 'yona kamboja ghandaranam...' French Indianist Alfred Foucher said that the Kohistan, a mountainous area near Kabul might be the land of the Kambojas, of which we know very little, except that they were more Iranian than Indian and raised fine horses. It seems from some inscriptions that they were a royal clan of the Sakas better known under the Greek name of Scyths.

Historians tend to believe Kambojas were in fact an Iranian tribe. (Old Iranian and old Sanskrit are very close languages. All these people called themselves Aryan, from which comes the name Iran). Panini, the Indian genius of grammar, observed that the word kamboja meant at the same time the tribe and its king. Later historians identified the same word in the name of several great Persian kings, Cambyse (Greek version) or Kambujiy (in Persian). Cambyse the Second is famous for his conquest of Egypt (525 B.C.) and the havoc he wrought upon this country.

It seems, ironically enough, that Yonas and Kambujas lived quite close to each other in the Kabul area, (although some authors would place them further north in Kashmir) in a cold mountainous country, using furs and wool garments, living, as a lot of Afghans still do, from agriculture, horse trading and the manufacture of weapons.

But, seen from the point of view of the orthodox brahmans, these people did not act in a proper manner. The Buddha himself is reported as saying that among the Yonas and Kambojas there was no caste, or only two, masters and slaves. Slaves could become masters and vice versa, which was anathema to the Indian social thought of the time. And the Jataka say the Kambojas have savage and horrible customs. La Valle Poussin concludes from what Panini says: 'These are people who do not observe the laws regulating food and marriage'. Panini also says Kambojas and Yonas shave their heads, which seems a bit odd. But who knows the fashions of the time?

It would be proper here add to our file the word Champa. This is not a local, Indonesian word but an Indian one. It is the name of the central city of an important tribe (samgha, which means clan, before it designates the religious community), in the country of the Angas whose name has become Bengal. Champa is today in the vicinity of Bhagalpur, on the Ganges, downstream from Patna. Bengal, at the time, and even now, is the most Eastern terminal point in the Aryan push, the cultural process of transforming local populations into Brahmanical (or Buddhist) societies. Assam and the Northeastern part of India is only half Indianized even today. There has been an obviously strong resistance to the cultural change brought by the Vedic invaders coming from the west or northwest.
Georges Maspero, at the beginning of his book on the Kingdom of Champa, reckons the Sanskrit origin of the word and notes its use in Sanskrit for a tree and its strongly scented white flowers (Michelia Champaca L.). The old Chinese chronicles transcribe the name as Tchan(-tcheng). But less known is that the Chinese also used the word in connexion with a Mekong valley chieftdom which fell under Mongol domination for sometime. And Tatsuo Hochino reports of a tradition according to which Laos was once called Champa Lao. We know, in Southern Laos, a town called Champasak, but there is no reason to believe that coastal Champa ever ruled these areas. Conclusion would then be that the word Champa, borrowed from Bengal, has been applied to several regions at different times. There was also a Yonaka in Northern Thailand, and Michael Vickery in his thesis has shown that 'Kamboja' has been used by the Burmese and the Thai chronicles to name regions which were not at all in the Khmer realm (p. 375).

So why were all these words used in reference to existing populations of the Subcontinent transported to Indochina? The most likely explanation is that, when Indians came into contact with local populations, the brahmans or the traders retrieved from their geographical memories names of populations (whose real name they probably ignored) which, in their view were similarly marginal and remote. All these people only partially, if at all, observed the brahmanical rules which, in the Indian view, were the most desirable. Local people had no castes, did not observe proper food prohibitions, had different rules for marriage. Under Indian influence, their elite adopted these rules, so they would not be treated as 'dasyu', or savages, like some groups in India who resisted and refused the new social model. If somehow Champa meant 'half-Hinduized', Kamboja 'casteless' and Yona 'non-Hindu foreigner', then these verbal categories could fit the situation Indians were encountering when they mixed with the local Southeast Asian rulers and reorganized the political and economic structures. Early Hindu settlers were using their own mental categories and imposing them on the natives as we see from the documents. It is then not astonishing that they also imposed the names of these new entities, if only because Sanskrit was the vehicle of this cultural transformation. These words had no ethnic content but were, with all due qualifications, political. They said something, which is unfortunately not very clear to us, from the point of view of classical Indian culture.

But we also see that somehow the local population maintained its own language, traditions and even its own (popular) religion. Neither the Chams nor the Khmers have become proper Indians. But they have accepted Indian names, forgetting in the process the alien origin of these words and using these new concepts to name new political entities.

The word Barang

In Cambodia, Westerners are usually called barang. Some understand this word as meaning, specifically, 'French', but it actually means a foreigner with a European complexion. Khmers have a local adaptation, fransay when they want to be more specific.

The word is not Khmer. It has a long history. First of all, the word may be found in several unconnected languages in the area. The Thais say farang (or sometimes falang) while the Khmers say barang. It is because there is no F sound in the Khmer language, and B is a tentative rendering of F. In Vietnamese, where Westerners are usually called tay (which means West), the word pha-rang or pha-lang-xa is also known, if fallen into disuse. It was probably a mixed attempt to blend farang and franais. At the time of the Nguyn dynasty (19th century), the word for Europe was usually Hoa-lang, 'being a Vietnamization of the Siamese word for white men, farang'.

Vietnamese as well as Chinese speakers tried to make the best out of this sound FA, which they heard from foreign travellers, and which seemed to concern the French, who used the sound FRA (as in France) to refer to themselves. But this is an impossible sound in Chinese or Vietnamese. FA instead was available, but already had a meaning: 'law, justice'. And in order to write a sound, the ideographic writing uses a word with approximately the same sound. Then France was written fa-guo in Chinese and phap-quoc in Vietnamese, meaning in a double sense, France or 'country of law, or justice'. The French colonial enterprise took stock of it. Let's only add that the Vietnamese pronunciation is quite close to the ancient way of pronouncing Chinese that one hears today in Cantonese, which is more conservative than the Mandarin (northern) pronunciation.

But nothing of the sort occurred in Khmer. The word was new, acquired from the Muslim traders coming from Malaysia, India and the Gulf region. The Malays who probably got the word earlier have no sound F. Unlike the
Khmers who rendered F with B, they used P. And when hearing Arab seafarers say 'frandji', they uttered perantjis. This is still the word for French.

It is clear now that barang is just one form of a word which has been adapted from India - where it is also found with several spellings - to China, borrowed from the Muslim, often Arab, traders known in Asia for many centuries. They circulated along the shores of Africa and India the word farandji to name the people from Europe, to distinguish them from the Rumi (Romans), in fact the Greeks from Byzance, successor to Rome. It means 'Franks' and was the word the Crusaders used for themselves. They had established a 'frankish' kingdom in Jerusalem which had lasted about one century (1099-1187. The last stronghold, Acre, fell in 1291). Some Christian Arab families have taken the word as a name, for instance, a president of Lebanon was called Suleiman Frandi. The word has travelled since, from Arabic faranji, it has spread to Ethiopia, on the way to India 'Ferendj, faranj, farangi is the usual word in the Ge'ez [medieval] chronicles used to name the Europeans'.

The first Crusades were led by the kings and the military aristocracy of northern Europe, mostly Germans, Flemish, British, French and Normans. In this vast area, the word 'Frank' had a long political history. The Franks, when we hear of them in the earliest historical records are a group of unorganized Germanic tribes living in the West of the Rhine. (This record call them Pranci, but later Franci prevailed). They started to cross the Rhine in the third century A.D. They controlled an important ford to which their name is still attached (Frankfurt). During the 5th century, the Salian Franks expanded and taking advantage of the growing weakness of the Roman empire, they established Frankish kingdoms in the North of France, Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. They were warriors, spoke their own Germanic language and had their own laws. In the following centuries, they expanded their area of control over most of Northern Europe, destroying in the process other Germanic kingdoms. They inherited the title of Emperor in the ninth century. The name Francia was given to the North of France where the most important Frankish kingdom was established.

In the process, they had become Christian and more and more assimilated to the Roman culture. Some maintained their Germanic language, but others started to speak 'Roman'. The word 'Frank' meant began to mean less a tribal origin and more the common membership of a class of warriors who had become large landowners by right of conquest. At the time of the Crusades, it was still used as a political word encompassing a great number of these new States, born out of the disappearance of the Roman empire. Many French kings have their name as Louis, an evolution of the Germanic name Hludwig, or, as the chronicles said, Clovis, considered as the first French king (around 486 A.D.). On the other hand, Francia, at first a small part of Northern Roman Gaul, expanded southward and their inhabitants were called 'Franais', although very few of them had Germanic ancestry. They spoke a rather rotten form of Latin, called 'Roman', and later 'French'.

So, to put it in a nutshell, when Thais say farang or Khmers say barang, they unwittingly use the name of a bunch of tribes who used to live in central Germany about 2000 years ago, a word of which nobody knows the original meaning. It is lost in the dark forests of the past. It has been said that the word originally meant 'free' (Thais also entertain the myth that the word Thai means 'free', a pure invention). An earlier source (Historia Francorum) says in 660 A.D. that it means 'ferocious' but both are late mythological rationalizations. It has meant 'free' much later, because of the privileges of power. Is not the history of words sometimes strange?

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Review

Mother of Writing: The Origin and Development of a Hmong Messianic Script


Smalley, Vang, and Yang's Mother of Writing concerns all aspects of the development of a native writing system for the Hmong of northern Southeast Asia, a people without a standard writing system, the majority of whom have been illiterate in their own or any other language. The native writing system, Pahawh Hmong, was invented by an illiterate peasant in Laos, Shong Lue Yang, who claimed to have been divinely inspired. Those who use his script generally believe that Shong Lue did have supernatural powers, and was an incarnation of one of the twelve sons of God. To them, he was more than an intellect; he had wisdom about the condition and insight into the future of the Hmong people, and was treated by his followers as a prophet.

The book includes a description of the phonology of Hmong and the Pahawh Hmong 'code', an analysis of the system in terms of its developing linguistic sophistication and efficiency through four stages, the historical events surrounding its creator (both mythical and prosaic), an analysis of the cultural and political setting in which it arose, an account of the struggle to preserve and disseminate the script after Shong Lue was assassinated, a survey of its current use (the extent to which it is used, who its users are and what their attitudes are toward this script and others), a discussion of the place of Pahawh Hmong in the context of the development of writing systems world-wide, and finally, some reactions to the script and to the movement it represents by influential non-believers, academicians and others, most notably by Smalley himself.
As Smalley discusses in detail in Chapter 10, writing systems have been invented only a handful of times in all history; some argue no more than once. Most modern writing systems can be traced to the Sumerian script. Writing was apparently also invented independently by the Chinese. In addition, however, there are a few, relatively poorly documented reports of writing systems invented by illiterate people. This book certainly represents the best existing documentation of such a rare accomplishment. One of the reasons for the quality of the documentation is that the book deals with very recent history: the script in its first form was developed in 1959 and Shong Lue Yang was assassinated in 1971. Moreover, as Smalley repeatedly points out, Pahawh Hmong is unique among those special few writing inventions: it is an alphabetic script. The ability to perceive and represent sounds smaller than the syllable has long been held to be beyond the capability of uneducated, illiterate people by both historians of culture and writing and psycholinguists interested in phonological awareness. But even the first version of Shong Lue's script accounted for all and only the phonemic contrasts in the language and had a systematic way of representing initial consonants on the one hand and vowel-tone complexes, in a manner sensitive to the independence of the two, on the other. Through the four stages of development of Pahawh Hmong, Shong Lue progressively reduced the number of symbols to be learned (without sacrificing complete phonemic representation) and moved toward greater and greater systematicity.

With the exception of another book by the same three authors which tells the history of the script in triplicate - in English, Pahawh Hmong, and the romanized Hmong, there is no other reliable source on this fascinating phenomenon. As Smalley points out, the one article that exists on the script and the one article by an academic that mentions it are both based on faulty data. Smalley has been careful to pin down historical details about the development of the script and the demographics of its present use in as many ways as he can - largely, he explains, to make it easier for Westerners, including himself, to come to terms with the fantastic and supernatural elements of the mythic history. The story of the origin of the script is supplied by Shong Lue's primary disciple, Chia Koua Vang, to whom Shong Lue entrusted the future of his script, and another important supporter of the movement, Gnia Yee Yang. The Hmong co-authors give the book an authority that a product exclusively from the ivory tower could never have. Smalley, however, is the obvious person to assemble and analyze this material: his work on Southeast Asian languages and linguistics is well known and highly respected. In Laos in the 1950s, he provided the linguistic analysis that led to the development of the most widely used Hmong script, the Romanized Popular Alphabet.

There is more to be said about Smalley's qualifications as the appropriate person to present this story to the West, however. An interesting sub-text in this book is explicitly addressed in the last chapter. Smalley is a Protestant missionary whose life is based on his belief in the mythic history of another prophet in another culture, also a champion of the poor and dispossessed, a 'son of God', destined to be feared, misunderstood, and martyred. How is a man in his position to understand Shong Lue Yang's life and accomplishment? This is Smalley's challenge: and he attempts to do so with exemplary sensitivity, humility, and honesty. The book is both important and beautifully written.

Martha Ratcliff
Wayne State University.

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THE WEISS COLLECTION

Thomas O. HIlmann
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On 10 June 1914 two boxes arrived at the Royal Ethnographic Museum (Knigliches Ethnographisches Museum ) in Munich which (according to the bill of lading) contained 'exhibition items' from China. The sender was the diplomat Fritz Weiss (Wei) who had become Consul for the province of Sichuan three years earlier. In 1900, at the age of 23, he arrived in China as a candidate for the post of interpreter and had, since, been living in the Middle Kingdom without lengthy absences. Apart from some Chinese objects (mainly shadow-play figures) and Tibetan wall hangings, the
consignment contained an extensive 'Lolo collection' consisting of approximately fifty items for which the Director of
the Museum, Lucian Scherman, expressed his immediate appreciation

Dear Consul, I would like to advise you that your collection has just arrived. The contents, however, do not correspond
in every detail with the inventory of 46 items you sent but I am sure, you will have no difficulties in providing the
necessary clarification. I also note that the two pipes and the bamboo flute are included. The textiles are quite musty as
are the scrolls enclosed. We shall try to dry the items to eliminate the smell and will take the necessary steps to see
they are conserved ... I thank you most kindly for the consignment and hope to receive news from you soon which
would allow me to make permanent provision for your collection. The last sentence particularly addresses the property
rights which were unclear at that time. Three years earlier Fritz Weiss had sent a 'Lolo collection' of similar items to
the Museum of Anthropology (Museum fr Vlkerkunde) in Berlin. For that the Commission of Experts approved 1,500
Marks. Weiss hoped that Munich would give him a similar amount or, perhaps, some other form of 'remuneration'.
Already in September 1913 Scherman, in reply to a query on this subject, had mentioned the Museum's 'extremely
restricted budget' but at the same time declares his readiness to inform the relevant Ministry and, possibly, also the
Royal Academy of Sciences (Knigliche Bayrische Akademie der Wissenschaften) of your efforts in furthering the
scientific endeavours of our Institute. This remark was interpreted by Weiss not without a sense of reality as his reply
dated 1 November shows

Frankly, I am rather reluctant to part with the collection; almost every piece is a reminder of the time of its acquisition
which in the years to come I would not want to do without. If, however, adding to your collection through my
assistance is of such value to your Institute, the budget, however, being so restricted, I would perhaps be prepared,
considering that Prussia has its 'Lolo collection', to give my 'Lolo collection' free of charge to the Royal Museum in
Bavaria thus contributing to the comprehensiveness of its collection. Because of the not inconsiderable value of the
items which hold a particular significance for me through the personal risk involved in their acquisition with which
you certainly will be familiar, I would expect with certainty that the Crown in Bavaria will show its appreciation in the
usual way, an indication of which I was able to discern from your letter. To be quite frank with you, I do not consider
as satisfactory equivalent some class of the Order of Merit of St. Michael (Verdienstorden v. Hlg. Michael) which is
probably given to benefactors on such occasions; far more would I value a form of recognition which contained a
personal communication. Whether this should be the Maximilian Order of Science and Arts (Maximiliansorden fr
Wissenschaft und Kunst) or a class of the Order of Merit of the Bavarian Crown (Verdienstorden der Bayrischen
Krone), you will surely be in a better position to judge being in propria persona. Perhaps you would be kind enough to
enlighten me on the procedure. The explanation was given immediately. In a letter of 9 December marked 'highly
confidential' the grades of the Orders were set out. Scherman who had been elected Extraordinary Member of the
Academy in 1912 concluded in the following way

In my opinion your interest (in being given personal recognition) would be best served if you received a medal of the
Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences. Here, your name would be engraved with the addition bene merenti. This is a
far more personal recognition than any other Order as well as carrying a more scientific status. I would undertake the
necessary steps in this matter if I had your prior agreement. On 17 January 1914, immediately after receipt of this
letter, Weiss agreed 'in principle' with Scherman's proposal, but asked for further information about the grades of the
Order as well as the names of 'persons to whom these have recently been awarded.' The letter closed with the cautious
remark

Because of the finality of the transfer of my collection to become the property of the Museum I would like to ask you
to accept the collection for the time being, as a LOAN, though I have no doubt that an agreement, on the lines you
have proposed, could be reached without difficulty. More than a year had passed after the Museum received the
collection before Fritz Weiss - together with Leo Frobenius - received the medal. In the composition of the Document
of Award of 31 August 1915, Lucian Scherman, who in the previous year had been promoted to Ordinary Member of
the Academy, expressed the desire for further gifts

According to the report of the Royal Ethnographic Museum you have presented to this Institute a 'Lolo collection'
which is valued as an ethnographic rarity; the Museum also considers acquisitions of this kind part of its special
obligation to contribute to the understanding of Indo-Chinese culture. We, therefore, are greatly appreciative of your
knowledge of Chinese culture which has been made available for use by the Ethnographic Museum in Munich. As the
previously mentioned report particularly stresses, your collection of items from areas of China's aboriginal people on behalf of the Royal Ethnographic Museum is to continue. Moreover, a series of detailed explanatory notes on shadow-play figures from China are to be included in your donations. The Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences has, therefore, decided to award you the great silver medal Bene Merenti in recognition of your services. Thus the 'Lolo collection' became the property of the Museum after more than two years of negotiations. We know far less about the exact ethnographic provenance of the objects than we know about the various activities which preceded the acquisition by the Museum. Though Weiss in his letters emphasizes (on several occasions) the great personal risk to which he was exposed during his expeditions to the country of the Lolo (now officially classified as Yi by the Chinese government), he does not mention where and in what circumstances the objects he sent to Munich were obtained. Though we know that before 1914 he reached the vicinity of Liangshan on several occasions - as well as the areas of Ningyuan and that between Mabian and Ebian - his reports, however, do not allow an exact geographic, or rather, ethnographic identification of the various objects in the collection; a number of objects listed in his first offer (of 24 July 1913) were probably not obtained in their places of origin but were bought from Chinese dealers:

1.2 Two black lacquered saddles with wooden stirrups for toes only (1 tailstrap) [14.55.12; 14.55.13]
3.4 Two buffalo-hide shields, yellow/red lacquered pattern [14.55.1; 14.55.2]
5. War helmet of woven reeds [14.55.29]
6. War helmet with ear guards, thick felt leather [14.55.37]
7.8.9 Three large armlets black lacquered leather [14.55.37]
10.11 Two small armlets
12.13.14 Three quivers, one containing poisoned arrows [14.55.9; 14.55.10]
15. One bamboo bow with bamboo string for the manufacture of felt [14.55.15]
16. One blue coat, poncho [14.55.31]
17. One white/grey coat, poncho [14.55.30]
18. Lolo woman's cap
19.20 Two women's skirts, pleated, coloured [14.55.32; 14.55.33]
21.22 Two women'scollars with silver embroidery [14.55.21; 14.55.22]
23. One small bag with cross stitch embroidery and fringe [14.55.34]
24. One chain for hanging over the ear
28. One small leather satchel [14.55.35]
29. Spindle [14.55.20]
30. One Jew's harp [14.55.19]
31. Wine container
32.33.34.35.36.37 Three large drinking cups, 3 drinking cups. Wood or leather, painted [14.55.23; 14.55.24; 14.55.25; 14.55.2; 14.55.27; 14.55.28]
38.39.40 Three spoons painted [14.55.16; 14.55.17; 14.55.189]
41. Sword and scabbard [14.55.11]
42. Powder horn
43. One leather sack
44.45 Two leather suits of armour, breast and abdomen guards [14.55.3; 14.55.4]
46. One suit of chain mail, breast and rear guards [14.55.8]

Prior to the dispatch several objects were added to the collection including '2 pipes and bamboo flute' mentioned in Scherman's letter of appreciation. However, today some of the objects in the 1914 inventory are no longer in the Museum.

Apart from the 'collection for exhibition', an extensive collection of mineral samples as well as a series of photos reached Germany. 'More than 30 cylinders of song and speech recordings ... of the Lolo' were sent to Erich Moritz von Hornbostel in Berlin. Parts of this material were published decades later by Kurt Reinhard.

When Fritz Weiss wrote to Lucian Scherman in 1913 that the 'Berlin Collection' bought by him in 1911 'would have been for a considerable time the only one in Germany and perhaps Europe', his statement was not totally correct. Already in 1906 the Hamburg Museum of Anthropology (Hamburgisches Museum fr Vlkerkunde) had received from J.F.G. Umlauff forty 'Lolo objects'. A considerably smaller collection was collected by Heinrich Handel-Mazzetti in Ningyuan in 1914; it became the property of the anthropology-ethnography section of the Natural History Museum (Naturhistorisches Museum) in Vienna.

[Note: The Wei Collection is kept in the Staatliches Museum fr Vlkerkunde, Maximilianstr. 42, D-8000 Mnchen 40, Germany. This article is translated by Margret Wijeyewardene from Thomas O. Hillmann (ed.) Ein Volksstamm von ungmetlicher Selbstndigkeit: Die Yi (Sdwestchina) und ihre materielle Kultur dargestellt anhand der Sammlung Fritz Wei im Staatlichen Museum fr Vlkerkunde in Mnchen. Fonticuli 2, Berlin (Quest): 1991.]
News and Correspondence

Steve Van Beek (Amara Court C-6, 645/44-51 Petchburi Road, Bangkok 10400. Fax (662) 255-3746) writes:

'I have recently come across your Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter and am impressed by its breadth and depth

'I would also request your help. I am writing a book on the Chao Phraya River system and its role in the development of Thailand. I am seeking any studies which may have been done on the river or the riverine commerce or life by any Australian scholars. I am particularly interested in finding answers to two simple questions: a) From whence did the names of the four tributaries - Ping, Wang, Yom, Nan - derive, and b) what was the Chao Phraya called before it acquired its present, polysyllabic name?

'My research has taken me several routes. The main line was triggered by Jit Phumisak's assertion that "Sayam" derives from a rootword translated as "people of the river" and that when early Tais migrated towards Cambodia, they were referred to as people who came from a particular river. Taking this backwards to assume that early migrants from the Shan States into northern Thailand might have done the same thing, I have been poring over Shan State maps and texts. I have found towns named "Ping", "Taeng" (a Ping tributary) and "Kha" (a Yom tributary) and a river named "Pang" which, given the penchant for dropping vowels and the difference in Shan and northern Thai methods of rendering words and pronunciations, might be stretched to become "Ping". I am searching for more detailed maps of Burma in the hopes of pinpointing enough coincidences of name similarities to conjecture a connection but am wondering if anyone at ANU or other Australian universities might be able to provide me with any leads.

"Chao Phraya" is obviously a name used from Ayutthayan times but as the river area has probably, been inhabited for the past 6,000 years and since it received foreign visitors, are there any ancient texts in which rivers and placenames in Siam are mentioned?'

* * *

Thai electronic encyclopedias

Thawi Sawangpanyangkoon

On the occasion of the 60th birthday of Her Majesty the Queen, the Siam Commercial Bank has offered a grant of 40 million baht to four committees of local scholars of the northern, central, northeastern and southern regions of Thailand to compile four local cultural encyclopedias. The whole project is to be called the Thai Cultural Encyclopedia and Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn has graciously accepted the presidency of the advisory board. Work will be done on the project over the next four years and will be published both in printed form and on disks for personal computers. The project was initiated by Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda, former president of the bank and currently Finance Minister, and Dr Olarn Chaipravat and Bannawit Bunyarat. On the academic side Dr Prasert Na Nagara leads the administrative council with Nagara Phongnoi as Vice-President. Each encyclopedia will be made up of fifteen to twenty volumes. More than a thousand scholars will be associated with the project. The bank will supply on-line computers to the working committees for convenient exchange of data. The editors-in-chief are Professor Udom Rungruangrsi (north), Professor Prakhong Nimmanahaeminda (central) Professor Thawat Pannothon (northeast) and Professor Suwthiwongse Phongphaibun (south). Day to day management will be in charge of Anchalipan Amornvivat and Saroch Indragajita of the business promotion office of the Siam Commercial Bank.

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The seminar conducted by the Thai-Yunnan Project on 'Contemporary developments on Burma's borders' on 21 November 1992 (see Newsletter No. 19) has been well received and this has encouraged us to propose a broader conference on 'Southeast Asian borders' tentatively scheduled for 29-30 October 1993. It is planned to have expert
Southeast Asian participation. We also expect considerable participation from other departments in the Research School of Pacific Studies and the Faculty of Arts. We welcome expressions of interest, suggestions and comments from our readers.

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Le groupe d'études et de recherches sur l'Asie contemporaine, Université Laval, announces two publications in the series Documents du Grac

Dominique Bureau Répertoire des thèses, mémoires et essais: réalisés dans les universités québécoises et portant sur l'Asie.


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The Lund University Programme for East and Southeast Asian Studies announces the construction of a database on research on the region. For inclusion contact:

Boel Billgren
International Office, Lund University
Box 117, S-221 00 Lund, Sweden.

* 

Professor Colin Mackerras, Griffith University, has proposed a panel on indigenous peoples of Southeastern Asia at the Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia to be held at Murdoch University, Western Australia 14-17 July 1994. The panel will cover the region of the Thai-Yunnan Project. The Newsletter will carry information on the progress of the proposal.

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5th International Conference on Thai Studies, see page 9.

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This issue of the Newsletter is edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene. Scott Bamber will resume editorship with the June issue. Correspondence may be sent either to him at CHRTU, University of Western Australia or to Gehan Wijeyewardene, Department of Anthropology, RSPacS, ANU, Canberra ACT 0200. Please note new ANU address.

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3 At present the limits of possession is 25 tolas, but the Government is in process of reducing the limit to 3 tolas.


11 Hamilton, Francis (1820). 'An account of a map of the countries subject to the king of Ava, drawn by a slave of the king's eldest son'. The Edinburgh Philosophical Journal (Edinburgh), vol. 2, no. 4, April, pp.262-271.


16 Crawfurd, John (1830). Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin-China. London: Colbuin and Bentley, pp.429-430.


* Editor's note. The theme of this paper has wider application in the region. One should note that the term 'Lao' was used by the Siamese for the people of Chiang Mai and north Thailand, who, it appears, called themselves 'Khon Mang'. The 'playground for elephants' phenomenon also appeared in north Thailand. Central Thai wrote the name, Lanna, with a mid tone on the first syllable - meaning 'field'

* This paper was read at the IXth Congress of the EACS (Paris, September 13-17, 1992).

I am grateful to the EACS, and especially to Mme Alleton who has arranged a subvention for me, enabling my participation in the Congress.


24 After a first period of recognition of 'minority nationalities', the establishment of autonomous structures, and democratic and agrarian reforms, they were submitted to the ultra-leftist experiences which aimed at erasing their ethnic and cultural differences. Now the autonomous structures have been restored and free markets have opened everywhere. See LEMOINE, Jacques 'Ethnicity, culture and development among some minorities of the People's Republic of China'. In TAPP, N., CHAIO, Chien, op. cit., pp.1-2; LiO(s),O(c),k, Vladimr 'Ethnic situation in China with a special respect to south China (some statistical data)'. Archiv orientln, vol. 60, 1992, no. 3, pp.251-268.


26 In 1956 the State Council announced fifty-one minority nationalities, during the next year the primi, Monba, Lhoba and Jino were confirmed as minzu. For details see my above mentioned article 'Ethnic situation ...'.

27 This term was first used by Wang Tong-hui, wife of well-known Chinese ethnographer and sociologist Fei Xiaotong. See WANG Tonghui, FEI Xiaotong (eds) Hualan Yao shehui zuzhi [Social organization among the Hualan Yao]. Shanghai 1936.


32 The 1990 census identifies the Yi 'nationality' as the 7th largest minzu in China, with 6,572,200. See also my above mentioned paper, p.256.


35 The 1982 census gives 863,809 in Guangxi, 282,877 in Hunan, 147,147 in Yunnan, 95,779 in Guangong and 19,398 in Guizhou. In 1990 they numbered 2,134,013. There are scattered groups of Yao in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, and recently in Europe and N. America. LIU Yaoquan, HU Qiwan 'Survey of the Yao studies in China (1949-84)'. In LEMOINE, Jacques, CHIAO Chien (eds), op. cit., p.507; LiO(s,)O(c,)k, Vladimir, op. cit. p.259.


37 The most widely used languages among the Yao people are Mien (with the dialects Kim Mun, Byau Min and Yau Min), Lu Mien which belongs to the Yao (Mien) branch of the Miao-Yao (Hmong-Mien) linguistic group; Punu of the Maio (Hmong) branch of the same linguistic group; and Lakkia which is part of the Dong-Shui (Kam-Sui) branch of the Zhuang-Dong (or Tai) linguistic group See FEI Xiaotong 'Fifty years investigation in the Yao Mountains". In LEMOINE, Jacques and CHIAO Chien (eds), op. cit. pp. 20-24; LIU Yaoquan, HU Qiwan op. cit p.508; PAN Chengqian 'Yao dialectology'. In LEMOINE, Jacques and CHIAO Chien (eds) op. cit pp.47-48; RAMSEY, Robert op. cit.

38 TAPP, Nicholas C.T. op. cit., p.108.


43 Their population was more than 200,000 in the early 1950s. See FEI Xiaotong, op. cit., (1990), pp.14-16.

44 This article is offered to the Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter as a sign of gratitude for all scholars who contribute to its most interesting content and as a subject for further discussion.( December 20, 1992).

45 1 Aubray, 91780, Chalo-Saint-Mars, France

46 See Pierre Meile, Les Yavanas dans l'Inde tamoule, p. 80.


48 Michael Ferlus, ASEMI p.47
49 See Foucher, La vieille route de l'Inde, p. 271; See Also - Rock Edict 13, 30 (see Bloch).

50 Panini's Grammar, IV, 1, 175.

51 See La Valle Poussin, L'Inde aux tems des Maurya, p. 15 and 40.

52 All information about the ancient Kambojas have been culled by B.C. Law, Kshatriya Tribes of Ancient India.


54 VI, p. 208. See tienne Lamotte, Histoire du Buddhisme indien, p. 110


56 Pour une histoire..., p. 5 and 170.


59 This meaning has remained: the small region where Paris is located is called 'Ile de France'. The Charles de Gaulle international airport north of Paris is located in a village named Roissy-en-France, referring to the limited early geographical extension of the word.


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