The Refugees' Language

The theme of borders and frontiers is one which has recurred in the Newsletter. Unfortunately it is often the plight of ordinary people caught between national boundaries which is the focus of our interest. In a previous issue, for example, Gehan Wijeyewardene drew attention to the situation of the "Akha" children, actually Tais from Burma, who make a living charging visitors to Mae Sai to have their photographs taken (Number 8, March 1990). As pointed out in that article, as far as victims go, the children on the bridge at Mae Sai are among the more fortunate; they at least appear to have choices.

The position of other refugees is rather more complicated. One such case came to the attention of the editor midway through last year whilst conducting research in Meng La county in Sipsongpanna. The first mention of the refugees came in response to my faltering attempts to communicate in Tai Lue with local villagers. In a later conversation with my Chinese interpreter, the Tai Lue villagers referred to me as "the foreigner who speaks the refugees' language (nanmin hua)". Subsequent questioning revealed that the language in question was in fact Lao.

There are in fact many ethnic Lao in the Meng La region. Some have married into Tai Lue villages, in districts some considerable distance from the border, such as near Meng Nun. On weekends they may be seen riding into the market on tractor-drawn trailers, the women wearing their distinctive pha nung and short hair style. Some Lao even make it further, as far as the street markets and department stores of Jinghong. Pairs of self-conscious young men, often sporting Thai
promotional t-shirts such as that for Soraphong's recent hit Huachai mai dai soem yai lek. In Meng La town itself there seems to be a steady stream of Lao merchants and government officials passing through, to the extent that some shop and restaurant signs are written in Lao. Several officials at the county government offices speak Lao (and Thai). Of course this situation is to be expected—Meng La is bounded on two sides by the Lao PDR. What is not expected, however, is that a sizeable part of the Lao population of Meng La county did not simply cross over the border from the neighboring provinces in the Lao PDR, but were resettled there from refugee camps in Thailand.

The closer one approaches to the border, travelling along the well-made bitumen road which leads to Mu'ang Sing, the more evidence there is of these Lao refugees. There is one large settlement at the 14 km post, not far out of Meng La, straddling the road squeezed between the Nam La river and the hills. At Meng Mang, close to the Lao border, there are further settlements, with three hundred Lao refugees in the area, according to local officials. Most of this latter group are housed on the extensive rubber plantations in the area. Stories about their occupation vary according to the source: local officials said that they are employed on the rubber plantations; the opinion of neighbouring Hani (Akha) villagers was that the Lao do nothing, just live off handouts. The Lao refugees themselves said that they are rice farmers and want to work, but have no land.

What is apparent is that this Lao group is very out of place in Meng La; few of them speak any Chinese, and they have not fitted into the

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Chinese community. Even among the Tai Lue, with whom they could be assumed to have some cultural affinity, the Lao are often regarded as "lazy". It appears that they were resettled around eight years ago, in response to an offer from China through UNHCR. Many are from southern Laos, and whatever their expectations at the time, most now want to get out of China, even to return to the Lao PDR. As one Lao man in Meng Mang said "China is just a bigger form of refugee camp".

With increasing talk of the establishment of air, road and river links between Thailand, Sipsongpanna and the Lao PDR in the near future (Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 May 1991) it seems that the region will soon open up. Already there is said to be a plan to remove restrictions on travel to Meng La, as recently occurred in Dehong, and Chinese workers are rumoured to be in Laos, undertaking repairs on the road they constructed through Mu'ang Sing in the seventies. Also, indications are that, on all sides, the motives behind opening up the region are far more closely allied to development of the region's commercial and tourist potential than they are a response to the needs and welfare of the region's population.

Supposing that these plans do indeed come to fruition, then their implications for the "victims of frontiers" may be worth considerable thought. With the expansion of the free enterprise economies of China and Laos, will they prove to be an embarassing reminder of an earlier time in the region's history, when ideological considerations were of more importance? Or, in the spirit of chinthanakan mai, will the resumption of contacts between nations be matched by a reappraisal of the situation of individuals such as the Lao refugees in Meng La?
More than just Old or New Capital

Niti Pawakapan

Sitting in the bus coming to ANU this morning (31 May), the fog was so thick that I hardly saw anything around me, not even the Australian parliament. A bad omen—the media would definitely have taken a big bite and made headlines of it if such a thing had happened to the Thai parliament house in Bangkok (the Thai capital). But we in Canberra (the Australian capital) knew what had been going on in the ALP caucus last night. Finally, the Hawke/Keating business had come to a crisis. The media grasped their chance and made their day through the newspapers, on television and on radio. Ordinary people, the story goes, don't like Paul Keating because he is arrogant and mean. He loves aggression, especially in parliament. Worse, he's rich, very rich.

This brought to mind Pasuk Pongpaichit's article in Khao Phiset of May 20-26. Pasuk writes that the last decade in Thailand saw rapid socio-economic change and, consequently, the confrontation of two powers, the so-called ngoen kao 'old capital', on one side, and ngoen mai 'new capital', on the other. Ngoen kao means the Thai aristocrats who, for years, have established their wealth, prestige, social status and a closed relationship among themselves, and become a prominent group in Thai society. They are, or were, rich, educated and well-known. Many of them work in the public service and military and, to some extent, use their authority to achieve and maintain their wealth and privilege.

Ngoen mai, on the contrary, includes those who have made their way from the lower levels of Thai society in the last couple of decades. This group came from poor families and had limited education, but through hard work, the application of skills and talents, have become wealthy. In this laissez-faire economy, Pasuk goes on, these people have done everything to achieve more wealth and ensure their social status; in so doing, they have got themselves into corruption. These are the businessmen turned politicians, especially those who were in politics before the February coup. Pasuk, with little reluctance, puts the blame on the latter for their involvement in corruption when she mentions further that "...their [ngoen mai] attitude toward corruption contrasts with the moral standards of ngoen kao, especially the technocrats who hold firm to their ethics and honesty."

Pasuk has an answer, but it is a one-sided conclusion. Talking about corruption in Thai society is like throwing a stone into a crowd of people, it, doubtless, will hit someone. It is easy to accuse any Thai either in the public or private sector of corruption. In the past all Thai military dictators were involved in corruption, but no one dared to, or could publicly, if not privately, talk about it. The worst corruption was, and is, probably among the Thai police. The great difference, however, is that under the former government, that is Chatichai's, corruption has become a public concern. Unlike the situation ten or fifteen years ago, anyone could express his/her opinion freely in the last few years, and those who enjoyed this freedom the most were those in the media. In modern Thai history it is only twice that the Thai media has had significant freedom to
criticise the government, i.e. between 1973 and 1976, and under Chatichai's administration. One must not forget that it is only during the last few years that the Thai prime minister, nicknamed Na Chat (younger uncle Chat), made the media feel at ease with his easy-going style. It was a time during which the media could question any politician, including the prime minister, on any topic; and, most important, the media had gradually made corruption in Thai society a matter of public concern. This has given Thai journalists, who have more freedom than any of their colleagues in Southeast Asia, particularly in the newspapers, a status, higher than any others in the region. Pasuk, however, is quite correct to say that ngoen kao supported the anti-parliamentary movement, the government of Chatichai being the immediate target. It is clear, of course, that many former ministers, or ngoen mai, were accused of having dirty hands involving their misuse of authority, their illegal businesses and corruption. But were they the only ones to blame? The accusations were directed towards parliament in an inflammatory way, largely by the military, using the media to influence the general public. The media had found difficulties in their relations with some ministers, Chalerm Youbumrung in particular had caused anger among the military as well as the media, who turned to the military and made of the senior military figure, General Chavalit Yongjaiyut a Mr Clean na hero riding a white horse coming to rescue.

The result was predictable. While the military maintained its image as the country's guardian, the government was held to be nothing but a bunch of greedy, corrupted businessmen. Before the February coup, the Thai media, whether consciously or not, played its part to discredit the government, gradually, but systematically.

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Review Article

Georges Condominas: From Lawa to Mon, from Saa' to Thai

Michael Vickery


The subject indicated by the title, and a major theme of both the essays translated here, is change of ethnic identity, in particular how Thai ethnicity spread over areas occupied by other peoples. The historical and ethnographical evidence suggests two possibilities: movement of Thai peoples, and the adoption of Thai language by non-Thai in the absence of significant movement of original Thai speakers. This is perhaps the greatest unsolved problem of the early history of Thailand. How was it that Thai became the language of areas occupied by Khmer and Mon whose societies were at a higher level of cultural and material development, and in the case of the Khmer politically more powerful? Was it conquest of decaying
civilizations by bold warriors, or peaceful acceptance of a new language? If the latter, why? This is an area in which historical ethnography may have a field to itself. Straight historians of Thailand have stuck to Ayutthaya-centric king-and-battle treatments, and have either ignored the problem, or put forward ad hoc, even contradictory, explanations for particular cases. Either way something is implied about the area occupied earlier by the speakers of the language, which seems to have spread.

With respect to the Thai/Tai, the current consensus, based on linguistic comparison, but also supported in general by the traditions of the Thai peoples in whom Condominas is most interested, is that the oldest identifiable location of Thai-speaking peoples was in what is now northern Vietnam and adjacent areas of southern China, Kwantung and Kwangsi. Linguistic comparison suggests that their dispersal, the spread of their languages, from that area westward, southwestward, and northwestward into Yunnan, began about 2000 years ago. Those languages, or their linguistic descendants, may have reached what is now central and northern Thailand around 1000 AD.

This consensus is quite recent. Until the late 1960s the standard opinion among Western scholars, and official history in Thailand, held that the Thai had originated in central, perhaps even northern China, had constituted the important kingdom of Nan Chao in Yunnan, and that the spread into Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, the Shan States, etc., was a rapid, mass migration of original Thai speakers after Nan Chao was conquered by the Mongols in the 1250s. This view is not based on any Thai traditions, but was devised by European amateur historians and based on misinterpretations of Chinese sources. A modification of this view by G. Cïds was that the Thai migration and conquest of other peoples had not been by a massed population, but by small bands of warriors.

Condominas recognizes evidence for both types of language spread, but his treatment is inconsistent, maintaining elements belonging to the Nan Chao theory, although he recognizes the validity of the arguments against it.

On page 29 he refers to 'the rapidity with which the Thai-speaking peoples have achieved expansion from Southeast China up to and including Assam on the one hand, and to the Malaysian peninsular area on the other', which is not after all so rapid if the 2000 years estimated by the linguists is in mind (think of the ethno-linguistic changes in Europe over the last 2000 years). It would have been rapid, if, as in the older Nan Chao-theory, it had all taken place between the mid-thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, by which time central and peninsular Thailand were certainly mainly Thai.

In his discussion of the two versions of the older expansion theory, a flood of people favoured by Louis Finot, and assumption of power by a small Thai ruling class suggested by Georges Cïds (pp.30-31), who considered that the Thai had begun infiltrating the valleys south of Yunnan from long before the Mongol conquest, Condominas interjects one of his surprising historical judgements, that '[t]he Thai established themselves everywhere in small autonomous principalities, except in Siam where they formed a large state' (p.31, n.1), forgetting that until the sixteenth century Ayutthaya was no larger nor politically more important than Chiang Mai, that until the fifteenth, perhaps sixteenth century, it may not have been
predominantly Thai in language, and that until those relatively late
dates the indubitably Thai states of 'Siam' Ñ Sukhothai, Kamphaeng
Phet, Phitsanulok Ñ were small autonomous principalities just like
those further north and northeast.

Covert Nan-Chaoism appears where Condominas acknowledges that
'most of the population [of Nan Chao] spoke Tibeto-Burmese languages',
although insisting that there had been 'temporary predominance of a
Thai-speaking chieftaincy originating from the valley floors of
southern China' (p.39), and that a 'Thai group had, moreover, already
dominated a state system, Nan Chao, where it is true the
Tibeto-Burmese soon regained the control of the confederation' (p.78).
At what time this is supposed to have occurred is unclear. Condominas
mentions it again in reference to 'numerous populations [who] rid
themselves of their [Thai] conquerors, as was soon the case for the
Nan-chao, and a large area of Burma' (p.45), undefined, and which
surprises given the large area of Burma which is still Thai (Shan). It
was apparently, in Condominas's view, these Thai chiefs in Yunnan
whose conquests 'enabled them to constitute a vast area of Thai
principalities, extending from the southern confines of Nan-chao and
covering the northern area of continental Southeast Asia in its wider
sense from Hainan and Upper Tonkin to Assam' (p.40). Clear rejection,
or at least neglect, of the new linguistic consensus, is in the
reference to the 'Thai groups ... their migration to the west Vietnam
region [implicitly from Yunnan] in the ninth and tenth centuries'
(p.47).

Condominas, thus, still holds that the Thai moved out of
Yunnan in all directions, even if Nan Chao was only a temporary
conquest, not a genuine Thai state.

A real relic from the Nan Chao theory is the remark, following
CÏds, that elements of early Sukhothai military organization were
derived from the Mongols (p.52, n.41). This explanation was proposed
by CÏds when he believed Nan-chao to have been a real Thai state (Les
Žtats hindouisŽs d'Indochine et d'Indonesie, 1949, pp.55, 318), and he
neglected to remove it from the 1964 edition when he already realized
that Nan Chao was Tibeto-Burman; and rejecting the Nan Chao connection
removes any reason to link early Thai organization with the Mongols.
Condominas does not go as far as another student of Tai political
systems, Jacques Lemoine ('Tai Lue Historical Relation, etc.',
Proceedings of the International Conference on Thai Studies, July
1987, Vol. 3, Part I, p.131), who found in Thai nO(ø,a)y 'master' a
derivation from Mongol noyan, while Condominas thinks nO(ø,a)y is
from Sanskrit nO(ø,a)yaka (p.107). This is equally suspect, for
nO(ø,a)yaka is found in Thai independently of nO(ø,a)y, and the
differing speculative etymologies offered by Lemoine and Condominas
illustrate the need for intra-Tai comparative work rather than ad hoc
suggestions of linguistic diffusion.

Subconscious Nan-Chaoism may have influenced the explanation
which Condominas, quoting Haudricourt, offered for the semantic field
of mŸšng, which 'designates ... both the main town and the
principality, but ... also defines the communes of different sizes ...
for on the vocabulary level there is no distinction', and it is thus
an example of 'semantic structural impoverishment', for which 'the
only possible cause ... seems ... to be the change in language, a
learned language and therefore not as rich as an inherited language'
(p.36 and n.11). This is an explanation based on assumption of the rapid Thai language expansion over a large area implicit in the Nan Chao theory. Its ineptness is shown by the precisely identical semantic field of Khmer sruk, and apparently also Mon O(d,o)O(σ,u)O(ν,ú) (H.L. Shorto, A Dictionary of the Mon Inscriptions from the Sixth to the Sixteenth Century, p.135) in areas where there is no evidence of rapid population or linguistic expansion.

Although it is not explicit, one has the impression, indeed from the very title, and from the remark, 'the study of present-day Thai domains and principalities [apparently those of Vietnam]1 seems indispensible to an understanding of the process of formation of these states [i.e., "the kingdoms of Lan Na, Lan Sang, Ayutthaya, or their present-day heirs, Laos and Thailand ... strongly influenced by the Mon kingdoms and the Khmer Empire" (pp.31-32)], that Condominas considered the Tai societies of northern Vietnam to represent an original, or at least ancient, Thai political system, less adulterated by other cultures than those of Ayutthaya, Sukhothai, or even Chiang Mai, and more peculiarly Thai, fundamentally different from Khmer, Mon or Vietnamese. Not only is that concept outmoded as a basis for cultural research, but Black, White, and Red Tai societies have been for so long under Vietnamese influence and administration, and possibly subject even earlier to Khmer and Cham influence, that a mixed administrative terminology and political structure are inevitable. They have been as much influenced and changed by the assimilation of foreign models as the Thai of Ayutthaya-Bangkok.

Besides the inconsistencies concerning who and where the Thai were before the beginnings of Thai expansion, which would not necessarily detract from a study of the political structure of the Thai societies of northern Vietnam, there are problems with the descriptive part.

First is the question of language and transcription, for the descriptions involve constant citation of Thai terms. Condominas's citations of Black and White Tai include two different systems of transcription, a European one and another in Vietnamese QuO(«,™)c Ng¥´, and occasionally, for comparison, transcriptions of standard Central Thai according to conventions used there, as well as an apparently ad hoc phonetic rendering of adminsttrative names in Vietnam where QuO(«,™)c Ng¥´ would have been appropriate. This can be very confusing, and I think misleading, for students of anthropology or history trying to use Condominas's 'Essays'. Thus, the name for one group of commoners, 'house people' is given both as c™n h#¿n (p.47), and as c™n h´¿n, Qu™c Ng¥´ spellings on page 48 and as kon hŸšn (p.64) and kon hšn on page 105. There are even a few instances in which Condominas seems not to have realised that a term used in a Thai title was Vietnamese, not Thai, and thus evidence of assimilation of Thai society to Vietnamese. Such is ²ong (also ™ng), in ²ong sen (p.52), the title nha O(«,u) (p.62), and quan in a 'Th‡i saying' (p.57), which is moreover reproduced entirely in QuO(«,™)c Ng¥´, giving a false impression to anyone who does not know the conventions of that system, whereas the saying itself can be understood in terms of fairly straightforward Thai, or at least Lao. I suspect also that the tax termed nguO(™,.)t (p.47) is Vietnamese.

Further confusion of terminology is inherent in the nature of
description and analysis of the Thai political systems. This is because Condominas has relied on others, both early French colonial explorers and modern Vietnamese scholars, who have tried conjecturally to explain the structures observable today in terms of development from an ideal or hypothetical structure in the distant past.

The confusion is clearest in treatment of the classes of commoners. In one description of the 'house people' (c̄n/kon hē¿n/hŶšn), who seem at present to be among the lowest class of Thai, more or less domestic servants, their status is rationalized by making the category originate in captured non-Thai war prisoners, who were later freed and given their own villages because that encouraged greater production. Then they were mixed with freed hill tribe slaves, and eventually with any persons who could not pay their debts. The historical rationalization differs somewhat from one source to another, and students should understand it for just that, speculative history. It might be pointed out that the term 'house people' corresponds literally to the Ayutthaya-Bangkok Thai bala ršan (/phonlaršan/), which now means 'civilian', and in which the Sanskrit bala, probably in this context borrowed from Angkorean Khmer, has replaced the native Thai kon/khon (Black and White Tai hŶšn/hšn is the same term as standard Thai ršan). There is indeed an opportunity here for useful comparative historical hypothesis, but in a different manner.

Within the discussions of commoners and their evolution there is another expression which exhibits total confusion. It also indicates a category of people, and is written 'pO(u,ù) or p‡i' (p.48) or puO(a,ù)' pai (p.51). Condominas states that the first term derives from Cantonese puk, 'servant' (p.111), and that the entire expression means 'those who live close by' (p.48), or "helper" or "auxiliary", here to be translated as "serfs" (puO(a,ù))' plus '/paai/ÊÑ with a long a Ñ it is an auxiliary word, not to be confused with pO(a,ù)y meaning "commoner" (p.53), or 'serfs of non-Tay origin' (p.64, see also p.67). The 'commoner' pay, on the contrary, were "free peasants" ... reputed to be descendants of the fellow warriors of the tao [princes] (p.60). Note the differing transcriptions of pO(a,ù)y /pay.

In fact, there can be no doubt that pO(.,u)a/puO(a,ù)' , written in the glossary in Black Tai script with a final k, is the Khmer term puak, written buok (Old Khmer vnok/vnuok), meaning 'group', found in standard Thai as phuak, and indicating external influence on Black and White Tai, although whether directly from Khmer or via another Thai language is uncertain.

As for pay/pai, Condominas sees two distinct terms, one equivalent to standard Thai phrai, the registered commoners of premodern Ayutthaya and early Bangkok, and another term which is an auxiliary accompanying the term puO(a,ù)' . In one context (p.53) he says the latter contains a long a, and in the glossary (p.108) both are written in Black Tai script. The same ai vowel symbol is used for both, but what is more intriguing is that the term which Condominas calls an 'auxiliary' accompanying puO(a,ù)' is written with the intial labial consonant corresponding to standard Thai pho [ph] phO(a,o)n, indicating that it is the term cognate with standard Thai phrai, 'registered commoner'. Moreover, ¶iu Ch’nh Nh’m and Jean Donaldson, in their Tai-Vietnamese-English Vocabulary [White Tail],
volume 2, p.280 gives 'pO(a,o)y [with a long a] ... the people, citizens (as opposed to nobility'). Condominas's other term pay, which he says means ordinary commoners (p.108), and which is written in his glossary with the initial corresponding to standard Thai po [p] pO(a,o), is not found in ¶iu and Donaldson, nor in Diguet's dictionary of Black Tai, although it must be known to some native speakers for Condominas to have obtained it in written form. A version of the Black Tai traditional chronicle in Black Tai script which I possess (courtesy of James Chamberlain) writes the word for 'common people' with the letter corresponding to pho phO(a,o)n. I suspect that because in Black and White Tai initial aspiration has been lost, so that the initials corresponding to standard Thai p and ph are now pronounced the same (as unaspirated /p/), there has been confusion in spelling among even some native speakers, which has resulted in invention of a second terminological category, because of course some 'commoners' were genuinely free and of relatively high status, while others were indeed serfs. Another possibility is that the term /paay/ which Condominas says is an auxiliary with puO(a,ù)', meaning 'slave', is the old common Southwestern Thai *baai (phaai, paai) 'to be conquered, defeated', also, however, to written, if etymologically correct, with the symbol corresponding to pho phO(a,o)n (see Fang Kuei Li, A Handbook of Comparative Tai, p.66). If this were the case, puO(a,ù) pai should be interpreted as 'group of the defeated'.

One more terminological problem in the discussion of commoners in the Black and White Tai societies is Condominas's treatment of the terms cuTMng nhO(«,™)c/kuong –ok, respectively QuO(«,™)c Ng¥´ and Western transcriptions. Condominas introduces the first term as a type of 'duty' paid to lords by peasants (p.47), presumably from earliest times. Then, when captured slaves were freed (see above) they were settled in villages and paid cuTMng, their settlements became cuTMng hamlets, and their fields were n‡ cuTMng. With a later development some types of cuTMng people and hamlets came to be called nhO(«,™)c/–ok. 'cuTMng and nhO(«,™)c mean basically the same thing [but] nhO(«,™)c are the new cuTMng'(p.48). In another context Condominas says 'kuong –O(o,ù)k (the two words can be used separately),"slaves" or "serfs" of Tay origin ... (subjugated peasants)' (p.63); and in the glossary (p.105), kuong is 'slave of Tay ethnicity', but 'a Laha informant translated it as "interior"'. That translation should have been given more attention, for cuTMng/kuong (Black Tai, White Tai cTMng) is in fact the usual word for 'in' in most of the Thai languages of northern Vietnam, replacing nai of standard Thai. The etymological origin of the people termed kuong was this 'interior people', and from this point of view view nhTMc/–ok looks suspiciously like a misapprehension of nok, 'out, outer'. Jacques Lemoine has written that among the Lue the "Kun Hoen" (kon hŸšn) were 'divided into "inner" (or "domestic") and "outer" (or "more distant") categories of dependents' (Lemoine p.127). He did not provide the Lue terminology, but it can hardly be other than kuong or nai and nok. A problem, however, is that ¶iu and Donaldson, Volume 2, p.263, list nhO(™,«)c as 'a person at the disposal of an official as his public service', which is distinct from the term 'outside', transcribed by them as nO(o,÷). And James Chamberlain has informed me that among Black Tai living near Vientiane several years ago, "/kuang/ which means 'in, inside' were household servants for officials ..., 
and the O(n,÷)ok/ were servants at the same level who worked in the fields".2 They were thus in fact 'outer' people, although the term O(n,÷)ok is certainly distinct from nok.

At least neither of the inferences that "O(n,÷)ok was the usual Black Tay word" equivalent to kuong, or that O(n,÷)ok is "the White Tay term corresponding to Black Tay kuong" is adequate (pp.105, 107).

At the other end of the sociopolitical scale Condominas has misunderstood the title 'ho luang', the literal meaning of which he says is 'The Great Yunnanese', and an example of Mongol influence on the Thai via Yunnan (pp.103, 52 n.41). Not only does this quite arbitrarily displace the modern colloquial ethnonym 'Ho' back in the thirteenth century, but it is not the best conjectural explanation for ho in this context.

There are two other genuine Tai terms which could conceivably be at issue, and which would be transcribed as ho by a non-linguist eliciting oral information. One is the term written hq in standard Thai, and meaning a building. In the expression ho luang it should be construed as 'palace', 'governor's residence', or perhaps as the title of an official attached to such places. Examples of this use of ho abound in the anthropological literature on 'Thai political systems'. In Chiang Mai the O(H,.)o Na ('the front ho'), a literal calque of the Ayutthaya-Bangkok vaO(n,ú) hnO(a,ø) ('Palace [in] Front'), was 'the equivalent of "vice king"', as was vaO(n,ú) hnO(a,ø).3 In Luang Prabang Charles Archaimbault has recorded the Ho DevatO(a,ø) O(L,.)uong, the shrine or altar (ho) of the great (luong) devatO(a,ø), and other such ho denoting man-made edifices; and among the Kachin chiefs' houses were known by various names, including the term 'Hkaw', which is simply the Shan word haw Ñ a palace ... [and] Royal persons such as Kings and Emperors are referred to as hkaw-hkam (palace of gold) or hkaw-seng (palace of precious stone').4 The written Black Tai form of ho supplied by Condominas (p.103) is this term.

A second possibility is the White Tai and Lue word for 'head', corresponding to standard Thai hua. Examples of this are found in Lemoine, op. cit., ho sip 'head of ten' (p.128), ho khwaen 'head of a khwaen' (p.129), ho ha:sip 'head of fifty', ho hau:i 'head of a hundred' ho phan 'head of a thousand, ho muen 'head of ten thousand' (p.131). This is less likely as an explanation for Condominas's ho luang, for 'head of luang' seems meaningless.

Even where another word 'Ho', now written H'q in standard Thai, is found in traditional Thai literature, as in the modern language, as the name of an ethnic group, it is not always Yunnanese. The Lanna chronicle SinghanavatikumO(a,ø)r, at a fictitious date attributed to a time before the beginning of the Buddhist era, treats the 'Ho' as Thai living in RO(a,ø)jagO(r,.)ha, although the location could be interpreted as Yunnan.5

An instance in which comparative linguistic work reveals a relationship not seen by Condominas is one of the titles of nobility, ph“a/fia (QuO(«,™)c Ng¥´/Western), a 'Black Tay title for noble heading a fiefdom', and which 'may also be called fia tao', where the second term also means 'noble, man belonging to the aristocratic class', and which Condominas realises is the term also found in Lao and standard Thai, 'in former times ... a royal title' (pp.102, 113).
Fia is the Black Tai reflex of Mon ba–O(a,ø), pronounced /pha–aa, or phayaa/ in standard Thai, glossed by Condominas as 'royal title preceding the proper name of a monarch' (p.109), which is no longer true, although it was in Sukhothai times. Condominas's failure to see the connection ba–O(a,ø)-fia, is shown by the separate glossary entries, and in the remark 'the residence of a fia who bore the title of an –a (cf. pha–a)' (p.52), in which there is still another error. The identity, however, is proven by the constant appearance of dO(a,ø)v b(r)a–O(a,ø) in the Sukhothai inscriptions for the same relative status as occupied by fia tao in Black Tai society. This suggests either very early assimilation of Mon influence to the 'Tai political systems' of northern Vietnam, or possibly later influence from Sukhothai and Ayutthaya which had borrowed the title bra–O(a,ø) from the Mon. As for an –a / ŋn nha, which Condominas suggested might be a form of pha–O(a,ø), it shows another, probably ancient, borrowing. It is the Sanskrit O(a,ø)j–O(a,ø), ('order, edict') common in Old Khmer, but not at Sukhothai. What is suggested is that this term in Black Tai may be due to very ancient contact between them and the Khmer, or Cham, in Indochina.

The inconsistent evolutionary explanations offered by Condominas's informants and the intrusion of non-Tai terms at all levels indicate that far from representing an early stage of 'Tai political systems', the White, Black and Red Tai today, like the Lue, Khon MŸŠng, and Ayutthaya-Bangkok Thai, show multiple strands of assimilation of foreign elements.

It is not clear where Condominas stands on the question of Thai expansion Ñ by conquest, or through peaceful assimilation. He offers examples of both processes, and perhaps considers, quite reasonably, that both occurred. The only example of original ethnography in his 'Thai political systems' is a description of some Laha villages in northern Vietnam which in the 1960s, when Condominas visited them, had become so assimilated to the language and culture of their Black Tay overlords that they were indistinguishable in dress, and their children no longer spoke Laha at all. But as it stands it is no more than an example, without explanatory value, of one ethnic group dominating another within a restricted area, such as occurs constantly in the hills of northern Thailand, not only between Thai and non-Thai, but among Lisu and Akhu, Hmong and Karen, Karen and Lawa. There is nothing in this story which makes clearer what happened in the Sukhothai area in the 12th-13th centuries; nor is it even legitimate to conclude that 'the Laha and the Khang (Austroasiatics...) were the first occupants of this northwest Vietnamese region which the Tay came across during their migrations' (p.50), which also implies that Condominas considers migrations to be the important phenomenon, before peaceful linguistic assimilation can occur.

With this we return to the major characteristic of 'Thai political structures', as viewed by Condominas, the 'systems of boxes', or 'emboxment', an 'all-encompassing and hierarchical society' (p.35), in which the religious and political structures of each level mirror those of the next higher level, as is reflected in the use of the single term mŸšng for all. This structure seems to have influenced the 'vast Thai expansion' (p.37), though how is not explained, and evidence for vast rapid expansion is the semantic field of mŸšng.
It is strange that an ethnologist did not go beyond this, and even remarked that he chose the designation systmes ‡ embo”tement 'for want of anything better' (p.35), for what he has treated as a unique feature of Thai systems is precisely what other anthropologists have described as segmentary societies, in which a single term covers political entities at all levels, Cieng among the Nuer, and Tar among the Tiv. Those segmentary African societies also showed particular propensities for expansion under certain circumstances, and this might support the view of the spread of Thai languages via physical migrations and conquest, if it were certain that the same kind of segmentary structures pertained in Thai societies 1000 years ago.8

Condominas has assumed that such was true, and that Thai expansion was carried out by small bands under aristocratic chiefs who married the daughters or sisters of the non-Thai chiefs whom they conquered. The evidence to which Condominas alludes is the corpus of Thai legends about their past, which Condominas has accepted as literal factual history, something which detailed analysis of such tales has so far always shown untenable. There are examples in 'Essay' (pp.37, 43), and it is the main theme of 'Notes on Lawa History' in which his visit to a peculiar earthwork in northern Thailand starts a train of thought leading to imaginative reconstruction of a great Lawa state ruling in northern Thailand before the Mon, Khmer and Thai became dominant.

The circular earthwork, measuring altogether 23.5-24.5 metres in diameter, would be too small for a settlement, and 'could only constitute a small fort'. For Condominas this 'would imply a political organization resting not on a sprinkling of autonomous villages but on a broad social space of the kingdom type' (p.8). The logic of this conclusion escapes me, but that can be left for the moment.

What I felt as I read Condominas's description of the 'Lawa tomb' was a definite aura of dŽjˆ vu. In July 1985 I visited Umpang in Tak Province, and sought out some of the people who had been involved in the excavations of buried ceramics which suddenly appeared in the 1980s and produced a sensation in Bangkok art circles and among specialists in Southeast Asian ceramics throughout the world. According to a group of Hmong diggers, the ceramic burials were in circular sites about 10-20, sometimes 30-40 metres in diameter, sometimes slightly raised above ground level, sometimes with 2-3 terraces. They were thus precisely like Condominas's Lawa tomb, and indeed the diggers believed them to be 'Lawa'.

Most of the ceramics were easily identifiable as Thai products of the 14th-16th centuries, and it would not be amiss to guess that the sites were indeed graves, and not remains of edifices which could 'constitute a small fort'.

Whatever the ethnicity of those responsible, and it is a basic principle of arch¾ology that ethnicity and language cannot be deduced from material remains, they do not legitimate flights of fancy about ancient Lawa chieftains, least of all 'a political organization resting ... on a broad social space of the kingdom type' (p.8). Among all the shifting ethnonyms of mainland Southeast Asia 'Lawa' may be the most unstable in its attributions, and anything old and mysterious in northern Thailand may be called 'Lawa' by local people. To affirm that CO(a,ø)madevO(õ,ø) must have been Lawa rather than Mon, or that
she even existed, goes far beyond the limits of existing evidence. She is one of the characters of northern legend whose very historical existence should be considered most in doubt.

30 April 1991

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The New World Order in Mainland Southeast Asia

Gehan Wijeyewardene

The lesson the non-socialist countries of Southeast Asia appear to have for us, from their experience of the last twenty-five years, is that economic development demands authoritarian rule. Lee Kuan Yew has made his own view clear enoughÑfree-wheeling electoral democracy, South Asian style, cannot be afforded. The economic successes of Indonesia and Thailand, with varying degrees of military control, and of Singapore and Malaysia, with authoritarian, but parliamentary, governments, are only countered by the continuing difficulties of the Philippines. Authoritarian socialism has not brought the same development, but recent events in Burma, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia demand some re-assessment of the pattern of regional politics and implications for the future. It is convenient to look at the changing patterns of Southeast Asian politics from the point of view of Thailand, not only because we have most information from a Thailand point of view, but also because Thailand is quite clearly the major player in mainland Southeast Asia.

Authoritarian governments which have fostered free-market economies, welcomed overseas capital and technical expertise, controlled dissent and severely curtailed the activities of workers' organizations, have been a major factor in this success. There has, however, also been a cold war dividendÑthe generous attitude of the USA to the non-communist states, coupled with the exclusion of the communist Indochinese states from the world economy and the destabilization of Vietnam and Cambodia through support for the Khmer Rouge given particularly by China and the USA most notably in the United Nations. All this is now changing.

The two landmarks in recent times are the installation of Chatichai Choonhavan as Prime Minister of Thailand in 1988 and the military coup in February this year. Chatichai's policy in Southeast Asia was encapsulated in the slogan 'turning battlefields into market places' which captured the imagination of many of his fellow-citizens and won goodwill across the world. Much has been written about the influence of the ex-Prime Minister's young, left-wing advisers, and they certainly left their mark on the foreign policy of the period. Nevertheless, one should not ignore his own experience. Chatichai, as we all know, was a general who had served his time in the cavalry. But he also came of an important business family with widespread contacts, had served in the Foreign Service and been Foreign Minister under Kukrit Pramoj. It is unlikely that he would have been party to any foreign policy of which he himself did not approve.

We may discern three distinct aims in this Southeast Asian
foreign policy; first, the creation of a climate beneficial to Thai business in the communist states of Indochina and Burma; second, the assertion of the primacy of Thai political interest in the region; and third, the ending of the debilitating conflicts in the region. Though these are closely inter-connected, they need to be analytically kept separate. For instance, the Thai military had conflicting responses to them. Like Chatichai himself, many senior military officers had extensive business interests and could whole-heartedly approve of the first. The economic push into Burma, particularly into the timber industry, began during Chatichai's rule and was significantly controlled by military personalities. The second aim conflicts with Thailand's commitment to ASEAN—not because an interest in non-ASEAN Southeast Asia would downgrade participation in the Association, but because the balance of diplomatic power might be upset. It is significant that the military have moved to reassure ASEAN of Thailand's position. Finally, the military see a clear threat to themselves if peace in the region is on any terms other than those dictated by themselves.

The leaders of the February coup have partly continued the policy initiated by the Chatichai government and partly reversed it. Michael Vatikiotis, writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review of 9 May, cites the coup leaders' Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin as mending fences with ASEAN by repudiating Chatichai's Cambodia policy: "We are sticking to the PICC [Paris International Conference on Cambodia] and are in full support of our friends in Jakarta", Arsa said. The comment is indicative of the interim government's efforts to mend fences with ASEAN neighbours, some of whom regarded the policies of the Chatichai government as prising Thailand away from the six-nation association. Chatichai and his civilian advisers fashioned a policy the main thrust of which was to establish closer links with the Indochinese states.

In Burma, the junta has continued and enhanced trading relations. This seems to be part of a developing economic program of the Burma Army. A recent paper by one who has had experience as a senior representative abroad for Burma, suggests that from the very beginnings of the Burma Army it has aimed at maintaining a stranglehold on the economy. (This army grew, not out of the British Burma army, but out of the Burma Independence Army supported by the Japanese. This a matter of crucial importance in assessing the post-colonial history of Burma, because the ideology of the colonial army was manifest in a largely British, or British-trained, officer corps with minority, Karen and Kachin, other ranks.) The Defence Services Institute, set up in 1951, became a tax-free trader run by the army, first to provision army families, but later grew into an economic giant. The DSI grew under the vagaries of the political system until it was 'nationalized' in 1962. The author of the paper suggests that the army, mostly as individuals, moved in to take advantage of the nationalization, not only of DSI property, but also that of private owners. In 1990 the government established the Union of Myanmar Holding Ltd. 'with the object of carrying on business internally and abroad and making investment, etc., in the interest of the State and the citizensÉ Forty percent of the capital shares are to be subscribed by the Ministry of Defense, and 60 percent by members of the armed forces, either active or retired, and by regimental
institutions and organizations'. The authorized capital is reported as consisting of ten million shares each worth a thousand Kyat. The Thai military have always had efficient control of Thai business. Fred Riggs documented military and bureaucratic control of business twenty-five years ago. But perhaps there is still something Thai military entrepreneurs may wish to learn from Burma.

During the Chatichai period there was a quite dramatic shift in Thai policy from support, although tacit, of some insurgents, particularly the Karen, to support for the Burma Army. This change appears to have been outside the control of Chatichai and his ministry. Since the coup this support has become overt. The military have also further eased tensions on Thailand's border with Laos, and one of the first pronouncements made by the junta was that it thought Thai government policy under Chatichai had been 'unfair' to the Khmer Rouge.

In general we may say that the military have continued the Chatichai policy of extending business and trading links, but have strengthened their relations with the more militaristic segments of neighbouring states, reaffirmed Thailand's commitment to ASEAN and revived aspects of the cold war in their hostility to Vietnam and the Cambodian government. The leadership has also claimed that Thai communists are still active in the north of the country.

The area of greatest impact of recent Thai policy appears to be Burma, and this is perhaps partly because the Union of Burma had only tenuous links with the communist world and was not part of ongoing treaties. Clearly, very close academic attention needs to be paid to Burma's recent political history, as to every other aspect of that country given its neglect by the international scholarly community. With the limited information available to me, I would say that the crucial set of events had to do with the disintegration of the Burmese Communist Party, which allowed the Rangoon government to have an unambiguous great-power backer, China, for the first time. Of course there were other concurrent events which have had major repercussions. The Ne Win government initiated a few hesitant reforms, which ended in the suppression of the students' movement in 1988 and the imposition of direct military rule by SLORC. It was about 1988 that the Thai military began withdrawing their support for the Karen insurgents whom they had supported by allowing sanctuary on the Thai side of the border and the transhipment of arms. Since 1988 the Karen have lost many of their strongholds and have been reduced to their headquarters at Manerplaw.

In the meantime SLORC decided to conduct an election, which was held in April 1990. Much to the surprise of everyone, the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Su Kyi scored a massive victory in the voting. SLORC however refused to transfer power. Today the league is defeated and demoralized with most of its prominent members arrested, in exile or dead. It appears the election may have been a stratagem to identify and neutralize the second rung of opposition leadership. This is a view now publicly espoused by Senator Gareth Evans, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Canberra Times 27 May).

It is indeed a sad comment that the two movements opposed to the Burmese dictatorships came together at a time when they were both in decline. The ethnic insurrections formed an alliance under the
leadership of the Karen leader Bo Mya, calling itself the Democratic Alliance of Burma, with headquarters at Manerplaw. Most groups appear to have joined the alliance, the major holdout being the Tai (Shan) under Khun Sa, commander of the MŸang Tai Army. The political command, the Tai Revolutionary Council, now the Tai Reconstruction Council, declared itself independent of the Union of Burma. The policy of the DAB is preservation of the Union.

After the crackdown by the army on the student movement in Rangoon, many fled to Manerplaw, and some joined the anti-SLORC fighting forces. They were later joined by certain NLD leaders who with the DAB formed the National Democratic Front which was claimed as an alternative government to SLORC. Within the year, however, the Rangoon government seems to have bought off or defeated many of the insurrectionist groups although not necessarily those groups led by the actual signatories to the DAB agreement.

One of the major aspects of the current situation in upper Burma is the realignment of political and insurrectionist forces and the control of the narcotics trade. The break-up of the Communist Party left the Wa and the Kokang Chinese (see Jackie Yang Rettie Newsletter No. 12) as relatively powerful insurgent groups much involved with the heroin trade. One version of contemporary micro-history is that these groups have broken the control exercised over the trade by Khun Sa and that the trade routes have moved north, passing through Ruili in Dehong Autonomous Prefecture and across the PRC, downgrading the old routes through Thailand. Khun Sa, and some apologists for him in Thailand, claim that he gave up control of opium growing and the refining of heroin when he was made Supreme Commander of the MŸang Tai Army. He has recently claimed that he taxes traffic through the regions he controls, but does not himself engage in the trade. Since the Thai coup, the Royal Thai Air Force appears to have aided the Wa, now clearly the largest heroin traffickers in the region, in their battles against Khun Sa, which makes laughable Thai government claims to be concerned with the suppression of narcotics. It has been reported that the Wa and Kokang Chinese traffickers have been given freedom to trade by the Burmese government in return for the end of their insurrection. Even more significant Wa and Kokang leaders have been allowed to buy property and invest money in Rangoon and the SLORC heartland, tying their interests, inextricably, to the Burmese government. There are recent reports that the Rangoon government has come to terms with leaders of many smaller insurrectionary groups such as the Kachin and Pa-Ø.

The Thai involvement in these developments is threefold: the military-business interests now engaged particularly in timber in upper Burma, the military support being given the Burma Army and its new found ethnic allies, and direct agreement between the Thai and Burmese military leaders. It is reported that General Suchinda, the Army Commander, flew to Rangoon to meet General Saw Maung the day before the military moved to take over the Thai government.

The recent history of relations between Thailand and Laos bears comparison with those between Thailand and Burma. In 1987, the animosity which had been developing ever since the creation of the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic broke out in fighting, specifically at the village of Ban Rom Klao. Surprisingly the Thai army came off second best. This is one of the reasons for the canard heard from time to
time that the Thai army is not meant for fighting. In 1988 General Chaowalit, then Supreme Commander and with affinal relations with Laos, moved to end the fighting, to establish more permanent peacable relations, and opened up grass-roots trade between the two countries. These arrangements were made against the wishes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this should be kept in mind when we consider the charges made against the Chatichai advisers who were accused, among other things, of bypassing Foreign Affairs. The pattern was set before Chatichai became Prime Minister. Just as General Suchinda saw General Saw Maung before the coup, immediately after, he flew to Vientiane to meet Lao armed forces chief of staff General Sisavat Keobounphan, and one of the consequences of the visit was the withdrawal of troops by both sides from Ban Rom Klao (Ronald Tasker Far Eastern Economic Review 25 April 1991). Though economic cooperation and aid are increasing rapidly, it appears the Lao have some scepticism about Thai intentions and wish to avoid the devastation of teak forests which has taken place in Burma.

This alliance forged by the Thai generals with their counterparts in Burma and Laos and with the Khmer Rouge must be understood in terms of the position of the military in Thailand. Until very recently it was thought that the military and the bureaucracy were losing power to the commercial elite and those imbued with Western liberal and democratic illusions. It was thought the military were too divided among themselves to mount another successful coup. February changed all that, though there is some evidence that the leaders moved to neutralize the cavalry, hitherto a major player in coups d'etat, giving credence to reports of divisions within the military. The military are recognized by scholars and other political commentators in Thailand to be an integral part of the political process and, even at the height of parliamentary democracy, it has always been recognized that the interests of the military could not be ignored. Nevertheless the feeling appears to have grown among both military leaders and members of the bureaucracy that the Chatichai government was attempting to change these parts of the bases of Thai politics. The military/civil dichotomy has a complex manifestation in popular Thai ideology, but is neatly symbolized in the contrast between 'green' and 'khaki'. This synecdoche is constantly used in speech and in the press to denote the army (green) and the police (khaki).

There is a quite identifiable view in Thai society that whereas the army are the protectors of the Thai people the police are its enemies. There is a very common pun tamruat thai or th<ai (thai meaning 'Thai', therefore 'Thai police' or th<ai meaning 'plough' or 'to exploit', therefore meaning 'exploitative police'. One should distinguish any 'real' or 'justifiable' allegations against the police from the ideological view received by the society at large and therefore, from what sometimes happens in political action. Reports of the coup leaders' relations with their own appointee to the control of the police is educative. The following are extracts from MODEM, a civil liberties group newsletter in English disseminating information from Thailand during the period of martial law:

15 April: Rumours spread that the military were pushing for the Police Department to be brought under the ambit of the Defense Ministry... Gen Sunthorn dismissed the rumours, but ... Police Director General
Sawat Amornwiwat told reporters that he received an order last week to consider the possibility of the transfer and was urged to give an answer within 15 days. He had convened the police board to discuss the matter today. But Interior Minister Issarapong Noonpakdee disputed the claim when reporters asked why Gen Sawat confirmed the order, [he] angrily responded 'His mouth should be shut with a bandaid'.

17 April: 'I was kicked between my legs so hard I could not cry' said Police Gen Sawat Amornvivat after a meeting with the Interior Minister Gen Issarapong. The police chief was told to 'shut his mouth up' about the plan to transfer the Police Department to the Defense Ministry.

It could be that the Thai military are moving from a situation in which they held the ideological position of 'protectors of the nation' as against the police who were the 'exploiters of the people' to one in which the police will be completely within military control. As a coincidental, personal, vignette of the influence of the Thai military, when I was in Sri Lanka on a private visit in April last year I spent the contemporaneous Easter and Hindu-Buddhist New Year in Jaffna. Air travel was then only possible in Sri Lankan Air Force planes which landed in a 'secure base' held by the Sri Lankan government. To reach Jaffna town one took a taxi from outside the airbase in territory controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. On the dashboard of the ancient saloon car were a variety of stickers, one advertising the joys of Los Angeles, but most prominent among them was one in Thai which proclaimed peace and liberty under the umbrella of the Thai Army. About two months later I was in Dehong Autonomous Prefecture (Yunnan, PRC), the guest of the Yunnan Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and driving along the old Burma Road to Ruili in a car belonging to the local office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the dashboard was a sticker in Thai with the same message from the Thai Army. This is not an organization, I think, of which one may say 'Lord forgive them for they know not what they do'.

The economic carnival which has been blossoming in mainland Southeast Asia has arrived at its Easter without any intervening Lent. For some years now we have heard of the boom, largely Thai controlled, in the Cambodian port of Kampong Som. Last year on the northern border there was a boom in land prices of which I was given direct evidence in Mae Sai, on the Burmese border and in Chiang Khong, across the great river from Laos. In the northeast there is our own Australian Kangaroo Bridge which may arrive in time to be part of the economic bonanza. In the meantime the Burmese, the Lao and the Chinese are looking forward to roads, bridges and whatever will link the heartland of Asia with the Golden Peninsula. The Burmese, it seems, having forgotten insurrections, are encouraging casinos and motels in upper Burma.

It is very difficult to elucidate the Chinese reaction. Clearly the Chinese are now the major supporter of the Thai, and the Thai military have reciprocated, at least with support of the Khmer Rouge and the exclusion of the Dalai Lama. Yet with respect to Burma and the implications of the forthcoming coprosperity area, the Chinese on the one hand support the Burmese government of SLORC and their new-found allies, the Wa and the Kokang and, it seems, encourage the booming trade through Ruili. Yet, on the other, they complain bitterly...
about the alleged influx of heroin and the spread of AIDS. These allegations have been accepted by knowledgeable Western journalists, but I would have thought much greater evidence should be forthcoming. In my very limited experience the Chinese officials in Dehong seemed much more concerned about the movement of dutyfree cigarettes out of the market area of Ruili than they were about any drugs of another kind.

The Thai military are now in a position to control the coming economic boom in parts, at least, of what once was socialist Southeast Asia and to dictate the political agenda. The officer corps is highly trained and perhaps with a much more humane tradition than any other in the region. I would suggest that the leadership learnt from the manner in which the USA, relegated by some commentators to the status of a played-out force, used the emasculation of the Soviet Union and the lack of judgment of Saddam Hussein to create their New World Order, to bring together trends in the region of which they had long been aware, and many of which they had fostered. The distraction of other events which drew attention away from their own coup was only a minor bonus.

In the immediate future of Southeast Asia there could be many worse scenarios. It is hard to accept that the Burmese military dictatorship seems now entrenched. It is widely reported that their immediate reaction to the gulf war was a fear that they were to be the next target. This paranoia is only matched by the view now being put forward by some that the UN has established a precedent with its intervention in Iraq, and could now move to protect the NLD and the ethnic minorities. Not only does this view seem to be a misreading of what is happening in Burma and Southeast Asia, if taken seriously, could be the start of another epic disaster.

It is also hard to accept that Thailand has succumbed again to the vicious cycle of military coup and civilian rule. But if the killing stops in Burma, that in itself would be a tremendous step forward. In Cambodia one can only hope that the Thai military recognize that they have very little, if anything, in common with the Khmer Rouge.

June 1991

PS. Having written the above, I read an account of Sulak Sivarak's talk at a seminar in Bangkok. Below is a translation of a small part of it.

Khaw phiset 27 May-2 June 2534 (1991)
Report of seminar on 'Three months since the coup d'etat: how many steps backwards for Thai politics?' held by The Union of Thai Students, 23 May at Thammasart University. Reference is to a statement by Gen. Suchinda on the recent coup, 'One step backwards in order to go ten steps forward'.

Sulak Sivarak pointed out that before 2475 (1932) Thai politics belonged to the king under the system of absolute monarchy, and not to the people as a whole. After the change of the system of government on 24 June 2475, people's groups made clear that politics was the business of the people with equal political status for all.

For this reason, a coup such as the present one in which power has fallen to a few individuals, the military of the National
Peacekeeping Committee, Sor Sivarak pointed out, was a return to the period before democracy. ‘To see straight whether it is a step forward or a step backward, ask to whom the polity belongs. Does it belong to a small group or to the people as a whole?’

He went on to show that the groups staging coups had used the same methods, whatever the period since the seizure of power in 2490 (1947); that is, the appointment of a civilian government. ‘In 2490 Field Marshal Phin seized power and placed Nai Khuang Aphaiwong as Prime Minister. He retained this position for only a few months before he was forced out by the military on the grounds that the government was being run inefficiently. Field Marshal Por became Prime Minister again. In 2500 (1957) Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat prodded Field marshal Por out and invited General Phot Sarasin to become Prime Minister. So it went on till Khun Thanin (Kraiivixien) and finally we have Khun Anan. The military always use this method. The reason the military always bring in a civilian to be prime minister is that they consider themselves pure, not involved in politics, or that they must direct affairs from behind the scenes; but when the civilians fail they must come in and take over. Don't you see the present is no different from the past.’

He went on to discuss relations between this government and the military. ‘History repeats itself. If this government cannot solve the problems of the stagnant Chao Phraya, the people will hate Khun Anan; the problems of the Agricultural Council will also bring hate on Khun Anan. But no one will hate the military— they can always smile— and I say that Khun Anan and this government cannot last long, they will be pushed out like other civilian governments in the past.’

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A Short Comment on Modern Thai Music

Niti Pawakapan

The articles by Thanet Caroenmuang and Gehan Wijeyewardene on Charan Manophet's songs (Newsletter Number 12) raise a general issue of some interest. Though there is no doubt that Charan's success is due to his own talent and his excellent adaptation of Northern Thai folk songs to modern instruments, it is also worth noting that since the 1980s a new phenomenon has appeared in modern music in Thailand. Especially during the sixties and seventies the influence of modern Western music was very great. During those years most youngsters knew, and enjoyed, Elvis Presley, the Beatles, the Rolling Stones and the Bee Gees. One would not be too surprised to hear a teenager singing their songs or to see someone dressed like Elvis. Only the older people listened to Thai pop songs!

But teenagers since the eighties are different from their predecessors. It seems that not many of them would know, let alone listen to, Western pop singers or bands such as MC Hammer, U2, Icehouse, or INXS. There is little doubt that today it is more fashionable for Thai teenagers to listen to Thai pop songs than to Western ones. Thai singers and bands like Thongchai (Bird) Macintyre, Utsanee-Wasan, Carabao and Nuvo sell over one million copies of every
new album they release, and each concert performed by them is always stormed by thousands of teenagers. There is no one who does not know their songs.

Crucial to the recent popularity of these Thai groups are the new techniques and tactics of promotion, which involve millions and millions of baht spent on advertisement through the mass media. This should also be seen in the context of rapid economic growth, especially during the last few years when the Chatichai government was in power, and the change in the political situation which brought an unprecedented freedom of expression for everyone, but particularly for the media. Unlike the old days, singers, actors and entertainers in general were no longer part of a career for 'under-dogs', but a 'happy-go-lucky' one providing them all self-expression.

We could say that while these professionals have made their fortune overnight, they are also trying to establish a new status in Thai society for themselves. Thus, it is not surprising to hear the Carabao song Made in Thailand, or the music of Nuvo expressing concerns about deforestation, pollution and environmental problems of all kinds, and these invoke a response in their young listeners.

Nevertheless, it would be too soon to conclude that this is just another chapter in the history of popular culture in Thailand. A year or two ago when Caravan performed their last concert in Bangkok, many people thought that it was the end of phleng phā cheewit—"songs for life". Singers such as Surachai Chantimathorn, the former lead singer of Caravan, and Phongthep Kradonchamnaan, to survive in the environment of business and the free-market economy, have become singers under contract to record companies. However they also often sing in a few well-known pubs in Bangkok catching a number of different audiences, including some teenagers who can afford to pay for the expensive drinks sold in those pubs.

The style and theme of their music have changed little though their audiences have grown. As a matter of fact, the eighties saw a new uprising of social and political consciousness, which involved not only the politicians, military and big businessmen, but academics and many professionals, among whom are these singers and entertainers. Whether this foreshadows a new kind of nationalism in Thailand remains to be investigated.

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Pitfalls and Politics: Research on Health Care in Southwest China

Scott Bamber*

In approaching any research there may be a tendency to assume that it will be conducted under the best of possible conditions. It is assumed the major problems to be encountered will lie in the selection and application of appropriate methodologies. Anyone who has undertaken research programs will, however, be only too aware that this is hardly ever the case in practice. Despite the best attempts to build in safeguards, things inevitably differ from the way they were planned. While this is true for any project, it is argued here that qualitative research by its very nature frequently produces a number of crucial preliminary problems which often stand in the way of
the implementation of the research. These arise because qualitative research is often undertaken in remote locations and frequently involves different ethnic groups. However, notwithstanding the obvious importance of this aspect of qualitative research, it remains neglected and it is for this reason that I want to address here some of the things which can go wrong. The purpose is not only to assist those who wish to actively get more research projects underway, but also to demonstrate that what appear at the time to be disasters, can also be among the most instructive of experiences.

As the basis for this exercise, I will draw upon my own recent experience of conducting research in the far southwest region of the People's Republic of China. My study involved an investigation of beliefs related to health and medicine amongst the Tai Lue people of Sipsongpanna in Yunnan Province. The Tai Lue are closely related to the Thai peoples of Thailand and Laos, and thus quite distinct in language and culture to the Han Chinese. While Sipsongpanna was from ancient times nominally part of Imperial China, because of the region's mountainous landforms and hot monsoonal climate together with the marked cultural differences of its inhabitants, Chinese influence was minimal. It was not until Liberation in 1949 that there was any concerted attempt to incorporate Sipsongpanna fully into the Chinese State. Since that time there have been considerable changes in the region's administration, social structure, economy, and of course its health and medical system.

From my point of view, the main research interest was to look at the pattern of Tai practices and beliefs regarding health and medicine, within the Communist Chinese context. My plan was to conduct a year long period of field research in Sipsongpanna during which I would employ the methods of participant observation and small-scale surveys to obtain material which would enable a comparison with Thai groups I had previously studied.

Things turned out to be very different from what I had envisaged and, of the full year I had set aside, after various delays, frustrations, and other set backs, I finally managed to spend only three months in the field. The reasons why the project did not go as anticipated are complex, but can be narrowed down to several factors. Some of these, such as the Tiananmen incident, which took place just before I submitted my proposal to the Chinese authorities, would have affected any project. My own assumptions about the situation in China regarding social science and health research, as well as my own preparedness, were also somewhat over-optimistic.

From the point of view of qualitative research, the important difficulties I experienced stemmed largely from Chinese Government attitudes and policies. There were three main factors which did not fit well with the Chinese system: firstly I was proposing to undertake social science research; secondly I was proposing to do it with minority groups; and thirdly I was a foreigner. I will first describe my experiences in the context of these three factors then show how they relate to some fundamental areas of qualitative research.

Minority Peoples

The relationship between the Chinese Government and its minority
peoples is understandably a sensitive issue. It is particularly so in Yunnan where the variety of peoples who differ markedly in ethnicity and religion from the majority Han population is amongst the highest of any province in China. Officially twenty five different "nationalities" live in Yunnan.1 A number of these, such as the Tai, Hmong, Lisu and Lahu, also inhabit the neighbouring countries of Laos, Burma and Thailand, and because of their similarities in language and culture these peoples can move fairly easily back and forth across national borders. This, together with the region's geography, was also one of the reasons why the extreme Southwest was one of the last areas to be won from the Chiang Kai Shek's Guomindang forces and remained insecure for some years after Liberation in 1949.

Like minority groups elsewhere in China, the peoples of Southwest China suffered the extremes of repression inflicted during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The severity of this repression may have stemmed in part from support which some of the groups in this area gave to the retreating Guomindang.2 For Tai peoples the Cultural Revolution involved the destruction of almost all Buddhist temples, and the systematic searching of houses, even in remote villages, for any books written in the old Tai language. During both these periods large numbers of the region's inhabitants consequently voted with their feet and moved south into Laos and Burma.

In recent years there has been a marked shift in Chinese policy towards minority groups in this region. Instead of the brutal tactics of the Cultural Revolution, there now appears to be a policy of gradual assimilation. There has been a relaxation in official restrictions relating to minority peoples, so that they now have far greater freedom regarding the practice of religion and other aspects of indigenous culture. However by virtue of increasing contact with the Han majority, many features of indigenous cultures are disappearing. Thus for Tais only the first year or two of schooling is in their own language, after which all education is in Chinese. Apart from short segments in Tai and other regional languages, all television and radio is also in Chinese.

Still more importantly, in order to render the border less permeable, and to take advantage of the region's abundant wealth, the Chinese government has undertaken what amounts to the virtual colonisation of Sipsongpanna. Large numbers of Han Chinese, especially from the populous Sichuan province to the north, have settled in the region. For the most part these people work in the tropical forest timber industry, and on the extensive rubber plantations which were planted following the deforestation of much of the area. As a consequence, the region's towns are now largely dominated by Han Chinese.

While there have been no major indications of ethnic conflict in the region in recent times, it is clear that the Chinese government regards the region as sensitive. Areas adjacent to both the Burmese and Lao borders, including the whole of the county of Meng La, remain closed to foreigners. There have also been a number of recent reports about narcotics smuggling along the Burmese border. For these reasons it is easy to understand why the Chinese Government might choose not to permit foreigners to conduct research in the region.
Although there are numerous Chinese institutions involved in research and teaching in the social sciences, there still appear to be considerable differences between their status and the elevated position held by the so-called "hard sciences". I became aware of some of these differences when I tried to gain approval for my project.

The proposal was initially submitted through a prominent social science institute in Kunming as a medical anthropological study. After a considerable delay, I received word that the proposal had been rejected. I was told informally that the authorities in Beijing had not been able to cope with the combination of the two disciplines of medicine and anthropology. Unable to place the proposal neatly into either category, they had solved the problem by rejecting it outright. However, on the advice of the Chinese institution with which I was affiliated, the proposal was resubmitted through the Kunming Institute of Botany, a widely recognised scientific institution, as ethnomedicine. To my surprise, the research proposal was subsequently approved.

Apparently, medical anthropology is not recognised in China, possibly because it lies dangerously close to the social sciences. Ethnomedicine, on the other hand, while to my mind involving essentially the same approach as medical anthropology, enjoys the respectability of an association with "hard science". This respect for things scientific was something I encountered repeatedly in China, and it can sometimes serve to be a considerable advantage in conducting fieldwork. The presentation of my "magic" letter from the Academia Sinica with its red seal seemed to have a powerful effect on district officials and security personnel, on one occasion even enabling me to pass through a roadblock close to the Lao border for which even local residents require a special pass.

In marked contrast to a respect for "hard" science is a widespread ignorance of the methods of social science. So while there is in fact a department of ethnomedicine within the Kunming Institute of Botany, the accent is more on the "medicine" than the "ethno". There appeared to be no courses in anthropology, and students informed me that the only social science training they had received consisted of one or two lectures which were devoted to descriptions of the ethnic groups of the region.

Thus while fieldwork related to health and medicine has been carried out among minority groups for many years it has, with a few notable exceptions, been done so with a disregard for what may be regarded as some of the basic rules of social scientific method. Often the investigators have had little knowledge or sympathy with the language, or culture of the ethnic groups they are working with. In any case, given the ideological basis on which most research has been carried out under the Communist state, and the recent history of State involvement in the region, it is doubtful how much value could be placed on information which was obtained.

In effect, the combination of deep-seated Han attitudes towards minority groups and a lack of methodological rigour can come together to produce an approach to research which is something less than satisfactory. From my own experiences I can cite one example which
illustrates this which relates to what Chambers has referred to as dry season bias. After some two or three weeks of trudging through mud, pushing bicycles through villages, my appointed guide, a Master's student who had previously conducted research in the region himself, said to me: "You know we never conduct research here during this season." On further questioning, it emerged that most field research in Sipsongpanna is conducted during the dry season when roads are passable, and the weather is cooler. From the point of view of gathering information on medicinal plants, there is some sense in this, since that is also the time when the Tai doctors usually travel into the forest to collect their supplies of plants. However, as Chambers points out, the timing of research to suit the seasons most convenient to the researcher means that very few researchers ever manage to get an understanding of what conditions are like at other times of the year. Thus, while a researcher might get a very good knowledge of medicinal plants, he or she would not get to see the yearly range of other conditions and activities which have an effect on health.

There is a little more to the question of seasonal biases which has a cultural basis. In order to more fully understand the preference for cool season fieldwork in Sipsongpanna it is also important to consider how Chinese have traditionally regarded the region. From historical accounts it appears as if the South was regarded as a forbidding place; for Han officials it was the equivalent of the modern day "hardship posting", a place of miasmas and fevers located in the "barbarian" lands far from the Capital in the extreme southwestern reaches of the Empire. It was regarded as an extremely dangerous place from the point of view of health, and Han Chinese who were forced to spend time in the region took extreme care to safeguard themselves from illness. The "malarious" climate of Sipsongpanna is thought to have been one reason why, in the early part of this century, the Chinese administration chose not to establish its headquarters at Jinghong (Cheli) the Tai capital, but at Pu Er, some distance to the north.

How much of the reputation of Sipsongpanna was based on the actual dangers of the region, and how much to the remoteness from the capital, and the circumstances surrounding the posting of officials to the southern frontiers is open to question. Nevertheless it remains that in the Han popular imagination Sipsongpanna was a fearful place, to be avoided if possible. Even though Han Chinese have been firmly established in the region for some years now, this should not serve to discount the possibility that the image of Sipsongpanna as an unhealthy place has not been entirely lost and may continue to influence Han attitudes towards the region and its inhabitants.

Foreign Researchers

All foreigners wanting to conduct research in China must first submit a proposal for approval to the Chinese authorities. In addition to describing the intended research, the proposal must give specific details of the itinerary, including dates and the names of all institutions to be visited. Once the proposal is approved very little deviation is possible from the schedule and, as might be imagined, this can create big problems. In my case it was the first visit I had
made made to the study area, and on arrival I found out about the existence of a number of places which I considered important to visit. However in order to visit them I would have had to resubmit my proposal to the authorities in Beijing, which meant personally returning to Kunming to make arrangements, and the loss of valuable time.

Even after approval is given for a project, there are stipulations regarding research by foreigners. Of these the most important from the point of view of my project these were three in number. The first was that I was not allowed to stay overnight in Tai villages. At the end of each day I had to return to the nearest town and stay at the official guesthouse. This both limited the selection of villages to those which were close enough to towns to be accessible by bus or push bike, as well as preventing me from observing what happens in villages between afternoon and morning. The study populations I had selected were located some eight kilometres or so from towns and accessible only by bicycle or foot tracks. On some days the rain made it impossible to leave the guesthouse at all. Generally however, this meant that each morning my guide and I had to bicycle out for an hour or more to a study village, then return the same way in the late afternoon. Being the wet season it also involved riding a bike along a track covered in four inches of mud, with the consequence that we spent more time trying to wash and scrape the wheels clean than we did actually sitting on the bike.

Anyone who is familiar with rice farming villages will know that the period between late afternoon and early morning is the time when just about everything happens in a village. Further, the time I was permitted to do research just happened to coincide with the rice planting season, so almost the whole village population except the very old and the very young were busy away in the fields. My opportunities to observe a range of behaviour related to health, nutrition and daily life were thus limited. Almost as importantly, the opportunity to sit and talk with villagers at leisure in their own homes and form friendships was lost.

The second stipulation was that I had to be accompanied by a guide (peitong) while in the field. This seemed at first to be reasonable, since my Chinese was rudimentary, and though I could speak Bangkok Thai, I knew only a little of the Tai dialect spoken in Sipsongpanna. However, it turned out that I had little choice in the selection of a guide at all. Basically I was given a choice between one of the state tourist service's professional guides, or a postgraduate university student. Neither was satisfactory, however I chose the student, since he had previously conducted research in the area on the same subject, and knew a little of the language.

My guide lasted six weeks before quitting to resume work on his thesis in Kunming. As this happened at short notice, right before I was about to undertake the last round of the village interviews I had scheduled, my research was somewhat disrupted. This was more so because it takes time to train and learn to work efficiently with research assistants, and the replacement guide was a "hard scientist" and had neither experience nor a great deal of sympathy with the study population. As it turns out, I was lucky to have an assistant who lasted as long as six weeks; other foreign researchers I met in Yunnan went through several guides, and lost much time waiting for
replacements to be found.

It appears that postgraduate students are generally reluctant to be seconded to work with foreigners, and have to be persuaded with the "carrot" of the opportunity to practise their English. Certainly there are few other benefits since, of the ten dollars (US) per day, payable in advance, which I had to forfeit in order to conduct research, the student only received around three. The work is also often tedious and boring if the assistant is not personally interested, unlike a researcher who is prepared to sit and wait. It is therefore hardly surprising that problems arise.

The third stipulation was one which I only found out about after I had commenced research, and this was that I was not allowed to be given any detailed information about traditional Tai medical prescriptions. It came as something of a shock, since my research proposal had explicitly stated that I required this type of information. Though the Chinese have established a number of research institutes for the investigation of indigenous medicines, they are very careful about sharing this information with foreigners. There is a widespread fear that foreigners will take information on traditional medicines and reap the financial rewards from the development of pharmaceuticals. From my point of view, this restriction meant that though I was granted admission to these institutes, any interviews rapidly degenerated into the ridiculous. For example the director of one hospital when questioned even about the number of doctors on staff would only give answers such as "a lot", or "quite a few". It was when things reached this stage that I finally made the decision not to persevere with further research.

What important lessons can be drawn from these experiences from the perspective of qualitative research? As I see it the points outlined above relate to three important aspects of qualitative research: timing, quality and type of information, and evaluation. I would like now to briefly show how the constraints just discussed relate to these areas.

Timing

One of the important characteristics of qualitative research is a flexibility in approach. The researcher must be prepared to adapt him or herself to fit in with the patterns of life of a study population, as well as to respond to unexpected opportunities. This means not only being able to just enter people's houses and eat the same food, but also to make allowances for the important activities in their daily lives. In my case this meant being in villages at those times of the day, and of the year, when villagers were sufficiently free from other activities to be able to talk. By this means I hoped to be able to gain a clearer picture of various aspects of their health and medicine.

Unfortunately the subtlety of such considerations, so important to the researcher, can be lost on bureaucrats and officials in a capital located far away on the other side of a country. The time taken up in processing applications, as well as the need to provide and adhere to a fixed schedule are all factors which run against the aims of research. My original plan had been to commence work in Sipsongpanna in early February, a convenient time for
interviews as it came well before the onset of the wet season and commencement of the demanding work of rice planting. My permit to undertake three months research was finally granted in June, right at the time of the first rains. Although the situation was not altogether negative, since little was known of activities in the region during this time, in retrospect it may not have been such a coincidence that I was only given permission to do research during the time of the year which the Chinese consider least suitable for fieldwork in Sipsongpanna.

Quality and Type of Information

The official conditions under which I was permitted to undertake research not only restricted the physical access I had to the study population, but they also affected the information I obtained. The more obvious effect of this was in limiting the type of information I was permitted to obtain, for example details of drugs used in Tai medicine, and of public health policies.

Another effect was in the introduction of biases into the research situation. This was seen for example in my lack of control over the selection of assistants, and due to the restrictions on my accommodation that I was always in the position of being an outsider. The constant presence of an appointed guide, and the fact I was never able to spend enough time in villages to become familiar with the people meant that I had no way of comparing what they told me in interviews with what they actually did.

Evaluation

Under "ordinary" circumstances, steps can be taken to prevent or rectify at least some of these problems in the course of a project. Ideally, my planning would have included a pilot study, and a range of other checks and safeguards. However, this was not possible in China. Because my access was limited, conditional and inflexible, there was little opportunity to test and change a proposal based on feedback on site.

Conclusions

Though the problems they have to cope with differ in some respects, particularly regarding their access to study populations, Chinese researchers and planners face a similar situation to that of foreigners in relation to the application of qualitative research methods. Apart from the basic problem of a lack of familiarity with the concepts of qualitative research, the structure of the Chinese system itself acts against such methods. Essentially, local officials are concerned with implementation of policies coming from above in the bureaucratic hierarchy, rather than soliciting opinions from the local population. This, of course, has important implications for both the quality of data available on health and medicine, as well as the way in which interventions are carried out.

In conclusion I would like to briefly illustrate how some of these limitations translate into Chinese health care planning in Sipsongpanna. While doing fieldwork I was interested to find out
details of sanitation facilities in the Tai villages. Almost without exception Tai villages have no lavatories, the villagers going to the adjacent areas of bushland to defecate, or as they term it "visit the birds" (aew nok). I asked the residents of one village whether the government health service had ever provided sanitation facilities. They told me that a Chinese style pit latrine had been constructed in the village some years before. When I asked to see it they said that it had never been used and had eventually been covered in. Asked why it had not been used, they were at first a bit embarrassed, then answered what was more or less the equivalent of "you must be kidding have you ever smelt a Chinese toilet?". In fact I had smelt more than enough Chinese toilets which in a tropical climate can be a very testing experience. The villagers obviously felt the same way and decided to continue the traditional inoffensive practice of "visiting the birds".

The point here is that on the issue of sanitation there are obviously very marked differences between Han Chinese and Tais. The implementation of sanitation improvements failed in this case clearly failed because the planners were either not aware of these differences or disregarded them. Assuming that the latter reason was not the case, it seems clear that had the planners bothered to spend some time in the village talking to its residents they would have understood the aversion which they feel towards Chinese style toilets. In other words, the intervention failed largely through causes which would have been revealed through the application of qualitative research methods.

Acknowledgements
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chulalongkorn and the tithi mahasunya

J.C. Eade1

Each year in Thailand a publication is produced, called Patithin roek bon-roek lang. It devotes one page to each day of the year and gives special attention to how the moon is behaving on a given day. Just as the sun's path is divided into twelve compartments called rasi, which westerners know as signs of the zodiac (everyone knows in which sun sign they were born, even if they don't really know what a "sign" is), so the moon's path is divided into 27 sections, called roek.

Inevitably some roek are good ones and some are bad, and the whole scheme has been made complicated enough by the astrologers to guarantee them a 400-page publication every year (at a
supermarket-style 99 baht in 1991, an increase from 85 baht in 1988).

The apparatus of astrology on the whole tends to balance things out; good fortune tends, overall, to lie in equipoise with bad. But in the case of the roek lang, the bad ones outnumber the good ones in number, if not necessarily in the duration of their effect; by three to one. Defining the roek lang operating at a given time on a given day is therefore a lucrative business.

But there is yet another kind of warning these astrologers issue, which is when a given day may have its roek all well disposed, but is none the less a tithi mahasun(ya). Of such days all the authorities say that even if everything else is good, nothing at all should be attempted.

The criterion has here changed from roek to tithi, from determining which of its 27 compartments the moon is in, to determining how old it is. In each month fifteen tithi (lunar days) take the waxing moon from New to Full, and either fourteen or fifteen tithi take the waning moon from Full to New.

The procedure for determining these very bad days also takes account of where the sun is, grouping the twelve rasi in pairs. Having done that, it selects the first six even-numbered tithi and employs them in both their waxing and their waning phases. By this means it establishes a system whereby all twelve rasi have the opportunity to generate a mahasunya day twice in each lunar month, such that a really bad year could have 24 mahasunya days.

The distribution is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sun</th>
<th>Tithi</th>
<th>Waxing/Waning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aries/Cancer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taurus/Aquarius</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemini/Virgo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagittarius/Pisces</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo/Scorpio</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libra/Capricorn</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the dislocation between the sun's motion and the moon's motion, however, it is possible for a year to have fewer than twenty-four of these terrible days. In 1988, for instance, when the sun arrived in Sagittarius (on 16 December) the moon was already at 8 waxing, so the 2 waxing required for a match with the sun in Sagittarius was avoided.

It is only when one is possessed of this rather arcane knowledge about mahasunya that an entry in the Chotmaihet Hon of Kongsin (Prachum Phongsawadan, Vol. 8, pp. 159-60) can be properly assessed.

There is in fact not a great deal of astrology in Kongsin's record, but at this point one of his rare astrological comments does appear. The date is CS 1230, 12 waning of the 12th month, a Wednesday (=11 November 1868). The item is the Coronation of King Chulalongkorn. And the comment is the dire and terse one that this was indeed a tithi mahasun. Were the horas asleep? Should some heads have rolled?

The answer is in fact "no". The record also defines the time of the coronation as "dawn plus 9 bat", i.e. as 6:54 a.m. My computer program tells me that at 6:54 the tithi was still only 11:24. The sun was indeed in Libra, but the tithi was not yet also 12 and would not
become so until 8.10 pm. The point here is that although the civil calendar called the day "12 waxing", the 12th tithi was reckoned more precisely (there being one tithi for every $12\frac{1}{6}$ of separation between the longitudes of the sun and the moon). A tithi will therefore almost never coincide exactly with its calendrical equivalent.

On the critical day, a tithi mahasunya was indeed going to come into operation, but Chulalongkorn's coronation avoided it and the Chotmaihet was wrong so to damn the occasion.

1 May 1991

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A Table to Find the Tai Sexagenary Cycle Name for Any Year of the Christian Era

Thawi Swangpanyangkoon1

Most of the Tai peoples, the Thai, as well as the Chinese and the Vietnamese use a cycle of 60 names to reckon the years and the days. The Chinese and the Vietnamese use them to count the hours too. The Lanna people call this cycle Mae kaap cay, and the Central Thai Hon Thai or Mahacak.

Each cyclic name consists of two syllables—the first one is called mae pii Tai ("mother of the Tai year") or mae wan Tai ("mother of the Tai day"). There are ten "mothers", given in the Lanna pronunciation as follows (the spelling varies according to the different Tai groups):

1. Kaap
2. Dap
3. Rwaay
4. Muang
5. Poek
6. Kat
7. Kot
8. Ruang
9. Tau
10. Kaa

The second syllable is named luuk pii Tai ("child of the Tai year") or luuk wan Tai ("child of the Tai day"). There are 12 "children", each having an animal as a symbol:

1. Cay (rat)
2. Paw (cow)
3. Yii (tiger)
4. Maw (hare)
5. Sii (naga)
6. Say (snake)
7. Sangaa (horse)
8. Met (goat)
9. San (monkey)
10. Raw (cock)
11. Set (dog)
12. Kay (elephant for Lanna, pig for Central Thai)

To have the double syllable name, they assemble the odd number "mothers" with the odd number "children", and the even number "mothers" with the even number "children", so to have only 60 names (and not 120). There are for instance Kaap Cay (1-1), Dap Paw (2-2), but neither Kaap Paw (1-2) or Dap Cay (2-1).

The Central Thai use names of Khmer origin for the animals and they place the "mothers" after the "children" which they call Sok and Nak sat respectively. The Sok are classified according to the last
figure of the number of Chula Sakarat (AD minus 638). CS. 1351 (1989 AD.) is thus an Eksok year, the last figure being 1; CS. 1352 is a Thosok year etc.

In the vernacular chronicles of Lanna (Tai Yuan) Khemmarat (Tai Khỳn) and Sipsongpanna (Tai Lỳ) the date is given by the number of the Chula Sakarat together with the cyclic name of the year. The Chronicle of Chiang Mai, translated by Sanguan Chotisukrat, says for instance "In Sakarat 658, a Rwaay Sii year, Phraya Mangrai built the city of Chiang Mai...". The cyclic name is often used to verify the accuracy of the number of the era and vice versa. In this example Rwaay Sii is erroneous but the number is right, being the same as in the Chiang Mai inscription.

This table will give the right name, Rwaay San, for CS. 658 (1296 AD.). To find it, look for the two last figures of 1296, that is 96. From 96 read horizontally to the left (or to the right) to find Rwaay, the "mother" of the year. Next, from 96 read vertically upwards to find San, the name of the animal. The cyclic name for 1296 AD. is Rwaay San a year of the monkey with a third "mother". The Central Thai call it a Pii W¹¹k Atthasok, that is a year of the eighth Sok, 8 being the last figure of Chula Sakarat 658.

As a second example, find the cyclic name of 1991 AD. Look for 91 in the table; from 91 read horizontally to the right to find Ruang and from 91 read vertically down to find Met (goat). 1991 AD is thus a Ruang Met year, or a Mamae Trisok for the Central Thai. The number of the Buddhist Era is obtained by adding 543 to AD.

The last figure of an AD year gives the name of the "mother" or the first syllable of the cyclic name:

1 gives Ruang  2 Taw  
3 Kaa  4 Kaap  
5 Dap  6 Rwaay 
7 Muang  8 Poek  
9 Kat  10 Kot 

1 AD. is a Ruang Raw, or year of the cock, eighth "mother", the same cyclic name as 301, 601, 901, 1201, 1501, 1801, 2101 AD. because the same name comes back every three hundred years. With the same "mother" (the same last figure of a number) the name of the animal advances by four years for every one hundred years. Thus Ruang Paw will be the cyclic name for 101, 401, 701, 1001, 1301, 1601, 1901, and 2201 AD., and Ruang Say for 201, 501, 801, 1101, 1401, 1701, and 2001 AD.

Acknowledgement
The author sincerely thanks Dr Gehan Wijeyewardene for his help in revising the English of this article.
Notes on Xishuangbanna Tai Medicine

[From Editor's Introduction, Records on Xishuangbanna Tai Medicine, 3 vols., compiled by Institute of Yunnan Tropical Plants, National Academy of Science; Yunnan Standing Office, Institute of Medicinal Materials, National Academy of Medicinal Science; Xishuangbanna Prefecture Institute of Ethnic Medicine; Xishuangbanna Bureau for Medicine Inspection, Volume I, 1979.]

From their working experience and daily life, the valiant, intelligent and industrious Yunnan ethnic peoples developed some unique knowledge about medicine. It is said that the Tais have had their own medicine for more than 2,500 years. Some ancient Han Chinese records (Yizhou Shu, Wang Hui Jie) say that Tai medicine has a history of 1,000 years. Tai people have their own theory of medicine, and prescriptions which have fixed combinations of herbs.

Tai people classified illness into four categories, based on the causes of illness, and had different prescriptions for different categories:

A) the prescription called wayouta [Thai wayothat], consisted of six kinds of herbs, used for illness which was caused by wind;
B) the prescription called bataweita [pathawithat], consisted of three kinds of herbs, used for illness caused by earth;
C) the one called abuota [apothat], consisted of five kinds of herbs, used for illness caused by water;
D) that called diezhuota [tecothat], consisted of five kinds of herbs, used for illness caused by fire.

With the passage of time, their knowledge of medicine has been continuously developed and enriched. The Chinese Pharmacopoeia (1977) included a Tai prescription called yajiaohadun and the Chinese Pharmacopoeia (1974) included two Tai prescriptions, called yashalimennuo and yajiaopazhongbu. All of these three are different from the four described previously, but they also have been used for hundreds years and are still widely used in the Tai community. Their efficacy, use and processing are all different from traditional Han Chinese medicine. For example, Kalanchoe pinnatum L. pers. is usually used by Han doctors for injuries from falls, fractures, contusions, strains, burns and scalds, while Tai doctors use it for dysentery and diarrhoea. This type of difference characterizes Tai ethnic medicine.

In the old days, however, Tai medicine nearly became extinct. During the PRC era, a number of research institutions were established to work on ethnic medicine, and good progress was made. However, due to the disruptions caused by Lin Piao and the Gang of Four and also the policy of discrimination adopted by them, ethnic medicine studies were faced with difficulties caused by a shortage of expertise. After the crackdown on the Gang of Four, importance was reattached to studies on ethnic medicine, with a view to its use and development. Based on a survey that was conducted in the whole Prefecture, we compiled these Records on Xishuangbanna Tai Medicine. We hope that this book can promote the development of ethnic medicine and serve the...
A touching story in the Xishuangbanna area tells of the origin of Tai medicine: "When Sakyamuni lived in the world, he taught Gongmalabie how to collect herbs and use them for sick people. He also gave Gongmalabie a pack of herbs, among them many were roots and stems. Later, Sakyamuni was sick. The servant Anumeng [Hanuman] (a monkey) was sent to look for Gongmalabie. The monkey Anumeng was late as he was too fond of playing along his way and Sakyamuni died before Gongmalabie could come to him. He was too sad even to hold the pack of herbs, the contents of which were spilled all over the Mountain Jiguzha. From then on all kinds of herbs grew luxuriantly. All people, no matter from which ethnic group, were able to get herbs for their illnesses. Gongmalabie later told people about his experience and prescriptions. This is the origin of medicine in this world. Tai people have had medicine since then, more than 2,500 years ago."

Most Tai doctors today still keep some hand-written medical books concerning the collection and processing of herbs, making up prescriptions, and clinical experience. These books have been passed down from generation to generation, and many of them have not yet been included in any official records. All these are a valuable heritage left by Tai ancestors and constitute part of traditional Chinese medical science.

With a view to implementing the Party's policy concerning ethnic affairs and their medical science, and to improve medical service, particularly in ethnic areas, it is considered our first priority to systematize ethnic medicine and pharmacology. It is under the leadership of the party that development of ethnic medicine, which used to be a myth only, can become true.

According to the Introduction, volume 2 of Records on Xishuangbanna Tai Medicine also has a Tai-Han bilingual text, as "in order to make the book more useful to ethnic medical doctors".

Dang Ha Ya

[From Foreword (1) by Zeng Yulin, Chairman of Ethnic Medicine Panel, Institute of Chinese Medicine and Natural Herb Medical Materials, Medical Society of China, Kunming, December 1984.]
others in terms of its focus or details, while similar with its fundamental theory and prescriptions. The ten year Cultural Revolution was a time of havoc during which many manuscripts were destroyed. Up to now we have only collected 64 manuscripts. All of them, especially those used for leprosy and dysentery, reflect well the special features of the Tai medical theory and materia medica.

The Institute of Tai Medicine, Jinghong County, has compiled and translated Dang Ha Ya, based on a manuscript copied by a Tai doctor in September 1305. This is a very good attempt, and is also part of the national plan (1984-1990) concerning compilation of ancient ethnic medicine books. For the users' convenience, the translators rearranged the order of the contents, dividing the book into five sections according to the causes of illness (ie, amaba, xiliwa, mixianghui, longshaolong, and others). The translation complies with the original version in all other aspects.

According to Tai medical doctrine, health is ensured when the balance among wind, earth water and fire (within the body) is maintained, while imbalance among the four will cause illness. Four basic categories of prescriptions thus exist in traditional Tai medicine. Wayueta prescriptions are used for illness caused by wind; bataweita prescriptions are used for illness caused by earth; abuota prescriptions for illness caused by water; and diezhuota prescriptions for illness caused by fire.

Tai doctors are generally capable of both the diagnosis of disease and proficient in pharmacy Ñ including herb collection, processing, and usage. Tai medicines are usually in the form of pills, powders, extracts, tinctures, oils, tablets, and liquids medicine. Decoctions are also commonly used: some kinds are taken by mouth, as well as used for external application.

The following methods are those most commonly used in the processing of medicine:
Fen Ñ rubbing the herbs (dipped in water) against a piece of flat stone or in a rough bowl, using the liquid (produced from rubbing) for taking or external application.
Hong Ñ putting herbs in a bowl, steaming for about an hour, using the liquid.
Hongya Ñ boiling herbs in a big pot, while letting the patient sit on top of the pot (enclosed with bamboo-knitted basketry), similar to steam bath. It is usually used for rheumatoid diseases.
Shaya Ñ grinding herbs into fine powder, blending with goose oil, used for external application.

The translation of Dang Ha Ya will not only promote the further development of Tai medicine, but also benefit the interflow of medical knowledge between different nationalities. It will also be helpful in the development of new medicines.

[From Foreword (2) by Zhang Zhen, President of the Institute of Chinese Medicine, Yunnan, December 1984]

Our country is a multinational state, and ethnic medicine is one of the precious properties in our medical treasure-house. It is waiting for the people who work in medical science and practice to learn, explore, study, systematize, and improve, with the purpose of serving our country's modernization.
Dang Ha Ya means "medical book" in Tai language. Found in 1980 at Manlie, Menghan, Jinghong County, Xishuangbanna, it had been kept as a secret manuscript by the family of Po Diying, a Tai doctor, for generations. It is impossible at present to identify the original author, and certainly this will not prejudice its value. The manuscript, judging from its contents, is no doubt written by an experienced and authoritative Tai doctor (or doctors), based on his own experience in clinical practice. It is rich in contents and very useful for practice. However, it is written in the old Tai language and lists only the names of diseases and the ways of treatment, lacking descriptions of clinical manifestations and of dosage.

This made the manuscript hard to use for academic and practical purposes. For this reason, Mr Wen Yuankai, working in the Tai Medicine Institute of Jinghong County, organized a panel to sort out and translate the manuscript. The panel consulted a large number of prominent Tai, Han and western doctors, rearranged the order of the manuscript, added the descriptions of clinical manifestations, re-examined more than 600 kinds of Tai herbs, collected samples, and determined the dosages. It is due to their efforts that Dang Ha Ya, the old Tai medicine manuscript, appears published in its present form. It is one of the major achievements in ethnic medicine research in Yunnan.

Translated by Jiang Ren.

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Thesis Abstracts
Tense and Aspect in Zhuang

Luo Yongxian

This short note is the abstract of a thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts at the ANU. The thesis investigates the tense and aspect system in Zhuang, a Tai dialect spoken in Southern China on the Sino-Thai and Sino-Vietnamese borders. The study focuses on the following issues: actualization, termination, experiential perfect, structural change involving the scope of temporal-aspectual operators in serial verb constructions and the correlation between tense/aspect and quantification. Seven aspectualisers are examined in some depth, which represent all the major tense and aspect categories in the language, ranging from PAST, PRESENT to FUTURE. Of these aspectualisers, special attention is devoted to: liu, d‡y, kwa and pay.

The distribution of these items is very sensitive to semantic considerations. Each of them exhibits a distinct semantic base and differentially co-occurs with verbs in various semantic classes, where certain type changes can be observed. The choice of different aspectualisers reflects the speaker's different conceptualizations of events or situations in the real world.

On the syntactic plane, the use of some aspectualisers gives
rise to structural change in the verb phrase in certain construction types concerning scope of aspect in serial verb constructions. This finding is at variance with previous ideas about verb serialization. It is demonstrated that structural change involving the scope of temporal-aspect operators is a feature of Zhuang verb serialization.

More significantly, quantification is identified as a semantic implementation of the category of aspect in Zhuang, manifested through the use of the aspectualisers, where some intriguing interaction between syntax and semantics can be detected. From this fact it follows that quantification should be included in the domain of aspect. To our knowledge, no previous treatment of tense and aspect has ever seriously addressed this point.

***

Feeding Patterns and Nutritional Status of Young Children in a Rural Area of Chiang Mai, Northern Thailand

Miss Chawapornpan Sorn-Ngai

As in many developing countries, in Thailand childhood malnutrition remains a significant problem. A first, and often neglected, step in understanding malnutrition in a particular community is to examine the local beliefs and practices related to infant feeding. This short paper is the abstract of a study which aims to investigate these practices in young children from a rural community in Northern Thailand. In addition the study examines the children's overall nutritional status, including the pattern and likely causes of malnutrition amongst them.

The study children consisted of 136 children born between February 1988 and February 1990 in an ethnic Northern Thai district located some 30 kilometres from Chiangmai. The community consisted of ten villages and had a total population of over five thousand: most of these people were rice farmers or labourers.

Feeding practices were examined using several methods. These included focus group discussions with the childrens' caregivers, supplemented by informal and formal interviews, and by direct observation of the children being fed. Preliminary analysis of these data indicates that breast feeding remains the mainstay of early childhood feeding, lasting an average of 12 months. While solid foods are introduced early, they consist largely of low density carbohydrates. Findings so far indicate that feeding behaviour is strongly influenced by both traditional cultural beliefs and social changes.

Nutritional status was examined using conventional anthropometry. The results show that in general child growth declines in the second half of the first year, with half the study children showing mild Protein Energy Malnutrition (PEM) after the age of one year.

These results indicate that malnutrition remains a common problem in this area of Thailand, and that feeding practices contribute significantly to it. It is suggested that child nutrition
could be improved if it was targeted as a priority in local mother and child health programs. In particular, specific emphasis should be placed on improving the quality of supplementary foods. It must be stressed that such a program be consonant with those local beliefs held by mothers and grandmothers, the major influences on child care and feeding.

Editor's Note: The author has requested that anyone wishing to reproduce or cite information contained in this abstract please first contact her.

***

Recently Completed Theses on Thai Health

The following theses were recently completed by students enrolled in the Master of Medical Science in Community Health in the University of Western Australia's Community Health Research and Training Unit.

Dr Paibul Suriyawongpaisal (Department of Community Medicine, Mahidol University), An Investigation of Hypertension in a Slum of Nakhon Ratchasima Thailand, MMedSc, UWA, 1990.

"The results showed that the prevalence of hypertension was 16.9%. This was in agreement with the single previous study undertaken in an urban slum in Thailand; this prevalence was higher than the other reported Thai studies in other urban settings and in rural areas. Thus this data supported the conclusion that slum residents are at high risk of hypertension."

The study explores the relationship between blood pressure and a range of other variables, including cultural background, marital status, meditation, diet, income and education.

*

Ms Sansnee Jirojwong (Faculty of Nursing, Prince of Songkhla University, Hadyai), Types of Antenatal Care and Other Related Factors Associated with Low Birth Weight in Southern Thailand, MMedSc, UWA, 1989.

"In conclusion, antenatal care given by western-trained care givers or by both western and traditionally trained care givers had an appreciable effect on low birth weight and this effect still prevailed even when other factors were taken into consideration."

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News and Correspondence

The Golden Triangle
Hans Penth1 writes:

Reading Jackie Yang Rettie's article on Kokang in vol.12, March 1991, again reminded me of a little puzzle.

At present, the area above Chiang SŠn where the three countries Laos, Thailand, Burma meet, is commonly called Golden Triangle, Sam Liam Thong Kham. Much ado is made about it. It is said that here is grown most of the opium, and that "gold" refers to the riches it earns its growers. When it is pointed out that the area can hardly allow the growing of opium because it is not elevated enough, the answer usually is, "oh, but the opium is traded here". I wouldn't know about that but what I know, what I certainly seem to remember, is that in the 1960's nobody called the area Golden Triangle. At the time, I was frequently in the Chiang SŠn region doing field work and I don't remember hearing the name. I think I would remember it if were only because Sam Liam Thong Kham sounds like a loan word from central Thai where "gold" is simply kham. I also remember that at the time, in the middle 1960s, old Burma and Thailand hands called Golden Triangle an extended hilly area in Kokang, wedged between two rivers, hence "Triangle", a place where large amounts of opium were said to be grown. I don't know what it had to do with gold.

It thus appears as if since c.1970 someone with a knowledge of central Thai heard the English expression, Golden Triangle, misunderstood it, translated into Sam Liam Thong Kham, and misapplied it to the three border area above Chiang SŠn.

Perhaps one of your readers knows more. I may have it all wrong. What are the earliest mentions of the name?


[Dr Penth's observations also raise intriguing possibilities regarding another famous Thai "Triangle", the area of Bangkok known as Sam Liam Din DaengÑEditor.]

***

Motif Index for Folk Tales

Kristina Lindell writes describing the work of her group and their efforts to compile a motif index for folk tales in the Thai-Yunnan area. Early results of this project have already appeared in Asian Folklore Studies (1988 and 1989), and a workshop was held at Chulalongkorn University with the participation of six Thai universities. They are keen to extend the scope of the project to include other parts of the region and are interested in receiving contributions from readers of the Newsletter: "What we meant was mainly that people could send us a motif or two or ten".

Please contact:
Kristina Lindell
ParšnvŠgen 15
223 56 Lund
Sweden
Master's Degree Program in Thai Studies
Chulalongkorn University

The Thai Studies Section of the Faculty of Arts is offering a program in Thai Studies leading to an MA, commencing in 1991. It is now too late for enrolment this year as the academic year runs from June to March. However, the following information should be of interest to those who may wish to enrol in subsequent years.

The course is designed primarily for students interested in Thai culture and society. All classes are conducted in English. Applicants must hold a bachelor's degree and those from a country whose native language is not English must have passed the 'English as a Foreign Language test' (TOEFL) with a minimum score of 550. Applications are due before the end of February. The tuition fee (subject to change) is Baht 36,750 (US$1,490).

Information from:
Thai Studies Section, Faculty of Arts
Chulalongkorn University
Phyathai Road, Patumwan
Bangkok 10330
Thailand

Book news


The account of a recent trip to visit Tai peoples in Assam by four Chiangmai experts in Tai studies:

"What is related here transmits both the flavour of a travel account, with the added substance of expert observations, so that the reader is enticed to follow along. The book is thus both fun to read as well as a valuable scholarly work on Thai/Tai studies."

Available from:
Sakdina Chatakul na Ayuthaya
6/141 Ramkhamhaeng 2
Khwaeng Dok Mai-Bangna, Phrakhanong, Bangkok 10260.

* 

Sippanondha Ketudat: The Middle Path for the Future of Thailand: technology in harmony with culture and environment
(With the methodological and editorial consultation of William J. Klausner, M.L. Bhansoon Ladavalya and Sidhinat Prabudhanitisarn.)
Institute of Culture and Communication, East West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA and Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University,
Emeritus Professor Robert B. Textor writes, As you know, recently Thailand has become one of the economically fastest growing nations in the world, and an important part of the "Pacific Rim Miracle." Yet, all too little serious, systematic work has so far been published concerning the probably impact of rapid economic growth on the totality of Thai society, traditional lifeways, and cherished values. Indeed, as far as I know, Dr. Sippanondha is the first single Thai author to develop explicit, comprehensive, and systematic scenarios of possible, probable and desirable futures for the Thai people over the next generation of time. He uses an anthropological approach to examine the entire Thai sociocultural system, rather than limiting his focus to a few conventional economic or demographic sectors.

... currently serves as Minister of Industry.

THE FASHIONING OF LEVIATHAN
The Beginnings of British Rule in Burma

John S Furnivall

From The Journal of the Burma Research Society vol.29, no.1 April 1939, pp.3-137.

Edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene

An Occasional Paper of the Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University

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Canberra
1991

180pp., map, glossary, biographical notes, references

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Aust $25 air mail

This work was published in The Journal of the Burma Research Society in 1939 and is a superb introduction to the origins of colonial Burma. It is based on the correspondence and papers of the period (1825-43), which were also edited and published by Furnivall.

The Fashioning of Leviathan brings to life, with great skill, the people and the British rulers of the territory administered from Moulmein in those years.
This and the previous number of the Newsletter were edited in the Community Health Research and Training Unit, Department of General Practice of the University of Western Australia and transferred to The Australian National University by electronic mail for printing and distribution.

1 PhD scholar, Department of Anthropology, RSPacS, ANU.
1 Because these are the ones actually studied in this article, and because in the French original (p.264) Condominas wrote 'des seigneuries et principautŽs actuelles', which term can hardly mean any Thai states except those of Vietnam, the Lue, or the Shan.
5 Michael Vickery, 'The Lion Prince and Related Remarks on Northern History', JSS 64/1 (January 1976), p.328.
6 The date of Condominas's research has been inferred from the context. It is not supplied in the publication.
7 Although some linguists, on comparative linguistic evidence, would agree that speakers of Kadai languages, which include Laha, were in the area before Austroasiatics, including the Vietnamese, and the Tai.
*Community Health Research and Training Unit, Department of General Practice, University of Western Australia. This paper was originally presented at The 1st Western Australian Qualitative Research Conference held by the School of Occupational Therapy, Curtin University, May 1991.
1 Li Xiangyang, "Ethnic Identification and Ethnic Groups in Yunnan", Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter, 5, 1989, pp.8-10.
2 Moseley, GVH, The Consolidation of the South China Frontier,
1 Asian History Centre, Faculty of Asian Studies, ANU.
1 Chiang Mai University
1 Volume 2 in a series of Han translations of Tai classics.
1 Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Arts, ANU.
1 Student in the Master of Medical Science in Community Health program of the Community Health Research and Training Unit, Department of General Practice, Faculty of Medicine, University of Western Australia.
1 Archive of Lan Na Inscriptions, Social Research Institute, Chiangmai University.

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