Thai Unions Since the Overthrow of the Chartchai Government*

Andrew Brown

On 23 February 1991 the military returned to the centre of the Thai political stage. The democratically elected government of Chartchai Chunhavan was disbanded, the constitution abrogated and martial law imposed. While the National Peacekeeping Council (NPC) stated that it intended to restore democracy to Thailand, the precise nature of this democracy is unclear especially when one considers the steps which the junta has taken toward organised labour over recent months.

Initially unionists, particularly those employed in state enterprises, supported the overthrow of the Chartchai administration. After a meeting with the leaders of the NPC, members of the powerful State Enterprise Relations Group seemed well satisfied with the supreme commander's affirmation that 'the burdens of labour are the burdens of the military'. More particularly, state enterprise unionists saw the putsch as representing a strike against the rapacious and corrupt capitalist government of Chartchai which had been committed to selling off state enterprises to the private sector, a move which was perceived by unionists to be inimical to the national interest. This initial support for the junta soon turned sour. In April the military appointed cabinet quickly approved two bills, the first of which removed state enterprise workers from the provisions of the 1975 Labour Act and the second, which established guidelines for governing and regulating labour relations within public enterprises.
This later bill effectively undermined worker's bargaining power by removing the right to strike. State enterprise workers are still allowed to form 'associations' but these must restrict their activities to welfare issues. The term 'union' can still be used in order not to breach international labour conventions. Workers found guilty of instigating work stoppages are liable to a jail term of up to one year and a maximum fine of 20,000 baht. On April 15 these bills were rapidly passed through the National Assembly and became law.

The junta claimed that these measures were necessary for state enterprise workers with their persistent protests and strike actions represented a threat to the stability of the social and political order and the long term development of the nation. (Sayam Rat (Saphadawichan) 21-27 July 1991, p.21). Such claims invoke views which predominated during the Sarit era and stand in marked contrast to the discourse of growing recognition for unions which developed during the 1980s.

The administration of labour relations within state enterprises is now vested with the Committee of Public Enterprise Relations. The government controls the majority of votes on the committee and as the decision of the committee is final workers' protests over wages and conditions etc. are likely to be decided in favour of government policy. In addition there are severe restriction on the rights of public sector workers to form and carry on the affairs of their associations. For example, there is no provision which formally allows state workers time to take leave to attend to union matters. Moreover, a number of organisations have either had to be dissolved or reformed and it is estimated that the peak labour councils have lost 65-70% of their members. In addition, experienced and knowledgeable state enterprise workers have been forced to vacate their leadership positions within the federations and councils which has seriously interrupted the further growth of these organisations. The comparison of current conditions with those which obtained during the Sarit era is even more appropriate when one considers the fate of Thanong Phoan. Head of the largest labour council in the country
Thanong, like many other labour leaders, initially supported the junta. However, he soon emerged as an outspoken opponent of the regime. Intending to travel to Switzerland to attend an ILO conference Thanong stated that he was going to expose the Thai government’s use of repression against labour and its flagrant disregard for internationally recognised labour rights. Permission to travel was refused. On June 19 Thanong disappeared and has not been seen since. As one observer has noted the disappearance and possible murder of a national labour leader and the refusal of the government to pursue the matter fully is indicative of the current emasculation of the labour movement (Khao Phiset 15th-21 July 1991, p.28).

In summary, developments since the coup of February this year indicate a significant change in the field of Thai labour relations. It now appears that the growing recognition for labour organisation that occurred during the 1980s is now being reversed and a more authoritarian and repressive mode of labour control is being erected in its stead. Under such conditions the future of unionism in Thailand is now very bleak. Without the organisational strength and support of public sector unions, unions in the private sector will find it enormously difficult to influence both employer and government policy. As noted, it has only been a very small proportion of workers in the private sector who have been able to sustain union organisation. A trend toward company unionism is likely to develop. For the majority of workers these latest developments mean a continuation of exploitation and domination. However, while the struggle for union recognition which grew, albeit unevenly, during the 1980s has now experienced a setback this may only be temporary as longer run tendencies towards more advanced industrialisation and democratisation reassert themselves. As we have seen the growing recognition of unions was related to both economic and political change. Economically, it remains to be seen whether a more repressive policy toward organised labour will be effective in further promoting industrial development or whether such measures will in fact impede Thailand's attainment of first-tier NIC status. Moreover, while the development of politics toward a more bourgeois form of rule is now in doubt growing popular dissatisfaction with the NPC may well ultimately lead to a restoration of democratic processes within which unions may be once again accorded a legitimate industrial and political role.

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Kamnan belong to the Ministry of the Interior, Democracy belongs to the National Peacekeeping Council

Chatcharin Chaiwat
[from Khaw Phiset 19-25 August 1991:9]

General Chavalit Yongjaiyut, leader of the New Inspiration Party, is reported as saying that before we can decide on the policy of how kamnan-phuyaiban are chosen we must decide on the principle as to whether they are to be chosen by the people or by someone else.

Samak Sunthornwet, leader of Prachakorn Thai, concludes that 'Before using any type of election, we should agree as to which group kamnan-phuyaiban belong, to the people or to the Ministry of the
Interior. The Minister insists that they are the ministry's men. Regarding this, General Issarapong Noonphakdi, Minister of the Interior and Secretary of the NPC, firmly states that he will definitely not review the system of kamnan-phuyaiban selection as suggested by the Ministry of the Interior, and if anyone thinks of resigning over this they can quit now.

The Ministry's policy is that the governor, who is the arm of the Ministry in each province, decides who should be kamnan or phuyaiban. The people only have the right to 'propose' a name to the governor. The Ministry, however, indicates that each kamnan-phuyaiban will hold the position for four years, not for life as in the past.

In the old system, the people directly elected their kamnan-phuyaiban, but they held the job till they retired. This could create a negative impact, as well as a positive. Yet several former members of parliament, for example, Surin Phitsuwan, of the Democrat Party, supports the old system, but with the election being held every six years. Therefore, there are two main points of argument, first, the method of selection, and second, the period of office.

If they are elected by the people, it means the people are involved in local administration, which is the basis of the democratic system. In contrast, if the Ministry of the Interior's system is used, and the governors are the decision makers, the system of administration will not be much different from the system in the old days, which gave the governors absolute authority.

When it comes to considering the period of office, despite the disagreement of kamnan-phuyaiban who may want to retain their privileges, most people accept that a time limit should be set. In other words, the period of office is a matter of 'mechanics', but the method of selection is a matter of 'principle'. The first priority, therefore, is that the selection method should concentrate on principle. General Issarapong, on behalf of the Ministry, believes that the Ministry has a better understanding than the people in selecting the suitable person. In brief, the Ministry is uncertain whether decision making in local administration should be left in the hand of local people, but is confident that the governors are suitable to take this responsibility and, more important, that the locals should be governed by the Ministry's authority.

It is clear that in principle, the Minister has no confidence in the ability of the people to govern themselves in local administration. Whatever the reasons for it, the Minister's judgment is that the Ministry will remain the 'elder brother in charge', or, in the language of political science, the 'decision maker'.

Such opinions indicate what General Issarapong's fundamental ideas are, not only concerning the selection of kamnan-phuyaiban, but most importantly towards the whole democratic system, which he thinks should be controlled in some way. We should keep in mind that he, as the secretary of the NPC which has the power to control Thai politics, and as long as he is still in power, wants to push democracy into a direction of his own choosing. Perhaps it is not wrong to say that the Minister sees democracy as a 'mechanism', not as a fundamental principle. At the same time, he regards the central government and the bureaucracy as the fundamental principle and source of authority. We may predict the pattern of democracy under the watchful eye of the NPC in the future from the policy towards the appointment of
kamnan-phuyaiban. There will always be 'state organisation' or 'bureaucratic decision' looking after the process of Thai democracy - because if these were not there, we would have the buying of votes, corruption, evil politicians, etc.; which were in fact the reasons given for the last coup.

This uncompromising declaration and refusal to review the method used for the appointment of kamnan-phuyaiban despite their own complaints, indicates the kind of governance advocated by this minister, what kind of system he favours. This Secretary of the NPC has shown what kind of power he thinks he needs to sweep the dirt out of the political system.

This attitude towards the selection of kamnan-phuyaiban shows very clearly the views of the NPC - perhaps even more clearly than that demonstrated in the drafting of their constitution. This is a matter of fundamental importance - it goes to the very basis of the democratic administration of local communities. It is difficult to believe that the leaders of the NPC are so adamant on this issue. In the days of democracy the election of provincial governors was being discussed, but now the NPC has gone so far backward as to propose the appointment of kamnan by these governors.

There are two statements to which we should pay attention. The first by the Deputy-President of the NPC, who said, referring to the last coup, that we must take a few steps backward in order to go forward (do we then end up backwards or forwards?). The second is that of His Majesty the King; very briefly, but with powerful impact throughout the country, he said '...Don't disappoint the people'.

Translated by Niti Pawakapan

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Problems of Thai Trade with Burma

'When Khun Sa went to war with the Red Wa, who first incited the fighting?'
(from Nityasarn Hor Karn Kha Samphan [Journal of the Associated Chambers of Commerce] June 2534 [1991]: 20-1)

There are two inter-connected aspects of the subject to be discussed. These are trade between Thai and Burma and the problem of the fighting between the forces of Khun Sa and the Red Wa, particularly as it affects Thailand and trade. At the present time we see that Burma has opened up the country much more than at any time since the first closure [of its borders] now over thirty years ago. This is most prominently seen in the opening of trade with civilized countries, especially those with common frontiers with Burma. Thailand is one of those countries trading with Burma. Many traders from Chiang Mai enter Burma to buy goods such as teak logs and precious stones so much so that Thailand now has a trade deficit with Burma because of this large import of goods, mostly natural products. Chiangmai has a trading border with Burma in Amphur Chiangdao. According to the report of the northern branch of the Bank of Thailand for last year, 2533, we exported tools, consumer goods and machines to the value of 750 million baht, much greater than the exports for 2532 which totalled
452 million baht. Imports are mostly teak, precious stones and agricultural produce and in 2533 these totalled 1,304 million baht, greater than the figure for 2532 which was only 612 million baht. The value of this trade should increase rapidly.

But there are still many problems in trade with this country, particularly to do with politics. The type of government of Burma is still socialist, not free [seriniyom] like ours. In addition there are problems relating to the infrastructure and supplies the standards of which are quite inadequate. Particularly in the wet season communications are inconvenient. Most important are the problems caused by fighting among various minority groups and between minority groups, unwilling to accept government rule, and the Burmese army. Though the opposition won the last election, the government of General Saw Maung has not been willing to hand over power.

But the problem that most affects the life and property of Thai citizens living along the border and interferes with logging in Burma is the fighting between minority groups of which there has been news recently. The fighting that most concerns Thai is that between the forces of Khun Sa (MTA - Mšng Tai Army [original corrected]) and the forces of the Red Wa - about which many would like to know what caused it, who initiated it and who provoked it.

In Burmese territory opposite Chiangdao district of Chiang Mai the fighting is such that shells have recently fallen in Ban Tha Torn resulting in deaths. Whose guns these were (Khun Sa's or of the Red Wa) is not known. It is the territory under Khun Sa's influence, very fertile for the growing of opium the raw material for the production of heroin. March and April is the period for the transport of opium to the heroin factories and it is the period in which there is contest for strategic territory necessary for this transport. This is only one reason for the fighting. There are many others.

Another reason arises out of the formation of the Union of Burma and the incorporation of minorities within it after independence from Britain. Many minority groups did not want to be part of the Union, but wanted to secede and govern themselves - particularly the Tai, the group of Khun Sa. These circumstances led to the fighting between the Burmese government and the minorities. But today it appears that the Burmese government is only fighting the forces of the Free Karen [what appears to be a misprint in the Thai name for Karen has been corrected]. They are not fighting Khun Sa or the Red Wa at all.

The reason for this is that the Burmese government wishes to stand aside and watch Khun Sa and the Red Wa fight among themselves and destroy each other. There is another advantage to the Burmese government. The territory of the Red Wa is in the north of Burma bordering China, and the government sees it as being of strategic importance militarily and for trade. The Burmese government wants this territory and they have incited the Red Wa to attack Khun Sa. The Red Wa themselves see Khun Sa's territory as extremely fertile and very suitable for the growing of opium. This is why this area has become a continuing battlefield. There is also continuing destruction and Burma will gain the advantage that with the extinction of Khun Sa's group one of the major, important forces of the Tai struggle for independence will be eliminated. They will also be able to take the strategic territory of the Red Wa - thus killing two birds with one
Nevertheless, the Burmese government is solving its problems and compromising on others so that the impression conveyed is of increasing control and the consequent opening up of trade. I believe that trade with Thailand will prosper and increase in quantity. Thai entrepreneurs should increase their investment as Burma becomes a much more inviting prospect among the neighbouring states of Indochina. Burma has plentiful natural resources and also a long border with Thailand. This is a great opportunity for entrepreneurs from Thailand, particularly from Chiangmai.

Trans. by Gehan Wijeyewardene. Thanks to Donald Gibson, Chiangmai, for supplying the Thai article.

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The Guomindang Strategy to Return Across Nations

Aphichart Suthiwong

After they took Thai citizenship many years ago, the Hor Chinese, also known as 'Division 93', from Yunnan Province, changed their way of life, living peacefully in the shade of the Thai flag, with their children and grandchildren. But now it appears that under the surface of these peaceful waters there is a powerful wave rapidly building up its strength to trouble this surface calm and happiness.

During the last two weeks Khaw phiset has been informed by senior members of Division 3 under the command of General Li (Li Wen Hwang) that there is presently an attempt by a group of individuals, with connections to Taiwan, who are trying all they can to restore the power of the Hor Chinese which they lost when they laid down their arms many years ago. The first part of this attempt is to establish a new united centre.

'They are trying to influence us through the use of money under the guise of giving help in various ways. They are trying to force us into accepting the dominance of Taiwan. There are many Hor Chinese, especially the younger generation, who have already sworn allegiance to the Guomindang'. This is the news flowing from high sources in Division 3. They also believe that these attempts hide many deeper intentions.

When the Chinese Hor forces fled the Red Army of Mao Tse Tung dug in near the Thai border, the army comprised two divisions—Division 3 under the command of General Li and Division 5 of which General Tuan (Tuan Si Wen) was commander. (The Thai wrongly referred to both divisions together as 'Division 93'.) Later the Thai Government called on both divisions to join in the suppression of terrorists at Khor Mountain and neighbouring areas in which they were victorious and were given the accolade by the Thai press of 'the tigers of the mountains'.

As a consequence in 2524 (1981) the Hor Chinese were allowed, by the Thai government, to take up Thai citizenship, lay down their arms and pursue their livelihood like all other citizens.

Division 5 had a large secure base at Mae Salong mountain in Chiang Rai Province. After the death of General Tuan, many years ago, Lui I-tien, a civilian, became the leader. As for general Li, the
commander of Division 3, before laying down his arms, he established a
secure base at Tham Ngob in Amphur Chaiprakarn, Chiang Mai Province.
[This appears to be a mistake. There is no such amphur in Chiang
MaiTrans.] There were also many other Hor Chinese under his command
settled along the Thai border in Chiang Mai ProvinceBan Arunthai (Ban
Nong Uk) in Chiang Dao district, Ban Sinchai, north and south, Ban Pha
Daeng, Bam Mai Nong Bua in Amphur Chaiprakarn and on Doi Ang Khang,
Ban Yang in Amphur Fang and many other places.
It was said that Division 3 under General Li had many more
Chinese under his command than were in Division 5. General Li now
lives in quiet at his residence in Chiang Mai city.

Mister Kong and the Free China Relief Association

It appears that Mister Kong or Kong Chen Ia, about fifty years
old, came to Thailand about eight years ago. He is currently head of
the Free Chinese Relief Association, Thailand Branch.1 His father is
Hor Chinese his mother Thai Jai. His role in the association is to
advise on and administer funds for the living conditions of the Hor
Chinese in Thailand according to policy set out from Taiwan.
But during the last three years his role has changed. It is
said that he and his men have tried to persuade the Hor Chinese in the
north to swear loyalty to Mr Kong's party. When there are refusals
they try to use the power of the help they are giving to force
decisions in their favour. If individuals or groups of individuals
refuse their leadership they cut off all aid immediately. With these
means they have recruited a large number of people. They are mostly
subordinates of Divisions 3 and 5. Among this number are Lui 1-tien,
the leader of Division 5 of Mae Salong and Chen Mongsiw also known as
Chief-of-Staff Chen, deputy to Lui.
'Mister Kong has told us that he is in the process of taking
Thai citizenship with the help of an unspecified government unit. This
has surprised the Yunnanese in Thailand, for this man is an official
of Taiwan who was sent to look after and improve the conditions of the
Yunnanese without himself being a refugee as we are. Consider, what
good has he done for Thailand that justifies his being allowed to
change citizenship.' The news is that in December he will finish the
period for which he was sent to Thailand, and people believe that Thai
citizenship will allow him to continue his secret activities.
'Mr Kong told my father he should resign from his position as
leader, as he is very old now. He also said that he would soon
organize elections for new village leaders of the Hor Chinese
community. When they are elected he would then have them elect a new
supreme leader of the Hor in Thailand' said Miss Chawiwan Chaisiri,
the younger daughter of General Li. She specifically said this was one
part of the plan to undermine the authority of her father.
Again, in December, the group influenced by Mr Kong will
organize candidates for election to the administrative committee of
The Yunnanese Society of Chiang Mai to turn this into a base for their
future activities. In the past this society has been a centre for
social activities among the Yunnanese community in the north. They
have not wanted to use the association as an organization for entry
into political activity.
On 21st September the members of the Yunnanese Society will
meet to decide whether they should organize the celebration of Taiwanese National Day in the name of the Society or not. It is expected that that there will be a division between two groups—the group of Mr Kong which wants to drag the Society into putting on these celebrations and the group of Yunnanese who want to prevent it because they know that if they take this political path they will be doing something contrary to the Thai point of view. This group believes that now that they have Thai citizenship they should not become involved any more in this type of activity. Whatever happens, at the moment, the group of Mr Kong is planning to put candidates up for election in mid-December as mentioned above.

The Taiwan-Hor Chinese-Khun Sa alliance against Chinese [PRC] influence

Though there is no documentary proof of contacts between the group influenced by Mr Kong, a Taiwanese official, and the Thai Jai revolutionary organization led by Khun Sa (Chang Sifu), news sources suggest that over at least the last two weeks a senior nationalist ex-military officer who is also an important member of Mr Kong's group has been attempting to create such an alliance.

Even more important, a senior source in the regional army told Khaw Phiset that in 2529 [1986] the MYang Tai Army of Khun Sa sent thirty men for training to Taiwan. The source said this training program must be continuing up to the present.

'In 2529-30 [1986-7] when Khun Sa split with the Red Wa, Division 5 (in Mae Salong) sent secret supplies in support of Khun Sa through Ban Hin Taek. The affair became public when the Wa sent a delegation to Lui I-tien warning him not to do it again. They forgave him this time because of their previous relations when General Tuan was still alive.' The same source said that Mr Kong was still supporting a group of Hor Chinese that were under the influence of Khun Sa. There were also members of Khun Sa's MTA travelling to Taiwan to discuss the organization of continuing aid.

The source explained that the illegal forces of the Wa in Burma were now waging war and contesting the narcotics routes which the MTA previously controlled, across from Amphur Mae Ai in Chiang Mai Province. These forces [Wa] were formerly under the control of the Communist Party of Burma. When the CPB disintegrated the Wa forces turned and accepted the authority of the government in Rangoon. They now receive arms and provisions which allow them to wage war against Khun Sa.

The links in this chain of politics were joined together when the Peking government turned round and grasped the hand of the dictatorship in Rangoon and sold arms worth many ten billions of baht. The Government of Burma used these arms to suppress the revolts on its borders as well as supplying the Wa, who have at least 20,000 men under arms, to enable them to attack the MTA. This war is still confused and is not yet over.

The result is quite obvious. Taiwan's help to Khun Sa through intermediaries sent through Thailand is a counter to the influence of China now spreading through Burma. [To Taiwan] it is like a backdoor into China itself. There is news that China is presently constructing a road from Yunnan into north Burma, in territory which is under the
influence of the Free Kachin. The road is for strategic military purposes and also as a route for mutual trade, at a time when Rangoon is isolated from the world economy because of sanctions against its abuse of human rights within the country.

'Whatever anyone does just let them go ahead as long as they do not involve us in it. We want to be Thai and follow the policy of the Thai Government. We do not want to have anything to do with Mr Kong nor to fall under the direction of China.' These were the words of Khun Chawiwan Chaisiri, the daughter of General Li.

[from Khaw phiset 23-29 September 2534: 3-5. The same issue carries an interview with General Li Wen Hwang.]
Translated by Gehan Wijeyewardene

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Thai-Yunnan Prostitution

The following is taken from a report which appeared in the Sayam Rat Sapadawicharn of 25-31 August under the title 'Hundreds of Chinese girls sold into Thai brothels':

'A report from the unit responsible for the suppression of gangs engaged in the deception of women says that there are presently young women from Yunnan and Sipsongpanna in mainland China who have been deceived into working in Thai suburban brothels. The number of such women is already in excess of 200. In one instance, police officers in the process of carrying out a raid on a brothel in Samranrat discovered a large number of young Chinese women.

Regarding the reasons for the increasing numbers of young women from China being lured [into Thai brothels], the report states that since gangs involved in recruiting women for the sex trade began encountering problems with Northern Thai girls fleeing or informing, they have turned to China instead. Not only do [Chinese women] not try and draw attention to themselves, but they are displaced persons and are unfamiliar with Thailand.

From information obtained from the Centre for the Protection of Children's Rights, which questioned the Chinese girls, it is known that this group of children were brought and sold into brothels in Bangkok about seven or eight months ago. They were then sent to the South to cater for Chinese-speaking Malaysian clients. At the Centre it was also found that most of this group of children were infected with STDs and the AIDS virus.

Trans. Scott Bamber.

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Tea Production On the Periphery of the British Empire*

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Many years prior to the incorporation of Burma into the British Empire, tea production had been an important economic activity in the
non-Burman region. One source suggests that the necessity for Theravada Buddhist monks to observe the vinaya in a manner stricter than hitherto practised stimulated tea production in some of the Shan States in the fourteenth century. Local legend from one of the States, Tawngpeng, indicates that tea seeds were obtained from a magical bird and brought to the region by King Alaungsithu of Pagan (1111-1167) who gave the seeds to two Taungthu cultivators. The King ordered that the seeds be planted to the north-west of a local pagoda and that a festival be held annually to commemorate the event. After determining that the Palaungs, the majority population in Tawngpeng, originated from a union between a Naga princess and the Sun King, he appointed Bala Kyautha Sao Hkun to head the local administration. Since the Taungthu recipients of the tea seeds accepted the King's gift with one hand instead of with two, they were deemed to be uncivilised. Consequently, the tea plants were named let-pet (one-hand).

Tawngpeng State, the major tea-producing area in the Federated Shan States, contained an area of 938 square miles. As of 1939 the population of Tawngpeng was 59,398 and it had a revenue of Rs. 645,634. The State was divided into 16 circles which corresponded as closely as possible to clan-divisions. Geographic features were characterised by hills ranging from five to seven thousand feet in height interspersed with valleys that averaged approximately ten miles in length and from a few hundred yards to a few miles in width. Maurice Collis, a former Burma civil servant, noted that upon approaching Namhsan, the capital of Tawngpeng which lies at the centre of the State at a height of six thousand feet, 'there is a vale and in the midst, ten miles away, is a ridge, on one end of which stands the town of Nam Hsan with the palace over it on a circular hill....The vale is one vast tea garden'. On the lower levels of the hillsides, Palaungs and Shans grow tea whilst higher up Kachins and Lisus practice shifting agriculture. Shans predominate in the valleys where rice is the staple crop.

A survey conducted in 1896-97 by Mr. W.G. Wooster revealed that the State had 9,199 acres under cultivation of which 5,315 acres were taken up by tea production. Four crops were picked throughout the year: Shwepyi (May to July), Hka-gyin (July and August), Hka-rawt (Sept. and Oct.), and Kha-reng (Nov.). Both wet (salad or pickled) tea and dry tea were manufactured with four more times pickled tea than dry tea being produced. To obtain pickled tea, the picked tea leaves are laid out in the sun to dry for a few days before being steamed. After steaming, the leaves are compressed and placed into pits which are weighted down. At this point the tea leaves are left to ferment until the desired result has been produced. Although there is no set time period for the fermentation process, the leaves are examined from time to time. The process for producing dry tea is far simpler. The picked leaves are placed on bamboo mats and left to dry in the sun.

The majority of the tea gardens were located on hillsides and planted at random. Seed is collected in November and sown in nurseries in February or later. Once the plant reaches 2 feet in height, it is planted on cleared slopes in August and September. The trees are not pruned since the Palaungs believe that pruning will cause the trees to die; consequently, they grow freely. Any available space in a garden
is filled annually with new trees. The plants are picked for the first time in the fourth year, and they continue to bear useable leaves for a period of ten to twelve years.13 At the end of its lifespan, the garden is often cut down and burnt.

In the late-nineteenth century, the tea gardens were considered to be the common property of the village. Capital-intensive plantations such as those worked in India and Ceylon were non-existent in the Shan States. In Tawngpeng, the average size of a tea garden was just over an acre in size.14 The Commissioner of the Federated Shan States, John Clague, noted that any villager could claim tea land in which he had cleared jungle and planted tea. Generally speaking, full rights to the crop were granted to the planter or occupier as long as State taxes had been paid.15 Custom dictated that tea gardens could be transferred only through sale or inheritance to another member of the same village; however, by 1911-12, in the vicinity of Namhsan, some purchasers and inheritors of tea-gardens were not residents of the villages concerned.16 Moreover, the Tawngpeng Sawbwa used his own finances and an agricultural loan from the State treasury to obtain large holdings and bring the purchased land under tea cultivation in the early twentieth century.17 By the 1930s, the communal aspect of the tea gardens was maintained through the village possessing the right to approve or deny an outsider's bid to obtain land in any particular village.18

On average, a worker is able to gather a viss of tea leaves per day.19 For this type of labour over a season, a tea-plucker in 1921-22, would earn Rs.10-12 if the wages were paid three or four months in advance. The more patient labourer, who could afford to wait until the end of the season, received Rs. 20-22. Workers engaged in weeding or hoeing gardens earned the same wages as pluckers. Alternatively, a worker might decide to keep one day's work in the plucking season provided that three day's work was done in the garden at a later date.20

At Zeyan village, which was reputed to produce the highest quality and quantity of tea in Tawngpeng, Chinese buyers from Mandalay paid the following prices for wet tea: Shwepyi N Rs . 25 per 100 viss, and for Hka-gyin and Hka-rawt N Rs. 20 per 100 viss. Dry tea sold at the following rates: Shwepyi N Re. 1 per viss, Hka-gyin N 12 annas per viss, Hka-rawt N 8 annas per viss, and Hka-reng N 4 annas per viss. Once the tea reached Mandalay, wet tea obtained Rs. 40-60 per viss, and dry tea fetched Rs. 150-200 per 100 viss. In 1895-96, approximately 15,000 bullock-loads of wet tea were sold, and about 25,450 viss of dry tea were produced including 10,000 viss for local consumption. The remaining dry tea was sold or bartered to traders in exchange for cash or ngapi (fish-sauce), dried fish and rice. The State imposed a tax of Re. 1-0-2 to Rs. 2 on pickled tea sent to Mandalay, and a tax of Re. 1-8-0 to other destinations. In addition, tea transported by pony faced a tax of Re. 1-4-0. Dry tea shipped by bullock-cart was taxed at a rate of Rs. 2 per load while dry tea carried by coolies was assessed at Re. 1 per viss.21 Responsibility for collecting the various taxes was delegated to village headmen who often appointed agents to gather the revenue.22

Mr. R.C. Wright, a tea-planter from Ceylon, offered an assessment of tea production in Tawngpeng:
It is good Manipuri jat, dark leaf....Some of the bushes are good, but
as a rule are cut and hacked about and spoiled for tea-bearing purposes. It is all one jat, Manipuri, which is the wild tea of Burma. From what I could see, if it were properly cultivated, it would be very good tea and of very fine quality.23

Moreover, a future Viceroy of India, George Curzon, visited the Shan States in 1893 and indicated that the tea industry held potential for developing an export trade.24 But, a lack of investment capital combined with a poor transportation network meant that a tea industry geared to an overseas market was absent in Tawngpeng. In regard to transportation, Table 1 demonstrates that mules, bullocks and coolies carried more loads of tea to the railway head at Kyaukme in the 1920s than did lorries.

Nevertheless, the domestic tea industry was indeed substantial. Tea provided Tawngpeng with a cash crop that could be exported to Burma proper.25 Based upon figures of carriage provided by the Burma Railways, Clague pointed out that, 'in terms of Shan dry tea at least 11 million pounds are exported from Hsipaw and Tawngpeng every year'. The corresponding figures for wet tea equalled 13,633,669 pounds in 1934.26 R. McGuire of the Government of Burma's Reconstruction Department reported, in 1944, that the total amount of tea consumed in Burma annually before the Japanese invasion was 16,500,000 pounds of which 14 million pounds originated in the Shan States.27

Clearly, the Shan tea industry had been successfully adapted to consumer demand in Burma proper. But the depression of the 1930s created a crisis in which tea prices and sales fell with a consequent hardship for cultivators. One solution devised to overcome the slump in the domestic market was to export tea from the Shan States overseas. However, the proponents of the plan ran into difficulties over misconceptions and legal undertakings by the tea-licensing authorities in India. Sympathetic officials in London were powerless to intervene in defence of the Shan tea industry so long as Burma remained a province of British India. It was not until Burma had been separated from India that the Government of Burma could contemplate granting approval to the export of tea from the Shan States overseas. By 1941, the Shan tea industry had some prospects of developing a small overseas trade in high-quality tea to supplement the domestic industry.

The slump in the Shan tea industry was noticeable in 1931-32. Shwepyi had fallen in price from a rupee in April and May to 6-8 annas a viss in later months. Furthermore, the revenue acquired from the tax placed upon Shan tea exported to Burma proper dropped from Rs. 113,805 to Rs. 79,882.28 During 1932-33, Shwepyi produced in Tawngpeng improved in price from a low of 8 annas to a high of Rs. 1-4-0 per viss; however, this gain was offset by an estimated 50 per cent decrease in production that resulted from a dry spell in February,

Table 1. Transport of Tea from Tawngpeng State to Kyaukme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WET TEA DRY TEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorries</td>
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<td>Carts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bullocks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullocks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
March and April. A lack of rain continued to hamper production in the following year. In addition, as Table 2 demonstrates, the prices paid for tea to cultivators fell steadily.

Table 2.
Prices Paid to Cultivators in the Shan States for Tea per 100 viss, 1929-1936*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price Paid (Rs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>65-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34</td>
<td>60-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-35</td>
<td>40-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>35-40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What could be done to improve the situation? The answer lay in the potential for growth which Wright, the tea-planter from Ceylon, and Curzon, the future Viceroy, had envisioned in the late nineteenth century. The opportunity to act upon this potential arose with the arrival of E.H. Beadnell to the Shan States. He was a private investor who had experience with tea production in India and had financial connections in London which would be crucial in raising the capital necessary to develop the tea industry in the Shan States. As a result, Hkun Pan Sing, the Tawngpeng Sawbwa, and Saw On Kya, the Hsipaw Sawbwa, backed by Beadnell's expertise, made an application in Jan. 1934 to the Tea Licensing Committee in New Delhi to grant Beadnell an export licence for one million pounds of tea for sale within the Empire. The Sawbwas believed that with Beadnell's support
the domestic tea industry in Tawngpeng, Hsipaw and Mongmit could be transformed into an Empire export-oriented industry that would be capable of countering the undesirable consequences of the slump through economic growth. Unfortunately for the proponents of the plan, the Tea Licensing Committee rejected the request made by Hkun Pan Sing and Sao On Kya, 'on the grounds that those States [Tawngpeng and Hsipas] do not form a part of British India'.

Obviously the criterion employed by the Tea Licensing Committee to reject the application for an export quota in Shan tea was incorrect. The Shan States became part of British India in 1886. However, the Committee did have a legitimate concern over the need to restrict any extension of land under tea production for export. Profits to tea producers were in a depressed state since the onset of the worldwide economic slump. The weakened world market for tea was compounded by the fact that in 1929 tea supply had exceeded consumption by 58 million pounds. Overproduction of tea within the British Empire and the large quantities of cheap tea that had entered the London market from outside the Empire had served to create a huge stockpile in tea and a reduction in profits. The tea surplus crisis intensified in 1932 when India produced a bumper crop of tea at a time in which prospects for increased consumption were unfavourable. To counter the problems in the tea industry, the major tea exporting countries (India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies) began discussions in 1931 to regulate production and obtain a balance between supply and demand. The Colonial Office desired that the tea market be permitted to stabilise itself without any international co-operation. It was thought that the tea industry of the Dutch East Indies would be the first to collapse and thus rid the Empire industry of a competitor. However, it was clear that a number of British companies in India and Ceylon would also collapse or be forced to suspend dividend payments; therefore the Secretary of State approved the scheme.

Negotiations went forward and culminated in the International Tea Agreement of 1933 which limited tea exports from the three countries to 85 per cent of their average exports in the best exporting year between 1929 and 1931. For example, under this formula the export quota allotted to Ceylon was 215,522,617 pounds of tea. Henceforth, until the expiration of the Agreement in 1938, exports of tea from India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies would be regulated to meet consumer demand and to limit any extension of land under tea cultivation. Sir Percival Griffiths noted that, 'an International Tea Committee was set up to co-ordinate all this action and in India the Tea Control Act to give effect to the agreement was passed in 1933'. Thus, a quota system was introduced to regulate the export of tea from British India. It was a request by the Sawbwas on behalf of their agent, Beadnell, to obtain a quota licence for export which was rejected by the Tea Licensing Committee. The time was not yet ripe for an expansion of the Shan tea industry into Empire markets. Not surprisingly the decision of the Tea Licensing Committee created a bitter and hostile response in Tawngpeng. In a letter written to Beadnell, Hkun Pan Sing queried, 'Will the TLC be dreaming up further Rules to shut out the Shan States'?

In 1934-35, the Shwepyi tea crop faced another setback which led to a drop in the amount of taxes paid from tea and thathameda to the State treasury. The Sawbwa had felt that he was on solid ground in attempting to promote the export of
Shan tea within the Empire which would help to alleviate the gloomy economic situation. The State already had a tea industry that seemed capable of expansion. In addition, Tawngpeng had two tea experts who had received their training in Ceylon. The Chief Minister, Hkun Hkam Heng, had gone to Peradeniya, Ceylon in 1924 to study tea production. He received the post of Tea Expert upon his return to Tawngpeng in 1925, a position which he held until he became Chief Minister in 1932. His replacement as Tea Expert, Hkun Tun, had also gone to Ceylon in 1924 to study up-to-date methods of tea cultivation and manufacture.42

The Sawbwa sent another emotional missive to Beadnell in August 1935:

Sir Joseph Bhore being an Indian certainly has no interest in Burma or the Shan States. He will do his best to instill the idea to Government not to give any privilege which is to be beneficient to Burma or the Shan States, but the British Government ought to realise that Burma or Shan States are part of British Empire and His Majesty's subjects should get equal treatment. Why should British Government treat us differently Ñ are we not British subjects? If we are not given the same privilege as Indians, then I should say that we are not regarded as His Majesty's subjects and it would be wrong for the British Government to treat us differently. Our people are dependent upon the only product of tea and if we are not given this privilege of having a quota, it would only mean that the Government does not care 3 whether its subjects are starved or not.43

In his letter, the Sawbwa seemed to be questioning the utility of remaining within the British Empire. Notwithstanding the depressed state of the world economy, and the emotional outpourings of the Tawngpeng Sawbwa, the inability to acquire an export quota for Shan tea demonstrates the vulnerability of interests put forth by a seemingly isolated voice on the periphery of Empire.

Officials in both Burma and Britain did materialise in support of the Shan tea industry. Clague, for one, recommended the scheme to Rangoon. He suggested that a guaranteed quota for Shan tea would help to alleviate the financial crisis faced by tea growers. In his outline of the situation, Clague wrote,

The tea gardens have been exceedingly hard hit by the great depression in prices in Burma which is their sole market at present. At one time during the depression tea was almost unsaleable, and in the Tawngpeng State, in particular, barter for rice had taken the place of many transactions.44

But, little could be done in view of the International Tea Agreement. Beadnell contacted his brother-in-law in Britain, Colonel Swainson, in an effort to tap parliamentary aid.45 Swainson gained a sympathetic ear from the Labour Member of Parliament for Limehouse, Clement R. Attlee. Attlee addressed two letters to the Secretary of State for India in defence of the Shan tea industry. In the first letter, Attlee pointed out that, ‘it looks as if the interests of a small local industry in Burma was being deliberately damaged in the interests of the big Indian industry’.46 In his second letter to Hoare, the deputy-leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party noted that
the Indian Tea Committee did not realise that the Shan States were part of British India; moreover, he wanted, '...to know whether the Government of Burma took any steps to protect their interest'.47 Both Clague and Attlee stressed the importance of tea to the local economy in their appeals.

Another determined, and more vocal, ally of the Shan cause entered the debate in the person of R.H. Craddock who had been the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma from 1918-23. Craddock had been the architect of the Shan States Federation in 1922, and he did not want the Shan tea issue to be neglected. The Sawbwa's letter to Beadnell was of particular significance to Craddock:

...it deserves attention because it is the genuine outpouring of a Shan Chief to his Agent....it is most important that the Chiefs should not be under the impression that they are of no account in the British Empire. In the event of any troubles arising in Burma proper...it is very important that the Shan Chiefs and their people should be well affected to the British Empire. They are the buffers between China and Burma.48

The former Lieutenant-Governor had more to say than to outline the essence of the political and strategic roles that the Shan States were expected to play in the Empire. He attacked the Governor of Burma, Sir Hugh Stephenson, for his disappointing performance in not undertaking a more vigorous defence of the local Shan interest. He argued that a duty of the Governor was to promote issues important to, 'the ignorant Palaungs' and, 'to see that the Shan Chiefs are equitably treated'. The Governor had failed in his duty according to Craddock: '...I have great respect for Sir Hugh Stephenson but I cannot honestly feel that he has realised that the whole question turned upon him...'. Finally, Craddock urged Lord Zetland, who had replaced Hoare as Secretary of State for India, 'to make it clear that it is the Governor-General and not the Tea Committee who is the proper authority to put matters right'.49 The rather brusque handling of the affair by the Tea Licensing Committee had generated a reaction which demanded a more detailed and delicate study of the matter. Whether or not the more forceful approach advocated by Craddock would have succeeded with the Tea Licensing Committee is open to debate, but it is possible that the Committee would have handled the issue with more tact and knowledge than was displayed in their response of 14 February 1934.

The key difficulty in finding a solution to the Shan tea issue was that virtually nothing could be done whilst Burma remained a province of India. One area in which there was some room to manoeuvre centred upon the Indian Tea Cess Act. In 1901, the Indian Tea Association made a proposal to the Government that a cess should be imposed upon tea exported from India. The revenue obtained from the cess could be used to promote the consumption of Indian tea in the domestic and world markets. Ceylon had already provided a lead in this regard. In 1892, Ceylon had imposed an export duty upon tea which, by the turn of the century, brought approximately Rs. 3 lakhs per annum for the Ceylon tea publicity campaign. The Indian Government accepted the proposal, and legislation for a Tea Cess became law on 1 April 1903. A committee of 20 members was established to administer the
cess from representatives appointed by the Bengal and Madras Chambers of Commerce, the Indian Tea Association, and by the Viceroy. As of April 1935, the cess on exports of Indian tea stood at 12 annas per 100 pounds.50

In what way did the Indian Tea Cess Committee bring benefits to the Shan tea industry? At the India Office, D.H. Monteath provided the answer:

The papers in connection with Mr. Beadnell's application suggest that the Government of India has hitherto had little, and the tea trade of continental India no knowledge of the production of tea in Burma. The report of the Indian Tea Cess Committee is devoid of any evidence of knowledge of, or interest in the Burma side of tea production. It may be inferred that Burma tea growers, such as they are, derive and have derived no benefits from the activities financed by the Tea Cess, and this inference is strengthened by the fact that the Tea Cess Committee does not contain and has not contained a representative of Burma.51

In other words, the Shan tea industry had yet to reap any benefits from Burma's inclusion within the scope of the Tea Cess Act. Consequently, almost two years after the controversy had begun, Monteath recommended that the Indian Tea Cess Act should be so amended that it would cease to apply to Burma. In addition, he wanted the amendment to become effective prior to the separation of Burma from India.52 Monteath pointed out that the exclusion of Burma from the provisions of the Act would be advantageous for both India and Burma. India would be able to assess the cess upon tea exported to Burma, but continue to receive, '...the not inconsiderable exports of Burma tea to continental India...free of this cess'. On the other hand, the increased cost of Indian tea might persuade consumers in Burma to purchase domestic tea which would stimulate growth in the local industry. Furthermore, tea exported from Burma could prove to be an attractive buy for overseas customers since it would be cheaper than tea exported with the cess applied. Most importantly, Monteath stressed the point that India and Burma would remove, '...an anomaly which might, in time, become an irritant'.53

Neither the Indian Tea Licensing Committee nor the Commerce Department of the Indian Government expressed any sympathy or agreement with the statements in support of the Shan tea industry. The Committee's Secretary was emphatic that only the individual tea garden owners, and not the Sawbwas of Tawngpang and Hsipaw, were legally entitled to apply for export quotas on behalf of Beadnell:

Forms purporting to be applications for quota have been received from Mr. Beadnell in respect of the States not in respect of the individual tea gardens in the States....the Sawbwas of the States....are not the owners of the estates and...it is only the owners who are recognised by the Licensing Committee in their administration of the Act.54

The Act was designed to deal with large plantation owners in the first instance, and small garden owners if necessary, but a provision to negotiate with traditional leaders who attempted to act on behalf of their subjects did not exist. Of course, to permit the Shan States to export tea would be, 'a violation of the international obligations undertaken by the Government of India on behalf of India and Burma'.55
This point was the key according to the Government of India. As the Viceroy pointed out to Zetland: 'We do not feel justified in taking action to remove any of the technical difficulties which stand in the way of the allotment of a quota to the Shan States, since their object is to defeat the purposes of the Act'.

H. Dow, acting on behalf of the Commerce Department in India also took issue with certain allegations made by critics such as Craddock and Monteath. He refuted allegations that the slump in the Shan tea industry could be associated with the Indian policy of tea control. While he conceded the point that Indian tea had entered the domestic market of Burma in 1934 at progressively reduced prices, he argued, 'that 1934 was the year in which prices reached their maximum depression and in which the purchasing power in Burma was at its lowest ebb'. Also, he corrected Monteath's premise that India received large quantities of tea from Burma. Dow doubted that little, if any, Burma tea reached India or anywhere else. In fact, the Burma tea exports mentioned by Monteath actually consisted of Chinese tea which was shipped to Tibet via Burma and Calcutta. Dow concluded, 'that the Indian Tea Control Act does not apply to those States [Tawngpeng and Hsipaw]', and that he would not recommend the extension of the Act to those States.

The Shan tea issue was brought into the Legislative debates in India and Burma during the fall of 1936 but without success. In London, Dow's letter created an atmosphere of resignation and frustration. Zetland continued to believe that it was a technical decision, whereas in the House of Commons R.A. Butler stressed India's position as one of expediency. An official at the India Office realised that Burma's hands were tied until the International Tea Agreement expired in March 1938. Monteath suggested that the issue was reminiscent of a scene from the pen of Lewis Carroll:

...the position of the Shans seems rather Alice-in-Wonderland-like: the Tea Control Act has never been applied in the Shan States, so they can have no quota: but as soon as their tea comes into the ports of Burma where the Act is in force it becomes subject to it to the extent that it cannot be exported without a licence; & no licence can be given because it is not within the quota which cannot apply.

Monteath added that he had been advised that the tea produced in the Shan States was similar to, 'high-grade China tea'. But, the possibility of India ever acting to promote the Shan tea industry seemed out of the question, thus he believed that Beadnell's only recourse would be to bypass the tea restrictions imposed from India altogether by exporting Shan tea 'ad-lib' through Bangkok, Siam. Craddock knew that Burma would be unable to act independently from India until the Agreement between India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies lapsed in 1938. However, he did not believe that India's ability to win debating points had diminished the crisis of low tea prices for growers or for the Sawbwas. He adopted a pragmatic, but political stance: 'It is politically unwise to allow this grievance to simmer among some important Shan States a day longer than is necessary'. Craddock's concern centred upon the discontent which might be generated among the Sawbwas of the tea-growing States who felt that the government had done little to advance their interests.
The Indian Government did make one concession to the India Office. Monteath's recommendation to exclude Burma from the operation of the Tea Cess Act before separation was accepted. The official notification to indicate that Burmese sea-ports ceased to participate in the levying of an export tax upon tea was issued on 17 February 1937. The reasons behind this decision were explained by Zafrullah Khan. One, little revenue would be likely to accrue from Shan tea exports. Two, Burma did not have a representative on the India Tea Market Expansion Board. Three, Burma's exclusion before separation would prevent acrimonious wrangling in the future between India and Burma over the handling of the Shan tea issue. Clague wrote that at the time when India had joined with Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies to control and restrict tea exports the Shan tea industry had not been considered since, 'there were no proposals...for manufacture of European tea in the Shan States'. The door had now been opened for the Shan States to prepare and promote a world-wide export market in tea.

The consensus at the Burma Office was that separated Burma would not join with India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies in ratifying a renewed tea restriction agreement in 1938. Indeed, this prediction proved to be accurate. After separation, the Government of Burma informed India that it could not become a participant since the tea regulating countries would be unlikely to approve the development of an export industry in Shan tea, nor would the legal definition of an 'estate' be applicable to the Palaung and Shan tea gardens. And yet Burma did seek to gain an advantage within the restriction scheme. The Government wanted to continue to import tea from the regulating countries at 4-5 annas per pound while at the same time export Shan tea at just over 10 annas per pound. But no, the Government of India was not prepared to accede to a request of that nature, and the separated Government of Burma decided to remain outside the renewed International Tea Regulation Scheme of 1938.

One Burma Office official speculated that Burma's refusal to join the tea regulation agreement might lead to a 150 per cent increase in price for imported tea, and that any attempt to obtain tea seeds from abroad would fail. Clague was more optimistic. He commented, 'India treated Burma badly over the proposals...for a quota for Shan States' tea'. He forecast that any large increase in the price of imported tea would only serve to stimulate tea production in the Shan States as a cheaper source of supply. Moreover, he thought that the opium problem might be solved by substituting tea for opium as a cash crop east of the Salween River.

Craddock had warned of dire consequences if the Sawbwas held the Burma Government to have been negligent in protecting their interests and those of their subjects. Clague indicated that it had been concern for the welfare of the tea cultivators that had spurred the Sawbwas on to press for an export quota in tea. Although there may be a case that can be made in favour of the argument that the Sawbwas were genuinely worried about the economic plight of the tea growers, the subsequent action of the Tawngpeng Sawbwa suggests that another, less generous, argument might have been more important. To illustrate, Hkun Pan Sing dismissed Beadnell from the post of Tea Agent and appointed his assistant, Mr. Bennett, as his replacement. Bennett and the Tawngpeng Sawbwa lobbied the Government of Burma to
approve their application to India for an export quota in Tawngpeng tea, but they had no intention of fulfilling the terms of the export quota if their application was successful. The conspirators planned to sell their quota to Mr. Ramchand Daga of Messrs. Kaniyalal Laxminarain of Calcutta and keep the money from the sale of the quota for themselves without exporting one ounce of Tawngpeng tea. Stephenson observed that, 'It was pure graft....which could not have benefited the Shan States though it might have put some money into the Sawbwa's pocket'. The scheme collapsed when the Government of Burma refused to sanction the application for a quota export. Needless to say, the incident deprived the Tawngpeng Sawbwa of any right to be morally outraged at the policy of the Government of Burma. A ramp along the lines described above did not prove to be unusual under the conditions of control and restriction in India. Griffiths reports that the selling of quotas was one of the flaws in the regulatory system. He discovered that many small tea estates were able to obtain quotas which were then sold to middlemen without any tea leaving the estate. Other estate owners sold their quota and kept the tea produced for sale in the domestic market. Thus, for some tea estate owners and less than honest merchants, the tea restriction system turned out to be a financial bonanza which required little effort beyond that of obtaining the export quota licence. Beadnell had proved to be an honest man who displayed confidence that he could obtain the consent and labour of the Palaung and Shan tea growers to transform the domestic tea industry into one capable of gaining a share of the world market. Clague believed that Beadnell had a fair chance for success. Nothing like this could be said for the quota fraud that Hkun Pan Sing and Bennett had planned. Furthermore, the incident served to vindicate the cautionary approach of the Burma Government somewhat in light of Craddock's criticism.

A large-scale export industry in Shan tea could not be created overnight once the Tea Restriction Agreement ceased to apply to Burma. Moreover, Burma proper suffered from an economic downturn in the summer of 1938 largely as a result of ethnic tension between Indian Muslims and indigenous Buddhists caused by the re-publication of a book written by Shwe Hpi, an Indian Muslim, which had less than kind remarks to make about the Buddhist religion. Nevertheless, the Lipton Company purchased a large quantity of Tawngpeng tea to test its marketability in Burma proper. And the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation Limited took some steps towards indicating the potential for Shan tea exports outside Burma.

In February 1939, the Corporation erected a factory to manufacture tea at Namhsan, the capital of Tawngpeng State. During its first season of operation, which lasted from 1 Aug. to 8 Nov. 1939, 47,900 pounds of tea were produced of which 16,732 went to Burma proper, Australia imported 10,812 pounds, and 4,128 pounds were sold at the Colombo Auction in Ceylon. This modest, but encouraging, start was surpassed in the second season of production which began 6 April and ended at the end of June, 1940. The Namhsan factory produced 154,561 pounds of tea of which 63,940 pounds were sold in Burma proper, 11,772 pounds were auctioned in Ceylon, and 29,414 pounds were purchased by the United Kingdom Ministry of Food. Collis noted that in Tawngpeng, they exported fifteen million pounds annually. We were continually
meeting tea caravans; the tea packed in tall, white baskets with leaves at the top, which were carried generally by bullock, a basket on each side of the saddle.82

Although the 1939/40 Tawngpeng State budget did not reflect the upturn in its tea economy, this situation can be explained by the generous contribution made by the Tawngpeng Sawbwa to the Lord Mayor's Fund for War Relief of Rs. 1.33 lakhs.83 Tea growers had reason to be satisfied as well. Not only did they have new markets for their tea, but the company guaranteed the tea suppliers approximately 'Rs. 100 per 100 viss of dry tea' irrespective of fluctuations in the market.84

Obviously, tea produced in the Shan States was not about to displace or challenge the share of the market held by the major tea-producing countries such as India and Ceylon. For example, Ceylon exported 235,739,000 pounds of tea in 1938.85 And yet the Tawngpeng tea growers had demonstrated a potential for growth by obtaining a share of Empire tea sales which brought benefits to investors, cultivators and consumers alike. Unfortunately for the fledgling Shan export industry in tea, its full potential was never realised. The Japanese occupation of Burma put an end to the progress attained in 1939 and 1940. Subsequently, the Shan tea industry reverted to a purely domestic affair after Britain transferred power to an independent Burma in 1948.86 Never again would Shan tea have commercial success in the international market.

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Ethnicity Policy in Burma

Fei Xiaotung's 1978 account of 'Ethnic identification in China' was translated and published in the Newsletter (No. 11, pp. 11-24). This article did not discuss the theory of ethnic identification nor the political implications - rather it discussed the basis, mainly historical elucidation, on which particular cases were decided. Nevertheless, it was an insightful account by a highly skilled anthropologist. The much briefer translation of a Burmese article below raises some important questions about the thinking of the SLORC administration as well as drawing attention to the implications of the Fei article in the actual administration of the Chinese policy.

A crucial passage in the Burmese article is
Each of the indigenous racial groups that belongs to the Myanmar race should take steps so that the autonomy of each group will be raised to a higher level of autonomous districts and township zones, and from these autonomous regional levels to the form of a nation. Through this, disputes regarding the suitability to the nation of either the unitary or the federal system will come to an end.

I would suggest that this reflects Chinese practice, and perhaps Chinese policy. In practice, in the southern and western parts of Yunnan, areas of which the Burmese would be most aware, autonomy is often confined to local government - that is to the level of local language primary schools and the control of local amenities such as roads. Many officials at this level may be of minority nationality origin, but would have been educated in Putong Hua at the secondary level. This is an aspect of what appears to be a general policy of
moving the brightest students from minority nationality schools into a Han milieu.

The implications of the Burmese article is that the 'Senior Military Official' is proposing a system whereby ethnic representation will be at this local level and these representatives joining others, of other nationalities, at regional and national levels. In effect parliamentary elections will be replaced by indirect elections - perhaps like the 'guided democracy' trialled in Pakistan. It may be likely that this is SLORC's answer to the electoral disaster they suffered in May 1990.

There are other aspects of this brief paper which need consideration. One may venture to suppose that the 'Senior Military Official' is making an official statement and making an ideological case. There are two 'intellectual' topics being discussed (and confused). The first is the nature of 'ethnicity' and race and the second, democracy and the separation of powers. There may be a certain cunning in the manner in which the separation of powers is insinuated into the argument as being not only the sine qua non of democracy, but also a substitute for electoral democracy. The level of the argument however is quite appalling and brings to mind comments in a recent article by Bertil Lintner (Far Eastern Economic Review 4 July 1991) in which he discusses the exile and disappearance of the Burmese intelligentsia. He writes "Virtually everyone who's got any qualifications has left, or is in the process of leaving", according to one Burmese observer.'

Gehan Wijeyewardene

'Loktha Pyeithu Nezin' by " a senior military official" and broadcast on the "Something to Read and Note Today" programme.

from SWB FE/1145 B/1 8 Aug 91 B. Internal Affairs

The type of constitution a nation should have depends largely on the nation's demography. The determining factors in this context are the distribution and concentration of racial groups, the level of development, the size of the population and [political] values.

Today the term ethnic minority no longer conveys a profound meaning. It is evident that the thinking that an ethnic minority is part of a major racial group has been greatly superseded by the concept that a racial group is simply a racial group. The belief that every racial group has the right to autonomy reflects the progression of political awareness among racial groups. The present course of political history clearly shows that the previously accepted notion that there are only eight major racial groups in Myanmar is fast disappearing with time.

If the minority racial groups that have always resided in Shan State are to be considered part of the major Shan racial group, then there can only be one main Shan insurgent group instead of the many insurgent group instead of the many insurgent groups that now exist, such as the Pa-o, Palaung, Wa and Lahu groups. Likewise, there can only be one Kachin insurgent group in the Kachin State. In a similar light, there should be no need for the Nagas to object to their inclusion in the Chin racial group. But such is not to be.
The fact that there are 135 racial groups in Myanmar makes it hard to argue in favour of a Constitution based on the major racial groups. If the state is to be founded on the basis of major racial groups, this still will not end the armed insurgencies, but will instead lead to even more serious racial unrest. Only if the state is founded on the basis of autonomy for racial groups will it be able to either eliminate or lessen misunderstandings and foster the spirit of nationalism. In other words, a three-step-unity - unity within unity within unity [preceding five words rendered in English] - must be established.

Each of the indigenous racial groups that belongs to the Myanmar race should take steps so that the autonomy of each group will be raised to a higher level of autonomous districts and township zones, and from these autonomous regional levels to the form of a nation. Through this, disputes regarding the suitability to the nation of either the unitary or the federal system will come to an end.

It will be most appropriate if decentralization [preceding word rendered in English] at the state level that ensures unity.

The wishes of racial groups will be fulfilled if they are allowed to control the three branches of power [executive, legislative, judicial] in the regions where they form the majority. The right to exercise power at the state level should depend on the branches concerned. For example, legislative power should concern the legislative assembly; judicial power belongs to the supreme court; and executive power should lie with the head of state and the government that he or she has formed. The distribution of power will then be balanced and just, and unity can then be achieved at the state level.

While establishing unity at the regional level through the autonomy of racial groups, unity among all racial groups can be achieved by the head of state, the legislative assembly and the supreme court.

The head of state in a country where many racial groups reside should be a person acceptable to the majority of its citizens and should also receive the support and trust of the majority of voters. Only then can that person represent the whole nation and govern effectively. Since the head of state represents the majority of the people, he shall be responsible to the people and comply with their wishes. The legislative assembly and the supreme court will guide and control the head of state in legislative and judicial matters.

In the same way that the head of state is directly elected by the people, persons participating in civil administration and legislative activities in the autonomous regions should be elected by the people in the regions concerned. Townships should be grouped and a similar practice pursued in major autonomous regions.

Chapter 1, regarding the state, was defined by the 1947 Constitution as follows. The state shall be called the Union of Burma, and the sovereign power of the state lies with the citizens. The 1974 Constitution says: The state shall be called the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma is a state where indigenous people reside together. Under either definition, the state is founded on the major racial groups.

It must be suggested that since the majority of the indigenous racial groups want autonomy, autonomous regions should be established based on the absolute conditions and on the majority racial groups at
the regional level, and the Republic of Myanmar should be established on the basis of a republic that reflects strong unity at the state level. This would be the most appropriate way to proceed in this new era of democracy.

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The Khamu People and their Study

Vladim’r LiO(s,ù)O(c,ù)‡k, Praha

The 1970s brought a revival of interest in the Khamu people, one of the ethnic groups living in Southeast Asia. Both Chinese and Western scholars have organized field trips to southwest China and northern Thailand villages, following up former research of the 1950s.

I. Situation

The ethno-cultural map of mainland Southeast Asia is extremely complex. Several hundreds of ethnic groups living in this comparatively limited area speak languages that belong to several families. One of the largest is the Mon-Khmer branch of the Austro-Asiatic language family. The vast majority of the Mon-Khmer languages are spoken by fairly small ethnic groups, which occupy the slopes of hills and mountains. Traditionally, these so-called 'montagnards' have been known by generic, usually pejorative names, meaning 'savage' or 'slave', such as moi (barbarians) in Vietnam, kha (slaves) in Laos, Thailand and east Burma, pnong or phnong (upland people) in Cambodia, and man (southern barbarians) in China. Now the upland ethnic groups are termed by less pejorative designations: in Cambodia they have become Khmer Loeu, (upland Khmer), in South Vietnam - Dong Bao Thuong, (upland compatriots); in Laos the former pejorative kha was changed to phuteng (Phouteng, Phuteung), 'people living high up', or Lao Theng (Lao Theung), 'upland Lao'.

II. Ethnic names and identification

One of the Mon-Khmer speaking ethnic groups are the Khamu, who are found in northern Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and southwest China. The Khamu people call themselves KamuÖ / KmhmuÖ / KahmuÖ, which means 'people, human being'. The pronunciations used by the Lao (Khamu), Thai (Khamuk), and other ethnic groups caused the different spellings in Western languages. In the past they were called by various derogative names, such as Kha Khmu by the Lao, Kha KhomuÖ by the Thai, Tsa Khmu or Tsa Muong Sing by the Black Tai, Moi by the Vietnamese, etc. Besides, in Laos the Khamu have been called La mangÖ (red deer) that has its origin in a legend among the Lao. According to this legend, a red deer being chased by a hunter suddenly disappeared, a Khamu appearing in its place.

In Laos, the Khamu are now grouped among a large grouping of the Mon-Khmer peoples, so-called Lao Theng (see above). In China, the Khamu have been known, until recently, under the terms Chaman, Shamang or Chama. Now, the Chinese authors call them Kemu. In Vietnam, the Tai-speaking ethnic groups call the Khamu different names, such as Xa Cau, Pu Thenh, Thenh, Tay Hay. The Lahu name for this ethnic group is Kha Klau, the Kang (Xa Khao) call them Klau, the Hmong (Meo) - Mang Cau. Since they have been confirmed as one of the 54 nationalities,
they are named Kho Mu by the Vietnamese authorities.

III. Location and ethnic sub-groups

The Khamu are the largest so-called Lao Theng group in Laos (389,700 in 1986). The entire Khamu population of northern Laos is divided into more than ten regional sub-units, called tmO(¹,«)¹y, the people of which speak different dialects or even languages. The Khamu still pay a certain amount of interest to these sub-units, even when they meet abroad. The word tmO(¹,«)¹y means 'guest, stranger', and in the past it may have been some kind of territorial political unit.

One of the important ethno-local sub-groups of the Khamu in northern Laos is the tmO(¹,«)¹y Yan, situated in the Ban Mo area north of the Namtha River. The tmO(¹,«)¹y Mee is the most numerous sub-group in the Luang Phrabang area, the tmO(¹,«)¹y RO(¹,«)¹k inhabit an area between the Namtha and Beng rivers in the northwest of the Luang Phrabang province, the tmO(¹,«)¹y ôu is in the Xieng Khouang province. Other important sub-groups are the tmO(¹,«)¹y LO(“,-)¹O(i,-) (Cwˆa) in the south of the Phong Saly province and the north of the Luang Phrabang province, the tmO(¹,«)¹y KhwO(ä,`)än around the city of Namtha (Luang Namtha) and the tmO(¹,«)¹y Kr¹¹» along the border with northern Thailand in the Sayaboury province. It is also of interest to note that the Lamet, who speak a language quite different from Khamu, are called the tmO(¹,«)¹y Rmet, as well.

In Thailand the Khamu (about 100,000 in 1983) are found mostly in Nan Province; small groups are also in Chiang Rai and Nong Khai provinces. In Vietnam (about 25,000 in 1983) the Khamu people inhabit the area of the Ma River (S™ng Ma) and ¶in Bin Phu, along the northwest borders with Laos. Small groups live in Tu‰n Giao, Thu‰n Ch‰u and So'n La. Scattered settlements are also found in Thanh Ho'a, Ngh Tinh and H’ang Lin So’n provinces. In China, the Khamu (more than 1,600) live in the flatlands, jungles at the foot of the mountains and in the uplands of the southern part of the Mengla (Muang La)16 and Jinghong (Chiangrung, Chianghung) counties of the Xishuangbanna (Sipsongpanna) autonomous prefecture of the Tai (Dai) nationality, near the borders with Laos. They live in twelve stockaded villages (ten villages in Mengla, two in Jinghong). In the Mengla county, the Khamu form about 1% of its population. Like the Khamu in Laos, in China they refer to each other using the tmO(¹,«)¹y name (village or area name).

IV Language

In 1909 Henry R. Davies classified the Khamu language as a member of the Wa-Palaung group within the Mon-Khmer language family. Henri Maspero assigned Khamu to the eastern branch of the Mon languages Palaung and Wa. Today the Mon-Khmer languages are regarded, in accordance with Joseph Greenberg and other scholars, to be a group within the Austro-Asiatic language stock. Groups of Mon-Khmer speakers, such as the Khamu, are heavily acculturated due to long and intimate contact with surrounding populations. The present fragmented distribution of these ethnic groups would indicate that they were once more numerous and that perhaps they occupied a larger area than at present.
Some scholars separate the Khamu sub-group within the Mon-Khmer languages, which includes Khamu, Rmet (Lamet), Khbit, Phuong, Xinhmun (Xing Mun, Puoc), Khang. The speakers of these languages live in the territory of northern Laos, Thailand, northwest Vietnam, and southwest China, in part. The Khamu language has a number of cognate words in other languages, such as Wa, Parauk, Ava, Lavua (Laveue), Pa-laung (Ta-ang), Rumai, Plang, Hu (Maanmit), Mang (Mang U, Xa Mang, Xa Bao), and some other Wa-Palaung (Palaungic) languages in southwest China, northern Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, as well as the Mon language of Burma and the Khmer language of Cambodia. The affiliation of the root words in vocabularies of the Khamu, Wa and Palaung languages, and the distinction of many Khamu root words from the cognate Khang and Laha (Laqua) languages was stated by Dang Nghiem Van in 1973.

V Ethno-cultural history and presence

The ancient ethnic territory of the Khamu people seems to be found in northern Burma and the southwest part of Yunnan Province, an area settled then by one of the branches of the ancient Bai Pu. In approximately the tenth century, as a result of the separation from the Pa-laung and Wa and the subsequent migration, the Khamu settled fertile upland valleys of northwest Laos and northeast Thailand. The successive migration waves of Lao coming from the north displaced the Khamu people to the mountains and close to the borders with Vietnam. The basic migration of the essential part of the Khamu from Laos to Vietnam was probably in progress in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the area of Luang Phrabang, the Khamu had settlements long before the coming of the Lao people, therefore the Khamu of northern Laos regard Luang Phrabang as their city. According to a Khamu legend, the city was built up before the Lao took power. All kings of Luang Phrabang are seen as descendants of the ancient Khamu ancestor W‡a».

At present, the Khamu have undergone a heavy acculturation towards Lao life, particularly in the Luang Phrabang area. The Khamu have frequently become Buddhists and adopted the Lao language. It seems that thousands of fully assimilated Lao are of Khamu descent. Among the Iu Mien (Yao) in Laos and Thailand, a considerably high proportion is of Khamu and other ethnic descent groups. These people have been purchased very young and ritually incorporated into the Iu Mien community. They are considered as Iu Mien in every respect. There are several thousand Khamu evangelical Christians in Laos and Thailand. In China, only the Khamu of Jinghong have taken over a foreign religion (Hinayana Buddhism) and have their own customs.

VI Totemism

The Khamu people worship nature and spirits called r—oy. An important role in the Khamu clan system is played by totemism. The totem of each clan is primarily a symbol by which a clan is recognized. The Khamu in China and Vietnam are reported to use their totem designation as family names, but the Khamu in northern Laos do not. Their names indicate their relationship to the older generation (the personal name of one's father is attached to one's own).

In the ethnographic material several tens of totem objects have been observed — plants or animals instrumental in killing or
saving the ancestor. The totem is strictly tabooed. The correct attitude towards the totem is one of strict dissociation. One may not eat, damage or even touch one's clan totem.35

The Khamu clans are divided into three main groups according to their totems. In some areas there are also totems which cannot be identified with these three groups. The groups are as follows:

1). quadrupeds: wild boar, civet-cat, gaur, sambur, barking deer, tiger, bear, different kinds of monkey, otter, scaly anteater, squirrel, lizard;

2). birds: forketail bird (malkoha), myna (munia), shrike, jungle-hen, hornbill, water rail, kite, kingfisher, bulbul, rice-bird;36

3). plants: fern tree, garlic, mushroom;37

4). other: snake, beeswarm, pestle, coop.38

In China, according to field research undertaken in 1980, some eighteen clan totems are in use among the Khamu.39

VII Studying the Khamu

In the preceding text I have indicated a few of the areas to which scholars have directed their attention. Contacts between Westerners and the Khamu can be dated back to the very beginning of the twentieth century. The Khamu were an object of study for Henry R. Davies in the context of the Mon-Khmer languages.40 However, the systematic study of the Khamu was begun only in the early 1950s (Roux and Tran, Halpern, Seidenfaden).41 Up to that time materials on the Khamu were included in general studies on Southeast Asia.

The first special studies on the Khamu were published at the beginning of the 1960s. William A. Smalley studied the Khamu from the Luang Phrabang area; Frank M. LeBar directed his attention to the Khamu of northern Thailand.42 In 1973 Dang Nghiém Van published an extensive study on the Khamu in Vietnam.43 At that time special studies on Khamu spiritual culture had also appeared (Ferlus, Bonometti).44

At the beginning of the 1970s two large projects on the study of the Khamu were started at Lund University in Sweden: 1) The Kammu Language and Folklore, 2) The Kammu Village, a Southeast Asian Minority Society. The research material was collected mainly during three initial field trips undertaken by Kristina Lindell (then affiliated with the University of Copenhagen, and later with the Department of East Asian Studies in the University of Lund) to the Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies field-station in Lampang, northern Thailand: 1) September 1972 to July 1973, 2) summer 1974, 3) summer 1976. Early in 1973 Damrong Tayanin, an expert on the Khamu language and culture, began to work in close collaboration with Kristina Lindell. In 1974, Jan-…jvind Swahn, Assistant Professor of Folklore at the Universities of Lund and Göteborg (Gothenburg) joined the team to research folk-tales. Since 1975 the research was joined by Jan-Olaf Svantesson (Linguistics) and Hékon Lundstrøm (Musicology).

During 1974 to 1984 important studies regarding 1) language,45 folk-tales,46 3) the annual agricultural cycle,47 4) music,48 and 5)
social relations were published by these projects. The research concentrated on two distinct categories among the Khamu in Thailand: 1) those living in what are probably old settlements near the border with Laos, and 2) those who had left their villages in Laos to work temporarily in Thailand but had married Thai women and become Thai citizens. This research concentrated on the Khamu refugees from the Yan of northern Laos.

In 1976, 1978 and 1980 the first field trips were organized to the Khamu in southwest China. Li Daoyong of the Central Minority Nationalities Academy studied the social history, language, economy and customs of the Khamu in the Mengla country in Sipsongpanna. Another Chinese ethnographer, Gao Lishi of the Yunnan Minority Nationalities Academy, concentrated his attention on the spiritual culture of the Khamu in Sipsongpanna.

The 1970s and 1980s were fruitful years in studying the Khamu people, especially because of the research team led by Kristina Lindell and because of the Chinese scholars. For more information on special publications on the Khamu I attach here a selected bibliography.

Selected bibliography on the Khamu (1927-1987) arranged according to the year of publication

1961a William A. Smalley, Duplicated summary of field notes on the Kammu.
1965b William A. Smalley, CO(i,D)a«: Khmu culture hero. In: Felicitation Volumes of Southeast Asian Studies 1, pp.41-54. Bangkok.
1973-4 Pierre-Marie Bonometti, 'Methode d’approche du genie kmhuO'. In: Martin Baber, Amphay DorZ (eds), Sangkhom khady san, Colloque des chercheurs en Sciences Humains. Luang Prabang.
1974b , 'The Yuan dialect of the Kammu language', Acta
Orientalia, vol. XXXVI. Copenhagen.
1976c Kristina Lindell, Damrong Tayanin, 'Kammu language and folklore'. In: Sj¿ren Egerod, Per Sj¿rens (eds), Lampang reports. Copenhagen. (The Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Special Publications No. 5).
1980c Wang Jingliu, 'Kemuren cunzhai jianwen' [Information on Khamu villages]. In: Minzu wenhua [Culture of ethnic groups]. Beijing.
1980d Gao Lishi, Kemuren de lishi chuansho yu yisu tedian [Historical myths and characteristics of customs among the Khamu]. Yunnan Minzu Xueyuan Minzu Yanjiusuo [Yunnan Minority Nationalities Academy, Institute for Minority Nationalities]. Kunming, (Mimeographed).
1981a Gao Lishi, 'Kemuren de tuteng gushi' [Kammu totem tales], Shan cha, No. 4, pp.91-92.
Letters

Vickery's Review of From Lawa to Mon, from Saa' to Thai

Julie Forbush writes:

In the June 1991 Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter, Michael Vickery's review of From Lawa to Mon, from Saa' to Thai by George Condominas is an exhaustive and valuable discussion. It leads one to wish for further thoughts on the subject of legend. In his context he is probably referring to northern chronicles such as Suvanna KhOman and SiÃ¼hanavati.

He wrote: 'The evidence to which Mr Condominas alludes is the corpus of Thai legends about their past, which Condominas has accepted as literal factual history, something which detailed analysis of such tales has so far always shown untenable.' (Newsletter page 8) What are the trusted historical sources that enable an analyst to determine that such legends are untenable? What does one expect of a legend?
What does one expect of oriental thought? Is it invalid unless it parallels western rationalism?

If Mr. Vickery knows at least the two chronicles shown above, he needed to defend his vision of northern Thailand as a region where 'Mon, Khmer and Thai became dominant.' (Newsletter page 9) According to those texts, the small group of Khmer who had been exiled to Umongsela (more than a millennium ago) had only a 19-year reign after their usurpation at Yonok Hiranya Chiang Saen. Then the Tai, in resurgence of power under their Prince Phrom (Brahmakumara), drove the Khmer out, far to the south, as Cornell's careful historian David K. Wyatt chooses to repeat (Thailand: A Short History, page 30). Since there are virtually no known arts or artifacts and no architecture of Khmer design in the north, one comes back to Coeds' two eras in the north—Mon and Tai (which might be amended to Lawa-Mon and Tai contemporaries—Lan Na), but in any case, the Khmer are absent. When provoked to attack Lamphun from Lopburi, they always lost.

Most of all, one would like for Mr. Vickery to expand upon his final sentence: 'She (C°amadev¼) is one of the characters of northern legend whose very historical existence should be considered most in doubt.' What is it, then, that 1,300 years later sustains her memory so vividly across the areas one can define as Hariphunchai by that very phenomenon? From Om Koi to Long and especially in Lamphun, her gifts, her wiles, her magically endowed elephant and her role at Lampang Luang are still the subject of talk, innovation, pageantry and new poetry.

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Professor Allen Wittenborn writes noting his appreciation for the Newsletter and its "serious and honest" coverage of 'materials that are almost impossible to find anywhere else'. He continues:

My current research interests as a professor of history at the University of San Diego include a look at the history and role of the Nationalist Chinese who first entered into Burma in 1949 and 1950 (I believe) and who now have spread out to Thailand and Laos., primarily the former. I am finding it difficult to locate materials on this subject, and wonder if your archives may hold anything pertinent on the topic. Further, is there any way to learn if there are other interested individuals that I might communicate with? I would appreciate whatever information you might provide.

Within this project I have been trying to learn something about both the Chinese Nationalist generals Lu Han and Li Mi. In reading Lucien Bodard's The Quicksand War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) I noted a short statement on page 162 that Lu Han was in fact of the Lolo (perhaps he was part-Chinese, though I am unsure about this) and that "he had pale green eyes." Is this in fact a characteristic of the Lolo people? Are the Lolo the same as or related to the Yi people? If you or any of your colleagues can provide any information on this, I would be appreciative.

In Newsletter Number 12 [March 1991], the excellent overview of Kokang by Jackie Yang Rettie indicated that the total area of Kokang is about 2000 square miles. However, in another source, Bertil Lintner (The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma, CPB, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Series No. 6, 1990) on page 83 notes that the area of Kokang is 2000 square kilometers. Can
somebody in your department clear this up?
    Thankyou again for your help. And thankyou again for an outstanding publication.

* Jackie Yang Rettie replies:
    I refer to Professor Allen Wittenborn's query regarding the discrepancy of the total area of Kokang. My article was extracted from the documented history of Kokang which was written in Chinese based on both Chinese and Burmese official sources. The Chinese form of linear measurement "li" was translated into the pre-metric mile. However, a close study of an enlarged ordnance survey map authorised for navigational purposes indicates that the approximate area may be nearer to 2000 square kilometres than 2000 square miles.

* Irene Bain writes from Kunming:
When I was in Guiyang, Guizhou the staff of Guizhou Minorities Publishing House (Guizhou Minzu Chuban She) were very interested in notifying foreign scholars about their publications Ê the titles translated below are possibly of interest to Newsletter readers.

An outline history of the Miao
(hardcover)  ´3.95
A historical survey investigation of the Miao (3 volumes; covering Hmong in Guizhou)
   ´5.30, ´4.00, ´2.70
Various gazetteers of Miao Autonomous Counties in Guizhou.
Miao dances and the shaman culture   ´4.00
Traditional accounts of the first Miao   ´3.50
Essays on ethnic demography   ´4.00 (relates to ethnic groups throughout China)
Miao-Han Dictionary
(East-Guizhou dialect, hardcover)   ´9.50
Miao funerals   ´5.50
The Yao of Guizhou   ´2.80
Customs of the Miao in China   ´6.20
Ancient songs of the Wuling Miao
[no price given]
The song of the relativesI
(Hmong-Han text)   ´7.50

Books can be purchased from:
Guizhou Minzu Chuban She
Guizhou Sheng Zhengfu Dayoan nei
Guiyang, Guizhou, China 550001

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Book News

    Evans examines, from a social anthropological perspective, the
economics and politics of Laos since the 1975 revolution. He also offers fresh observations on the viability of any socialist regime—particularly collectivisation. A description of the distinctive features of the revolution in Laos—the absence of a landlord class and the experimental attitude to and modest reach of collectivisation—is followed by an ethnography of Lao economic institutions under communist rule. The analysis of rural socialist measures is securely grounded in an understanding of village socioeconomic structure, especially household production strategies and forms of labour cooperation. The radical egalitarian assumptions of collectivisation ran up against the finely tuned checks and balances between reciprocity and indebtedness that characterized village cooperation in Laos. Evans draws upon the insights of Chayanov, Mauss, and comparative ethnography to argue that any socialist project must take account of the household as a production unit and the logic of peasant decision-making. Evans also shows nicely the perduring power that images of primitive communism have had in Marxist anthropology.


* Readers may also be interested in a recent issue of Peninsule devoted to the Tai peoples of China:


* FURNIVALL PAPERS

The following papers, part of the Furnivall Collection, are now held in the Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU. Copies can be made available for research purposes.

A study of the social and economic history of Burma (British Burma). Part III: British Burma before the opening of the Suez Canal 1861-62 to 1867-68. Published by the Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma [nd] [34pp]

A study of the social and economic history of Burma (British Burma). Part IV. British Burma from the opening of the Suez Canal to the annexation of Upper Burma 1869-69 to 1885-86. Published by the Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1957. [78 pp]

A study of the social and economic history of Burma (British Burma). Part V: Burma under the Chief Commissioners 1886-87 to 1896-97. Published by the Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1957 [73pp]

A study of the social and economic history of Burma (British Burma). Part VI a: Burma under the Lieutenant-Governors 1897-98 to 19134-14. The Pursuit of efficiency. Published by the Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1958. [122 pp.]
A study of the social and economic history of Burma (British Burma). Part VIb British Burma. Burma under the Lt.-Governors 1913-14 to 1923-24. Published by the National Planning Commission, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1959. [150 pp]

A study of the social and economic history of Burma (British Burma). Part VII: British Burma. Diarchy, 1923-37; Depression and Recovery (a) Boom and Depression, 1923-31. Published by the National Planning Commission, Rangoon, Burma 1960 [177 pp.]


British Burma, 1869-1886. Statistical Appendix. [17 pp.]

Materials for studying the social and economic history of Burma (The British Period) Part IVb Extracts from the annual administrative reports 1878-79 to 1885-86. Published by the Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1957 [Pages of notes from each report numbered separately.]

Materials for studying the social and economic history of Burma (The British Period) Part III: British Burma before the opening of the Suez Canal. Extract from the Annual Administration Report 1861-62 to 1867-68. Published by The Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1957. [Each paginated separately]

Materials for studying the social and economic history of Burma (The British Period) Part IVa. British Burma from the opening of the Suez Canal to the annexation of Upper Burma. Extracts from the Annual Administration Reports 1868-69 to 1877-78. [Each paginated separately.

Materials for studying the social and economic history of Burma (The British Period) Part V: Burma under the Chief Commissioners. Extracts from the annual administration reports, 1886-87 to 1896-97. Published by the Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1957. [Pages of notes from each report numbered separately.]

Materials for studying the social and economic history of Burma (The British Period) Part VIb Burma under the Lieutenant-Governors. Extracts from the Annual Administration Reports 1914-15 to 1922-23. Published by the National Planning, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1959 [Each paginated separately. Total 131 pp?]

Materials for studying the social and economic history of Burma (The British Period. Part VI.(a): Burma under the Lieutenant-Governors from the creation of a legislative council to the First World War. Extracts from the annual administration reports 1897-98 to 1905-06. Published by the Economic and Social Board, Office of the Prime Minister, Rangoon, Burma 1957. Pages of notes from each report numbered separately.]
Reports on Administration of Burma 1906-1914 [Each paginated separately. Total 133pp?]

Statistical Appendix 1861-62 to 1867-68 [pages numbered 31-34]

Statistical Appendix 1886-87 to 1896-97 [ii, 25 pp.]

Statistical Appendix 1896-97 to 1913-14 [64 pp.]

Statistical Appendix 1913-14 to 1923-24 [73 pp.]

Statistical Appendix 1923-24 to 1931-32[78 pp.]

Statistical Appendix 1931-32 to 1939-40. [109pp.]

Conferences

The Northwest Regional Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies, Fourth Annual Conference

University of Oregon Campus, Eugene, Oregon
November 8-10 1991

ENVIRONMENTAL STABILITY AND CULTURAL COLLISIONS

Keynote Address:
The Big Stone and the Small Man: A parable of Relations Between Nature, Culture and State in Southeast Asia
to be delivered by Dr Michael Dove.

Papers and panels include issues such as family planning, urbanisation, agriculture and trade, and natural resources.

Further information:
Southeast Asian Studies c/o History, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1228 USA
FAX: (503) 346-3127

* 5TH THAI STUDIES CONFERENCE 1993

Proposal for a Panel on:
THE THREE SEALS CODE AND ITS RELATION TO EARLIER LEGAL LITERATURE

'Most discussion of the Siamese Law Texts takes The Three Seals Code as a starting point from which to calibrate the gradual adoption of western legal ideas under the Bangkok dynasty. It would be novel and productive if a panel put The Three Seals Code at the other end of the time scale, and treated it as the end point of the development of Ayuthayan legal texts. Most historians of Ayuthaya seem content to repeat Burney and Lingat's synthesis of Siamese legal history. Elegant as their work is, it is now half a century old. Our panel would consider whether it is possible, desirable, or necessary
to offer the historians a new synthesis of the meagre information we possess about Ayuthayan law texts and practice. Is there life after Lingat?

Internal Textual Evidence

Our predecessors of the 1930s did a splendid job of establishing a critical text of the Three Seals Code. Their labours made it possible for our generation to engage in minute textual analysis. Michael Vickery, for example, has examined the dates given in the Preambles to each section, on the basis of which he proposes four reigns during which the law texts were successively recompiled: before 1569, 1593-9, 1611-22 and 1633-43 [72 JSS]. Japanese scholars from the National Museum of Ethnology, Senri, Osaka, coordinated by Professor Yoneo Ishii, have approached the problem from a linguistic angle, and have made it possible to date portions of the texts from our knowledge of the history of the Thai language. Their 'Key Words in Context' computer-generated concordance was published at least ten years ago, but, in European languages at least, I have not seen any use made of it. Let's ask the Japanese scholars to bring us up to date on the conclusions and hypotheses that follow from their work. Did the Siamese Thai language used by the texts change sufficiently between the 16th century and 1805 for us to guess the date of particular passages on linguistic evidence alone? Is there evidence that older passages had their syntax and vocabulary updated in 1805?

Other Ayuthayan Law Texts

Evidence from 16th century Lanna and Burma suggests that what's important for a judge or governor in a provincial town is to be visibly in possession of a law text. Whether the text is up to date, or even relevant, seems to be a matter of little importance. Indeed, the Thai Yuan and Burmese claimed authority for their texts on the basis of antiquity rather than modernity. For Lingat's claim [that the recompilation of Siamese law texts was functionally equivalent to the 19th century European invention of legislation] to be true, the Siamese position must have been quite different: the 'Recompiling Kings' must have been able to distribute copies of their new text to, at least, all their provincial governors, and must have persuaded them that the up to date texts should be cherished, and the old editions discarded. We could test this if we knew more about the kind of law text likely to be found in an Ayuthayan provincial capital. Dare we hope that there are still such discoveries likely to be made in monastic book chests? Until such a happy day, there are one or two clues that we could profitably reexamine. The most suggestive clue is the collection of law texts on which James Low of Penang based his articles of 1847-9. One of these describes itself as 'having been given to the General sent to conquer Tenasserim' and appears just to deal with evidence and procedure. The others share titles with sections of the Three Seals Code: a detailed comparison of texts and dates should reveal a lot. But do the manuscripts still exist? Low gave them to the Royal Asiatic Society, London, and Professor Barry Hooker remarks that they have since been lost. On the other hand Professor Simmonds assures me that he remembers recataloguing them.
within the last ten years. We at SOAS are perfectly placed to
investigate the matter further. If they still exist, they would make
perfect fodder for a one year postgraduate dissertation. Does anyone
know a student who is interested and could get the job done before
Summer, 1993? The second clue is the collection of 11 edicts edited by
Prince Damrong and published posthumously in 1964. As a non Thai
speaker i have not been able to consult this edition. I would very
much like to know the date and provenance of the manuscript, and why
these particular 11 texts were bound together. Perhaps a scholar from
Thailand who knows what unpublished manuscripts exist in Thai
collections could tell the panel about this and any other Ayuthayan
law texts. The third clue is to be found in Australia: ANU have a
manuscript which they describe as 'Traditional Family Law text,
Ayuthaya style writing. Can a scholar from Australia be persuaded to
look at this and report to us in 1993? [ANU does not appear to possess
this textÑEd]

The call goes on to suggest that the panel consider a range of other
evidence including Lanna Tai and Lao texts, as well as Khmer, Mon and
Burmese sources. The author suggests that there may also be other
useful approaches in addition to those outlined above, and welcomes
readers to write to him.

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Contributions may be sent by e-mail, but please ask for instructions
before sending.

Contributions, preferably on disk, may also be mailed direct to the
Editor, at: CHRTU, Department of General Practice, UWA, Nedlands,
Western Australia 6009.

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* This is the first of a two-part feature on Thai Unions. Part Two,
which looks at the history of Thai unions prior to 1991, will appear
in the December issue of the Newsletter.

1Known in Thailand, in English as the FCRA Service Corps for Chinese
Refugees in Northern Thailand.

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from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada,
and by a London House (Canada) Fellowship. The author wishes to
acknowledge the helpful remarks made by Professor Trevor Lloyd, Dept.
of History, University of Toronto.

2. Tawngpeng, or Taungpeng, is an English corruption of the Burmese name for the State, Taung-Baing. Loi Long is the Shan name which means big hills. The equivalent in Thai is, Doi (hill) Luang (big). The Chinese refer to Tawngpeng State as, Ta Shan (big hills) or Ch'a Shan (tea hills). Scott, J.G. and J.P. Hardiman. 1901. Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States (hereafter referred to as GUBSS) II:III:250

3. This king is also known as Aloncansu. The earliest-known Burman kingdom was centred at Pagan although in its initial stages it tended to be dominated by Mon and Pyu notions of art, architecture, religion and administration. The initial Burman identity can be associated with the reign of Alaungsithu. In the historiography of Burma, controversy has centred upon the reign of this king. According to G.H. Luce, Ceylon led a successful attack against Pagan in 1165 to unseat Alaungsithu. However, a later article by Michael Aung-Thwin demonstrates that Pagan did not come under attack from Ceylon at this time. Luce, G.H. 1970. "Aspects of Pagan History - Later Period", in Tej Bunnag, and Michael Smithies (eds) In Memoriam Phra Anuman Rajadhon. Bangkok: The Siam Society, pp. 129-146. Aung-Thwin, M. 1976. "The Problem of Ceylonese-Burmese Relations in the 12th Century and the Question of an Interregnum in Pagan: 1165-1174 A.D.". Journal of the Siam Society 64(1):53-74

4. Tawngthu cultivators practise shifting agriculture.

5. GUBSS II:III:252

6. The British grouped the main block of the Shan States into a federation as of 1 Oct. 1922.


9. GUBSS II:III:254-255. The Shan States of Hsipaw and Mong Mit also manufactured tea. In 1930, Tawngpeng obtained Rs. 206,619 from tea out of a total of Rs. 920,568 in revenue. Hsipaw gained Rs. 130,900 from tea from Rs. 1,103,243 in total revenue. Mong Mit acquired Rs. 229,793 in total revenue of which Rs. 8,800 came from tea. Rangoon Superintendent. 1931. Brief Review of the Working of Federation in the Shan States, 1922 to 1931. Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery, pp. 44-46. IOR: M/3/252

10. Letpetso is the Burmese word for wet tea. In Shan, wet tea is known as neng yam.

11. Dry tea is letpet chauk in Burmese.

12. GUBSS I:II (1900), pp. 357-358; GUBSS II:III, pp. 256-257

13. GUBSS I:II, p. 357

14. John Clague, Commissioner, Federated Shan States to the Secretary, Revenue Dept. (Burma), No. 168/21-3, 5 July 1934. IOR: M/3/512

15. In Tawngpeng State taxes consisted of thathameda and tea taxes. Thathameda is similar to a poll-tax.

The Burman heartland, or Burma proper, comprised the central Irrawaddy plain, and is the area which was ruled by Burman sovereigns in the pre-colonial period from the mid-sixteenth century until 1853.

Curzon was staying with Scott in Lashio. G.N. Curzon to Lord Carrington, 15 June 189[?]. MSS. Eur. F 111/81A. The Curzon Collection.

The figures for prices paid represent the average prices during any given year and are not strictly accurate since "precise accuracy is made impossible by the different qualities put on the market in varying quantities and at fluctuating prices at successive periods of the year".


Joint Controller, Indian Tea Licensing Committee, Calcutta to E.H. Beadnell, 14 Feb. 1934. IOR: M/37512


Note by Clauson, a Colonial Office Official, 23 Nov. 1932. Public Records Office (PRO): CO 54/914/14

Memorandum. Notes of a meeting on 15th Dec. 1932 with representatives of the Ceylon Association. PRO: CO 54/914/14


Griffiths, op. cit., p. 191

Hkun Pan Sing to Beadnell, 27 June 1934. IOR: M/3/512

FSS 1934-35, P. 4. IOR: V/10/537

Shan States and Karenni, op. cit., p. 64

Hkun Pan Sing to Beadnell, 18 Aug. 1935. IOR: M/3/512

Clague to the Secretary, Revenue Dept. (Burma).


Attlee to Samuel Hoare, 3 Jan. 1935. IOR: M/3/512

Attlee to Hoare, 12 Jan. 1935. IOR: M/3/512


Ibid.
The above discussion regarding the Indian Tea Cess is based upon, Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 596, 598, 613.

Extract from a letter, D. Monteath to Commerce Dept. (India), 7 Feb. 1936. IOR: M/1/195.

Ibid.

Secretary, Indian Tea Licensing Committee to the Secretary, Commerce Dept. (India), No. 886/S. 48-I. L.A., 18 March 1936. IOR: M/8/13.

H.S. Malik, Dep. Secretary, 'Dept. of Commerce (India) to the Under Secretary of State, India Office, Economic and Overseas Dept., 31 March 1937. IOR: M/3/512.


Dow to the Under Secretary of State, India, 15 Oct. 1936.


Notification. Dept. of Commerce (India), 17 Feb. 1937. IOR: M/1/195.


Clague, Adviser to the Secretary of State for Burma, Burma Office to M. Donaldson, Principal Secretary, Burma Office, 2 June 1937. IOR: M/3/512.


The Government of Burma attempted to have Burma proper included within the scope of the tea agreement, but have the Shan States excluded. Government of Burma to Dept. of Commerce, India, 14 Feb. 1938. IOR: M/3/108.

Comment by Johnston.


Clague to Donaldson.

The Hsipaw Sawbwa did not join in this scheme. J.H. Wise, Revenue Dept. (Burma) to T.A. Stewart, Secretary, Dept. of Commerce, India, No. 245K35, 28 March 1936. IOR: M/3/512. For the dismissal of Beadnell by the Tawngpeng Sawbwa see, Hkun Pan Sing to Beadnell, 31 May 1936. IOR: M/3/512.

Ibid. Stephenson had served as Burma's Governor from 23 Dec. 1932 to May 1936.

Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 191-192

Clague to Donaldson.

From 26 July until mid-Sept. 1938, 192 Indians died and 878 were injured during the communal strife. 171 people were injured through police action to restore order of whom 155 were Burmans. Cady, J. 1958. A History of Modern Burma Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 324


FSS 1939-40, pp. 48,56. IOR: M/3/226

Ibid., p56

Collis, op. cit., p. 211

FSS 1939-40, P. 8; Hkun Pan Sing to the Secretary of State for Burma, 6 Sept. 1939. IOR: M/5/16

FSS 1939-40, p. 56

Forrest, op. cit., p. 290


With respect to many varieties in spelling of the name of this ethnic group used by Western authors (K'a-mu, Khmu, Kham, Khamou, Kammu, etc.), I have chosen the spelling Kham used in Laos.


Li (1984), p.17.

The Lao authorities used to speak of four different groups: the Lao proper (or Lao Lum), the tribal Tai (or Lao Tai), the Lao Theng (or Thenh, Theung), and the Lao Xung (or Sung). The Lao Theng (also called Phoutheng) have formed a large group of the 'Kha' people, the Mon-Khmer upland people in Laos and partly in northern Thailand (about 832,000 in 1986). Cf. Kunstatter, vol. 1, pp.236, 238, 296; Minzu cidian, p.274. The figures of 1986 are taken from Miroslav NoO(z,ù)ina, 'Mobilizace horskO(y,«)ch etnik ve spoleO(c,ù)enskŽm vO(y,«)voji soudobŽho Laosu' [Mobilisation of the montagnards in the development of society in contemporary Laos], ms. of the PhD thesis, Prague 1990, according to his personal communication with Lev N. Morev, Moscow.
According to Li Xiangyang in 1987 the Khamu in China were confirmed by the Chinese Communist authorities as the fifty-seventh ethnic group with nationality status (minzu). Li Xiang Yang. 1989. 'Ethnic identification and ethnic groups in Yunnan.' Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter 5:8


Cf. Lindell, Samuelsson, Damrong Tayanin, p.63; Lindell, pp.2-3.

Ibid.


Cf. Bruk, p.427; Minzu cidian, p.530; Mukhlinov, pp.124-125.

In brackets are the Tai names; Chianghung is Tai LŸ (Lue) pronunciation. Cf. Cheah Yanchong. 1988. 'Sipsongpanna', Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter 1:3.

Li 1984 and 1986.


See Ngo Duc Thinh. 1983. 'Malye narody stran VostoO(c,ù)nogo Indokitaja' [Small ethnic groups of eastern Indo-China]. In: Malye narody Indokitaja, p.99.


Mukhlinov, p.124; Li 1984, p.16.

Mukhlinov, p.124.
28Cf. Lindell, p.3; Lindell, K., Jan-Olaf Svantesson, Damrong Tayanin, 'The Kammu calendar and its lore'. In: Lindell et al., pp.19-21; Smalley, p.113.
32Li 1984, p.22.
35Lindell 1984, p.5; Lindell, Samuelsson, and Damrong Tayanin, p.63; Zhao, pp.8-9.
36Many of the bird totems are unidentified. Altogether there may be as many as twenty-one bird totems. See Lindell, 1984, p.6.
37The plant group has only three reported items. In Vietnam there is a Garlic Clan, in Laos a Mushroom Clan, both with very few members. The fern tree is found as a totem in all Khamu areas, and it is also a totem among the Rmet - Ibid.
38Cf. Lindell, Samuelsson, and Damrong Tayanin, pp.5-6; Li 1984, pp.19-20; ibid., 1986, p.67.
39Zhao Weibang, p.8
42See the selected bibliography, 1961-1967.
43Dang Nghiem Van, op. cit.
44See the selected bibliography, 1972, 1973-4.
48Ibid., 1978c, 1981d, e, 1984c.
49Ibid., 1979a.
50See above about the tmO(¹,«)¹y.
51See the selected bibliography 1982b, 1984d, 1986.
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