On 15 November the Department of Political and Social Change in the Research School of Pacific Studies, in conjunction with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, took advantage of the presence of Professor Joseph Silverstein in Canberra to organize a 'Myanmar Update'. The study of Burmese affairs has a history of quite inexplicable neglect in Australian universities and it is a matter of some embarrassment that no Australian Burma scholar could participate with Silverstein. U Kin Oung and Gehan Wijeyewardene were the other speakers. The audience was mainly from the Australian Burmese community, some of whom had made the journey from Sydney especially for the meeting. The neglect of Burmese studies and the apparent lack of interest in the academic community approaches a scandal. Burma is an important constituent of our region and that there is no money to be made there nor the possibility of placing researchers within Burmese borders, is no excuse for neglect. Rather, there should be incentives made available for young scholars to move into a difficult area of study, a new and difficult language, where the reinforcement of easy fieldwork and numerous fellow researchers is unavailable.

The most important aspect of the report was the suggestion that the conflict in Burma can no longer be considered a series of insurgencies, but a civil war being fought between the Rangoon government, the State Law and Order Restitution Committee (SLORC) and the Burma Army on the one side and the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) on the other. The DAB consists of twenty-one organizations, the
most important being the Karen National Union, the Kachin Independence Organization and the All-Burma Students Democratic Front. The Alliance is based at Manerplaw, the Karen headquarters, and is led by General Bo Mya of the KNU, with his deputy being Brang Seng of the KIO. The student leader, Moe Thi Zun, is seen as making up the impressive trio in command of the Alliance. Since the students fled Rangoon after the 1988 crackdown, they have become a mature and experienced fighting force and an integral part of the DAB. The Alliance has paid much attention to the constitutional future. They have rejected the idea of a confederacy, as they have the idea of centralized control from Rangoon, and are attempting to work out how responsibilities will be divided between the centre and the constituent states.

The National League for Democracy, after its massive electoral victory in May, has, it seems, now succumbed to the intolerable pressure exerted on them by SLORC. All member parties of the League have now withdrawn claims to form a democratic government. One major disagreement between the League and the Alliance is the contention of the former that democracy should first be established in the plains before it can move to the hills. This approach is rejected by the DAB.

(continues on p. 2)

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The Burma Army has maintained its unity largely because of the harsh discipline exercised over its members and loyalty to Ne Win. Other ranks are mainly recruited from the countryside and their high pay and supplies available to them in an otherwise shattered economy, make them unlikely to want to return to rural poverty. Nevertheless it is likely that when Ne Win dies the major factor which holds the army together will go with him. There are already some officers, particularly retired ones, who have thrown in their lot with the opposition. The Alliance forces also do not now hold captured army officers as prisoners. They are released in the knowledge that on their return they are immediately expelled from the Burma Army, further weakening both the army and its morale. Members of the army are naturally concerned as to what would happen to them on the re-institution of democracy. If they are convinced that there will be no reprisals, a democratic government will have a valuable source of skill and competence at their disposal. This may prove of vital importance as the Ne Win government and his SLORC successors have
deliberately destroyed every level of leadership which may have mounted opposition to it within the country.

The relationship of the Shan to the DAB and their position in the future Union of Burma was raised. Under the leadership of the drug lord, Khun Sa, it has been claimed that most Shan forces are united under the control of the Tai Revolutionary Council and the MÝang Tai Army (see Number Ten, pp. 17-27). The accuracy of these reports is contested, and it appears there are important sections of the Shan forces allied to the DAB. Nevertheless Shan State is a matter of concern to the DAB, not least because the Wa forces, formerly part of the Burmese Communist Party, remain the best armed of all insurrectionary groups and have now forged an agreement with SLORC which allows them to continue the heroin trade without interference from Rangoon.

Of crucial importance to change in Burma in the near future is the mobilization of international opinion against the depredations of the SLORC government. There has so far been little success in persuading governments to mount a meaningful challenge, though there has been some withdrawal and suspension of aid. The German government has been particularly active behind the scenes in trying to impose constraints on the Rangoon government. Japan, in the past, has been one of the major international supporters of Rangoon, but there are indications that this may be changing.

Editor's note The meeting was told that the Chinese government appears to be giving support to some constituent elements of the DAB, specifically the Kachin, as well as support and comfort to SLORC. It is to be hoped that the international community has learned enough to prevent the alliance of Chinese Communists and Thai military which supported, and still continues to support, the Khmer Rouge, from performing a similar function for SLORC and the Burmese military regime.

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CHINA'S POSITION AS A REGIONAL NEIGHBOUR SINCE JUNE, 1989

Ian Wilson

China's attack on her citizens in Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 was accompanied by grave predictions that foreign policy shifts reflecting a similar ruthlessness and aggression would follow, making China a very awkward regional neighbour. At the end of 1990 these fears seem to have been groundless and China has just resumed official ties with Indonesia, held a successful Asian Games meeting and is in the process of restoring relations with the rest of the world to their pre-June status. China's position in Southeast Asia is even stronger than before after suffering none of the reverses experienced in relations with the West, suggesting that our region does occupy a special place in Beijing's calculus.

The predictions of an angry and assertive China, reacting to outside criticism by pushing its interests much harder and no longer
striving to co-operate within the region, were not without foundation. China responded to international condemnation on its human rights record and the imposition of economic sanctions by self-righteous blustering. The criticism, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama and the sanctuary provided abroad to those students and dissidents able to escape were all castigated by the new ruling clique as unwarranted interferences in China's internal affairs. This strident nationalism was also reflected in attacks on small nations like Granada and Liberia which had long been able to have relations with both China and Taiwan. Relations were actually severed with these and several other minor states and a stern warning was extended to the Philippines.

At the level of conceptualising the state of international affairs, there was a rejection of the theory of "social capitalism" developed by Su Shaozhi and other now disgraced reformers. This view timorously advanced the proposition that capitalism had moved far beyond the formation analysed by Marx and Lenin and that it was no longer inevitably bent on war and was probably better at adapting technology, pursuing economic growth and advancing human rights and social equity than stalinist socialism. Instead, the spectre of "peaceful evolution" was erected as a major threat to China and the socialist world. It was claimed that none other than John Foster Dulles had declared that the West could no longer defeat the communist bloc in open conflict and must instead undermine these systems by assiduous propaganda on behalf of parliamentarism, the free market, human rights and multi-party democracy. This analysis, which is still being promoted within the People's Liberation Army in particular, conveniently explained unwelcome developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and provided further justification for cracking down on the dissidents at home. It also underpinned the assertive foreign policy stance adopted towards the West.

Yet little of this was evident in China's relations with Southeast Asia. A hard line had been in place over Cambodia for almost a decade and there was no clear sign of either a willingness to retreat from its support for the Khmer Rouge or of any additional obduracy in negotiations for a settlement. Vietnam remained the focus of China's policy and, although some relaxation of trade restrictions took place at this time, there were fresh border tensions and China moved again on some of the disputed islands in the South China Sea.

One reason why China's relations with the region were not soured in the same way as were relations with the West was that there was little or no criticism of the abuse of human rights from the region. The actions in and around the Square fitted well with what had been done a year earlier in Rangoon but others were silent also. China remained the major guarantor of Thailand's security against Vietnam, making protests from that quarter most unlikely. The same special relationship precluded any change in the policy which has long prevented the Dalai Lama from visiting Bangkok. The business community in Singapore saw advantages in closer co-operation with China in the face of the removal of many foreign joint venturers following the disorder. Mrs Aquino, who was both flattered and
compromised when the Chinese students took up some of the slogans and symbols of "people's power", chose inaction. Like Japan, Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta were diplomatically mute and any regional economic sanctions were not likely to have much impact.

In all, the tragic events of June 1989 had very little impact at all on China's Southeast Asian policies and certainly elicited little reaction from the region. To the extent that Southeast Asia was spared the blustering rhetoric directed at the West, these neighbouring states probably occupy a special status in Beijing. On this occasion, as on others when there has been a re-orientation in China's foreign policy, specific policies towards individual Asian states have either remained stable or have changed only slowly.

Sino-Burmese diplomatic ties have enjoyed a remarkable continuity since the 1950s and it is clear that the Ne Win military regime has established a comfortable modus vivendi acceptable to both sides. Whether the same would apply should the democratic opposition be allowed to assume the political power it won at the ballot box remains to be seen. At the very least, the Chinese Army-run defence industries would not welcome a shift to civilian rule if it meant a cut in arms purchases by Burma, even if the prices are not generating vast profits. China has also done very little to encourage the communist insurgents in Burma under the current leadership, a courtesy which may not be automatically extended to a successor government if it seeks to renegotiate the terms of the relationship. As with the now much weaker Communist Party of Thailand, it is doubtful that Beijing could quickly crank up and control the remnants of the Burma Communist Party but as an option to help secure compliance from a different but still insecure government in Rangoon.

China's policy towards Thailand is also a complex one, dominated by the state of relations with Vietnam but subject to subtle differences within the Thai leadership, some of whom are ambivalent about Beijing and the extent of the threat from an economically troubled Vietnam. Again, arms sales help cement other ties but Thailand, unlike Burma, has other sources of supply. It is likely that China will continue to see Thailand as a very useful block to what are perceived as Hanoi's ambitions to control Laos and Cambodia and this means that close ties will be maintained, at least at the current level.

Indonesia and Malaysia have traditionally shown a much higher suspicion of Chinese intentions in the region and China in return has adopted a very cautious waiting policy which has recently been rewarded by the resumption of diplomatic relations with Djakarta. Movements of overseas Chinese capital back to the homeland have been largely ignored while China's strong interest in increased trade with Malaysia and Indonesia in the face of tough trade policy from Japan and both diminished capacity and threatened protectionism from the US have made China attractive in a way that was not present a decade ago. China has continued to assert that her future depends on a stable and peaceful environment and has matched this with action to the general satisfaction of most of the elites of Malaysia and Indonesia, even if
some suspicions remain submerged. China seems to have survived the economic sanctions and shortfall in trade and technology transfers from the West, partly because of the spectacular increases in trade with Taiwan. The foreign reserves and trade balance problems have been tackled and China yet again appears attractive as a trading partner for Southeast Asia.

The real challenge to Chinese foreign policy in the region stems not from the Tiananmen events but from the massive changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These events will force realignments for both political and economic reasons but their impact on the region is more serious, particularly in the face of a weakening of American capacity and resolve to participate in Southeast Asia in the manner of the 1960s and 1970s. The inability of the Soviet Union to maintain, let alone expand, its presence in the region has provided a useful pretext for some US disengagement but these factors also present great opportunities for Japan to expand its role in the Pacific. One constantly recurring theme in China's rhetoric has been the dangers posed by Japanese militarism. Convenient anniversaries of Japanese aggression against China in July and December provide the platform to remind people at home and abroad of the menace Japan once posed, operations which are often aided by injudicious statements by Japanese cabinet ministers, visits to wartime shrines and the publication of school textbooks with a commitment to the truth somewhat short of obsessional.

The inexorable rise in Japanese defence expenditure, made possible and legally acceptable by tying it to very healthy economic growth, has left Japan with a defence budget second only to the superpowers. Soviet capacity to seriously challenge China's influence in the Asia Pacific region was never very great, despite its nuclear strength. Not so Japan's challenge, which is primarily economic but the military backup is certainly increasing and each reduction in US and Soviet bases and deployment means a relative gain for Japan. Because China has great hopes of eventually participating in and gaining from the growth and prosperity of the Pacific Basin, Japan's dominance must be resisted at a level commensurate with retaining Japan's interest in and assistance with the development of the Chinese economy. This has no doubt stimulated recent increases in China's defence budget and the allocation of most of these funds to building a more credible blue water naval capability.

Eastern Europe's movement away from barter trade to hard currency has been accompanied by a demand for goods and produce of a higher standard than China can supply under the current quality controls. This is forcing China to find other sources for less than state-of-the-art equipment and Southeast Asia, after South Korea, is now more attractive. The area can also absorb more Chinese products, although not those already in competition between China and the industrialising economies of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. The prospects for closer economic are good without being spectacular.

Thus, in the face of a diminished Soviet capacity and presence, the problems facing the US and the increasing power of
Japan, Southeast Asia is likely to receive even more attention from China. After some brief danger that foreign policy formulation might fall into the hands of the Army, it is now securely back in the hands of an increasingly professional Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the rhetoric about threat and encirclement through the pernicious doctrine of 'peaceful evolution', the practicalities of China's complex international linkages dominate policy-making. Not only have Saudi Arabia and Indonesia been added to the list of nations recognizing the People's Republic of China but an arrangement has also been made with Israel in recent months. Israel is an important source of military technology, while Saudi Arabia is a valued market for Chinese arms. China will remain anxious to develop friendly relations with Southeast Asia and will expect a sympathetic response to its views in return. All this will be achieved by a combination of concessional trade and individually tailored diplomatic efforts by an increasingly skilled and informed foreign service. While not backing away from a role on the world stage, China is likely to concentrate much more of its efforts in developing a strong regional influence in Southeast Asia.

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Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever

Hjordis M. Foy

(This paper is based on a presentation made by Professor Foy at the Third Annual Conference of the Northwest Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies held at the University of Washington, Seattle, 19-21 October 1990. Professor Foy is with the School of Public Health and Community Medicine, Department of Epidemiology, University of Washington. Professor Foy writes 'The credit goes to the epidemiology division of the Ministry of Public Health in Thailand.' Her presentation was based on the following published articles:

Khancit Limpakarnjanarat, Prayura Kunasol & Bruce G. Weniger  

Prasert Thongcharoen, Prayura Kunasol & Dej Srisomporn  
'Changing patterns of dengue haemorrhagic fever in Thailand'  
The Dengue Newsletter, (n.d.a.).

Poovanon Eamchan, Ananda Nisalak, Hjordis M. Foy & Ong-Art Charoensook  

For this presentation I have relied heavily on the work of many colleagues in Thailand [see note above]. The study was done when I was an advisor to the Ministry of Public Health in Bangkok on sabbatical leave from the University of Washington.

Dengue fever is a viral infection transmitted by Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus and is spread by mosquitoes that mostly breed inside
houses. Theoretically it should be easy to control, yet the disease is increasing in incidence year by year. In 1984, 63,458 cases were reported in Thailand - the highest ever, and about double that reported in 1983.

Flower vases and abandoned tyres are favorite breeding sites. The flying range of Aedes is short. Although most Thais fear this disease, and know about the mosquito link, Thailand experienced its biggest epidemic of dengue hemorrhagic fever ever, in 1987, with more than 150,000 cases reported. Originally considered primarily an urban disease, increasing national rates indicate its spread into the provinces, including rural areas. The DHF case rate in 1964, the highest recorded, was about 220 per 100,000 population, nearly all in Bangkok. In 1970, one of the lowest on record, there were under 20 cases per 100,000, Bangkok having a marginally higher rate than the rest of the country. In 1984, with a total rate of about 200 per 100,000, the country outside Bangkok had a rate double that of the capital.

There are three clinical manifestations of dengue virus infection. Dengue fever or breakbone fever is characterized by sudden onset of fever, head and muscle aches, and influenza-like syndrome that lasts for a week. Dengue hemorrhagic fever (DHF) is characterized by bleeding at various body sites, including the skin. If shock occurs we call it dengue shock syndrome (DSS), intravenous fluid replacement becomes necessary. [Dengue fever is also called uncomplicated dengue fever (DF). DF was recognized and reported later than DHF and DSS].

Patients with DHF and DSS are generally hospitalized and this is the pediatric disease requiring hospitalization most frequently following diarrhea and respiration infections.

DHF and DSS are reportable diseases in Thailand. All health providers, even sanitarians and nurses in the district hospitals and subdistrict health centres in rural areas, are required to file a report on each case.

In the following I will first describe the epidemiology of dengue hemorrhagic fever during the last decades, pointing out the changes that have occurred, and finally describe our investigation in villages and in a school.

This chart shows the incidence of DHF in Thailand since 1958 when the disease was first recognized. Rates have increased with each epidemic; epidemics tend to occur biannually. Mortality rates, however, have
declined from 10% to 0.5%.

An examination of the monthly rates of DHF since 1962 show that the epidemics peak during the rainy season. Yet, in the year of 1987, the epidemic peaked in June-July, but the rain did not start until August, and the heavy rains came in September. Thus, the increase of incidence occurs in the dry, hot season, when little or no rain water is available for the mosquitoes except in man-made containers.

Examining the incidence of DHF by the four regions in Thailand, it is highest in the relatively dry Northeast, a region that was plagued by a severe drought. The rate is lowest in the rainy south.

DHF has been thought of as an urban disease; in the beginning it struck in the large cities, such as Bangkok. The incidence has now declined in Bangkok, but increased year by year in the provinces. Most of the population of Bangkok nowadays have access to tap water, whereas in rural areas water must be stored in large jars during the rainy season and saved for the dry season. In Bangkok, piped water is often available today, and there is not the same need for water storage as in the rural areas. This was not true in the 1950s.

The peak incidence by age is among the seven-year-olds, when children start school. DHF used to be exclusively a childhood disease, but is now frequently recognized in young adults. Morbidity, expressed as an age-specific hospitalized rate, showed a bimodal age-specific distribution. Very young children had an unusually high attack rate. The median age of patients during the period 1962-1965 was 3 years 10 months. The median age of DHF patients in Bangkok has shifted progressively to 5 years 10 months during the period of 1971-1973. Generally, for the whole country, there has been a trend for DHF to affect older children. In recent epidemics, the peak age incidence has appeared to move upwards to the 5-9 years age group. Similarly, young adults have been affected more than in the past, although the reason for the escalation of the peak age is not clearly understood.

I would like to go on to some of the investigations in which I was personally involved in 1987. One such outbreak took place at the beginning of August in a small village in the Northeast because of the death of 2 children.

Nakhorn Ratchasima, the provincial capital, is located some 200 miles northeast of Bangkok. Khonburi, the focus of our investigation, is a rural community with a small town for local trading some 50 miles south of Nakhorn Ratchasima. When we examined the reported cases of DHF in Nakhorn Ratchasima, we saw the incidence was high in 1984, but highest in 1987, and the epidemic peaked in July. Similar data for the district of Khonburi where the village (Village 4), that prompted the investigation, was located, the incidence was again highest in 1987, but rates continued high from July through October, in contrast to what was seen for the total province.

The age distribution was about what you would expect for DHF today, with high rates in school age children. Incidence was by far highest
in Kokrachai tambon, where Village 4 is located. Ten villages in the area were investigated after a severe epidemic of DHF in Nakhorn Ratchasima, in August 1987.

The road to the villages was muddy and full of water, and it takes about one and one-half hours to drive the 8 miles from Khonburi to Village 4. The subdistrict Khokrachai, located south of Khonburi, has 10 villages. Village 4 is located 12 km from Khonburi. A dirt road with numerous potholes connects the town and the village.

The incidence of DHF was highest in Village 4, but high incidence was observed in most villages. Neighboring villages did not have similar attack rates and it was not possible to trace the disease from one village to another. However, the epidemics in the villages seemed to follow each other sequentially. The incidence rates for the 8 subdistricts of Khonburi were 0.38, 0.50, 0.51, 0.80, 1.01, 1.22, 1.43, and 6.49 per 1,000 residents for January-August 1988. The highest rate, 6.49, was in the subdistrict Khokrachai, where Village 4 is located.

Looking at the 1987 epidemic in the 5 villages with more than 1,000 inhabitants, in one the epidemic began in March and came to an end in June. In the next the epidemic began in April and peaked in July; two more cases occurred late in the fall. In a third, it began in June and peaked in August, the time of our visit. All cases in August in this village occurred before the 20th, no later than a week after malathion spraying. The other two villages had low rates. Villages with low and high attack rates alternated on the map, and the spread could not be traced from one village to another.

A house to house survey was carried out by epidemiological teams, and children who had had fever during the 1987 epidemic were identified and bled. The team interviewed the households in Village 4 regarding febrile illnesses in children. After parental permission was obtained, blood specimens were drawn from the fingers of children who had experienced fevers.

A random sample of 20 children of 205 without history of recent infection were similarly bled. The presence of antibodies indicating recent dengue infection was about 65 percent, both for those with and without history of recent febrile illness.

Because of the high infection rate, randomly selected children in three additional schools representing five villages were similarly bled one month later - 20-23 children in each of 4 primary schools representing six villages being selected at random.

The infection rate was by far highest in Village 4, and the reported attack rate of DHF correlated well with the infection rate determined in the serological survey. There was one case of overt disease for each 14 children infected. The correlation between serologic infection and reported DHF rates was surprisingly high, particularly considering the relatively small number of children bled.
I will address our entomological study in Village 4. In a random sample of 52 households in Village 4, all water containers were inspected for mosquito larvae on August 13 by Dr. Poovanen and team workers. Thereafter, attempts at controlling the mosquito infestation took place. The evening of August 14, the physicians met with the villagers in an assembly hall and explained the dangers of mosquitoes and their breeding sites. The need to cover water jars was strongly emphasized.

Abate sand, that kills larvae in water containers, was provided and the homes were subsequently fogged with malathion. One month later Dr. Poovanen inspected 49 of the same 52 households. At the second visit to the village, abate sand could be seen at the bottom of most but not all containers; uncovered water jars were still found. The heaviest load of larvae was in shaded areas, in smaller rather than larger containers, and in the bathrooms.

Household index, container index and Breteau index were calculated before and after control measures. The Aedes house index was reduced from 67.3 to 20.4, the container index from 30.4 to 4.8, and the Breteau index from 228 to 33.

Although the mosquito population was reduced after the control measures, mosquitoes and larvae were not eliminated. The need for water storage is greatest in the more arid areas of the northeast, which has the highest DHF attack rate. In a recent investigation in a Bangkok school, mosquito larvae were primarily found in flower vases, tyres and similar containers.

The epidemic seems to come to an abrupt end at the time of institution of the control measures. However, the epidemic declined also in the villages without control measures.

IN SUMMARY: The epidemiology of DHF has changed. The disease affects older age groups than previously, suggesting a change from the first epidemic in the late 1950's. DHF is now well established in rural areas, rates vary from district to district, and village to village without obvious explanations. Epidemics do not depend directly on rainfall but the mosquitoes have adapted themselves successfully to the human habitat. We have been outsmarted by the mosquitoes, and need new approaches for control. Dengue hemorrhagic fever has indeed become a major public health problem in rural Thailand, and I can assume the situation is rather similar in neighbouring countries.

* * *
Translations

The Sacrifice1
from The Ancient Dongba2 Scripture of the Naxi nation
(originally in Naxi pictograph)

Translated from the Chinese by Jiang Ren

Hold in both hands the clean bowl full of water for the worship of the sky,
and pour this clean water all over.
Pour this water onto the mountains,
and we know that the animals and birds living in the mountains are not our
permanent possessions;
Pour this water onto the rivers,
and we know that the fish and prawns swimming in the rivers are not our
ever-lasting property.
Pour this water over the pig as the sacrifice to the sky -
to its mouth to clean the saliva,
over its lungs to clean the heart,
on its liver to clean the bile,
on its belly to clean the spleen.
This pig will soon be skinned and boned,
we hope its shoulder blade will be clean and shiny.3
The ceremony for the worship of the sky is maintained from generation
to generation,
and in this year, especially, we wish the Scripture will be chanted
more beautifully.
Pour this water on all the bones of the pig with four white trotters,
the bones will become as white and clean as white sea shells;
Pour this water on the pig's shoulder blade,
we hope that it will show a good omen.
This black pig with four white trotters
is a sacrifice to the God Mei ,4
is a sacrifice to the God Da, 5
is a sacrifice to the God Xu who lives in between of the sky and
the earth.6
We ask all three Gods,
to accept this sacrifice which has been purified.
A long, long time ago,
before the sun lights up day and the moon appears at night,
we already began to offer sacrifices to the Sky God.
We have since been protected and blessed by the Gods who have brought
us victory.
Our name is well-known and our prestige high,
like valleys filled with floods in summer.
Our men built yurts in which we live,
our women lit and maintained the fire.7
We settled with the raising of the pillar symbolizing victory,
with the standing of the stone symbolizing victory,
with the light of the fire symbolizing victory.
We gathered food with our hands,
we looked for spring water with our feet.
We finally settled on this warm land, generation after generation
on this lucky land.
Our family - the people who worship the sky,
did not know how to offer sacrifices to the ghosts and the gods,
we were not familiar with them
when we first came to live in the valleys;
Nor did we know how to please the guests
who were new neighbours to us
when we first came to settle on the mountains.
It was our chief who was intelligent and wise with the help of the
gods that
first taught
it was our diviner who had sharp ears and eyes that
first saw
on the incense which was used for divination
and on the shoulder blade which was used for divination
omens that said we should offer sacrifices to the Sky God,
to the Earth God,
and to the God Xu.8
At the time of creation,
above the earth there first appearedSibubanyu's sky9
which covers the whole earth.
This sky is hung high above,
this sky is spacious and transparent,
this sky is with both the Yang and the Yin,
this sky is paved with nine layers of brightly-coloured clouds,
this sky is decorated with big twinkling stars,
this sky accommodates the sun that warms the earth during day,
this sky holds the moon that lightens the ground at night,
this sky is Zhelao'apu 's sky,10
this sky is tall and sturdy,
this sky is broad-shouldered,
this sky is immaculately dressed.11
There would be no high and deep space without the sky,
there would be no vast expanse of our territory without the sky.
We give birth to boys and girls, to keep the family going,
our life becomes abundant and always prosperous,
we win each battle whenever we set out on an expedition, and are
never
frustrated,
we are gifted, and quick in movement,
we are able to prolong our life,
and we know that all these are bestowed by the Sky God.
At the time when the old year is replaced by the new year,
we did not commit any fault or omission to the gods.
Now the new month comes to the world,
this is the month of Dong  and Sai .12
Now, when this new month comes,
we have not stained our hands with things disrespectful to the Sky
God.
We have not forgotten to sprinkle the sacrificial grains with water.
nor to hold the ceremony of Luomandan .13
We have not forgotten to collect the sacrificial rice.
Nor did we forget to make the sacrificial wine.
On the third day of the New Year,
We did not forget to husk the sacrificial rice again with mortar and
pestle.
On the fourth day of the New Year,
we have not forgotten to measure the sacrificial rice;
nor did we forget to come to the altar on time;
nor to erect the sacrificial board and the wonder stones;
we did not forget to burn the Big Incense14 and to kowtow, and
to bring the baskets for the ceremony.
We did not reverse the order of the procedure required by the
ceremony,
we did not quarrel with anyone, nor
did we ever gossip behind someone's back.
On the fourth day of the New Year,
we did not forget to hold the arrow-shooting ceremony,
to make bouquets of flowers used for the sacrificial rite,
to offer a live rooster to the Sky God, and
to present a whole pig as sacrifice to the Sky God.
On the fifth day of the New Year,
we did not forget to butcher the sacrificial pig,
to bake nine pieces of liver for the Sky God
before the sacrifice was cooked.
We did not forget to sprinkle the sacrificial board with fresh blood,
and
to bring the baskets used for the rite.
We did not forget to free the white-footed spayed ox as the captive animal,
to present the live rooster, and
to erect the Dingtian Column made of white poplar
with an egg on top.
We, the descendants of Pudu, though we tried honestly to avoid faults and omissions,
may still have committed errors.
The faults we committed, we admit before the Sky God;
for the omissions made, we apologize to the Sky God;
all the misunderstandings will be straightened out; and
all the tangled affairs will be solved, before the Sky God.
We offer this white-footed sacrifice, this whole pig,
to the Sky God, and
we pray the Sky God for bestowal and protection.
At the time of creation,
the earth, the earth of Meimeixuraodui, first appeared below the sky.
There would be no high and deep space without the existence of the earth,
there would be no vast expanse of our territory without the earth.
This earth is Cuihengcuizi’s earth,
this earth feeds countless cows and sheep,
this earth provides grain and rice, as good as gold and silver,
this earth accommodates great forests, like having her shoulders covered
by dark green jade,
this earth is decorated with turquoise on her forehead,
this earth lies on a bed made of gold, silver and jade,
this earth has breasts which are big and full,
this earth is fertile and adept at breast-feeding,
this earth has well-built shoulders
this earth is immaculately dressed.
We, Pudu’s children, are fertile,
we become rich, never exhausted,
we win every battle whenever we set out on expedition, never experience
frustration, we have become gifted, are quick in movement, and our people are able to prolong our lives. We know that all these are bestowed by the Earth God. At the time when the New Year comes to man's world, in this new month of Dong and Sai, we have not done anything which is disrespectful and disloyal to the Earth God. We did not forget to sprinkle the sacrificial grain with water, we did not forget to hold the ceremony of Luomandan, and we did not forget to make the sacrificial wine.

On the New Year's Day, I did not forget to hold sacrificial rites for Sanduo and Shiri. On the second day I did not forget to find the sacrificial wood, and to wash my head and hands and feet on the following day, to burn the Big Incense and to kowtow with fervour, and to husk the sacrificial rice with mortar and pestle again, on the following day.

On the fourth day I did not forget to prepare enough rice, to eat the thin gruel cooked with wild vegetables, to come to the altar for the sacrificial rite to the gods, to erect the sacrificial boards and the wonder stones, to bring the baskets for the rite, and to expel the filthy air gathered around the altar. We did not disrupt the order which decrees who should walk in front and who behind, we did not quarrel with anyone, we never gossipped behind anyone's back, we did not forget to free the white-footed spayed ox as a captive animal for the Earth God, to present the live rooster, and to erect the Dingtian Column made of white poplar with an egg on top.

At the same moment when the sky and the earth appeared, the God Xu appeared in between the two. The cypress tree growing on the high cliff is the Sky God's and mankind's uncle. The oak tree which grows on the ground is the Earth God (the God of the place Xuraodui)'s grandmother. Cypress trees grow around the rim of the sky so that to enable the sky to remain stable and firm. Oak trees link the sides of the earth so that the earth becomes steady, not shaking. One white cypress tree has one thousand twigs, granting one-thousand-year's blessings to mankind. One black cypress tree has one hundred branches, guaranteeing one-hundred-year's propitiousness to man's world.

[To be continued]

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Ethnic Identification in China

Fei Xiaotong

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China is a multinational state. However, it is hard to clarify the number and identities of the nations living within Chinese borders. Before 1949, the KMT regime denied the existence of many nations. Even Dr. Sun Yie-Hsien's doctrine of 'five-nation republic' had been deliberately ignored. They claimed that some long-recognized nations were only offshoots of Han. This was extreme greater-Han chauvinism aimed at suppressing and eliminating the minority nationalities of China.

After 1949, the policy of ethnic equality was adopted under the leadership of the Communist Party. Many ethnic peoples who had long been under suppression, came forward to announce their ethnic backgrounds and the names of their nations. This proved that the Party's ethnic policy was successful. Up to 1953, names of the nations which had been submitted for registration exceeded four hundred. The question was then raised as to whether all these names represented distinct nations. Included in this list, were names of the places where some ethnic groups lived; others were names of sub-groups within a single nation; some were names used by other ethnic groups, and others different translations into Han Chinese. Therefore, examination and clarification of the names in the list became necessary before an answer could be given on the numbers and identities of the various ethnic groups. We named this process 'ethnic identification'. It is a work involving intensive scientific research.

The Party and Government had attached great importance to ethnic identification, because it is only through the clarification of the identities and number of nations in China that the Party's ethnic policy could be properly implemented. For instance, the policy of ethnic equality requires proportional representation of the ethnic units in the People's Congress at various levels; and if national autonomous regions are to be set up, then to which ethnic communities these areas belonged must be clarified. Beginning from 1953, in order to further the ethnic policy, ethnic identification was put on the agenda. Research panels composed of academic personnel were organized by both the central and local bureaux of ethnic affairs to work on ethnic units which had submitted their names for identification.

The preliminary step of the process would be to distinguish Han and non-Han units. If one unit is identified as non-Han then the following step would be to determine whether it belongs to a certain minority nationality or constitutes a distinct nationality of its own.

The following were the most common situations requiring decisions:
1. Some Han units had migrated to areas which had been inhabited
mainly by other ethnic peoples. Such units maintained Han features without knowing that they were ethnic Han. Like other ethnic groups, they submitted the names used of them by other ethnic communities. Such units included the 'Zheyuan people' in Yunnan and the 'Dan people' in Guangdong.

2. Han people had migrated to an area in different segments at different periods. The earlier Han migrants had been cut off from later developments in the Han region and their language and customs were divergent from the later Han migrants. They were discriminated against by the later Han migrants and believed that they belonged to different groups. As a result, they wished to be recognized as minority nationalities. The 'Chuanqing people' in Guizhou and the 'Liujia people' in Guangxi belonged to this category.

3. Under the old regime of ethnic suppression, some ethnic groups attempted to conceal features different from Han. The upper strata of certain ethnic groups was used by the Han regime to dominate other ethnic groups. From the point of view of the dominated, such dominating groups were no different from the Han rulers, and they were reluctant to recognize those dominating groups as members of their ethnic group. The 'Tujia nationalities' in west Hunan may be cited as an example.

4. For historical reasons, a single nation was divided and migrated in smaller groups to other areas. During the migration, some of them were deeply influenced by the Han people. Their language was altered and distinct features substantially lost, and their economic activities closely linked with those of the Han people. However, they lived in compact communities separate from the Han, and were often discriminated against. They identified themselves as ethnic minorities. People in this category included the 'Fan people' of Fujian and Zhejiang.

5. Parts of a single nation which migrated into different areas, basically maintained one common language, set of customs and tradition, while being referred to by other people with different names. As a result, they submitted different names for registration, such as 'Buzhuang' in Guangxi and 'Busha' and 'Bunong' in Yunnan.

6. People of one nationality lived dispersed in many different areas, and each of them assimilated the life style and culture of their neighbours, meanwhile they maintained one common language and were referred to by one unified name by other ethnic peoples, such as the 'Xifan' in Yunnan and Sichuan.

7. People of one nationality formed various communities which were widely scattered. These communities inhabited different areas which had no connection with each other. Language and customs of such communities varied from one to another while some similarities remained. They were referred to with one identical name in all these areas and they identified themselves as forming one single nationality, such as 'Miao'.

8. Disagreement existed within one ethnic group as to whether they formed a single nationality or an offshoot of another nationality. The 'Dahuer' in Northeast China were in this category.

The following complications reflect the characteristics of China's ethnic problem:
First, the origin and history of ethnic peoples in China may be traced to remote antiquity. Since the time of the Qin Dynasty (not to mention
pre-Qin history) which first saw the emergence of a unified multi-nation China, the various nations in China, through their intercourse and interdependence, have undergone a process of rise and fall, migration, disintegration and integration. For instance, we have witnessed substantial changes among the Manchu people over many generations. Nowadays, very few people among the Manchu tourists in the Forbidden City or Summer Palace can read the Manchu language on the inscribed boards which are hung on the entrance of each palace. The ethnic features of the Manchus has been substantially lost. However, most of them still firmly identify themselves as Manchu. Nearly 2.4 million people registered themselves as of Manchu nationality in the early 1950s. The figure is several tens of times times that first crossed the Great Wall through the Shan-Hai Pass. Some of the nations which were once powerful and prosperous in history, such as Xiongnu and Qidan, have vanished so completely that there is no trace of their descendants left. Because of the length of history, the complex origins and numerous changes, many knotty problems could not be solved without a thorough survey.

Secondly, a great number of ethnic groups have lived in this vast land. Intermarriage and mixture took place repeatedly among these groups. As a result of this process, these ethnic groups have gradually established their own dominions in which they live in compact communities. Some of these are small, others large and intersecting each other across the breadth of this vast land. The prairie which covers Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang and links Central Asia has been inhabited by the 'horse-riding nationalities'. At the east end of this prairie, so many nations which once shook the world, emerged, and their descendants nowadays are still distributed widely, as far as Eastern Europe. In the vast flatlands along the Changjiang River and the Yellow River Basins, one nation, which was first called Hua and later Han, gradually formed as the result of the merging of many ethnic groups through thousands of years. Like a rolling snow ball, its population continuously increased and at present is the largest in the world. The Han nation was formed with different blood.

The Tibetan people have inhabited the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau which accounts for one-fourth of the entire Chinese territory. They also embrace some different ethnic components. Some of them have assimilated with the Tibetans, while others have maintained their original characteristics to a certain extent. The Tibetans who inhabited the margin of the Plateau have in turn assimilated with other ethnic groups.

Ethnic relations in the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau represent the most complicated pattern. The Plateau has accommodated various nationalities. On its high mountains and deep-cut valleys, which are the geographical features of most parts of the Plateau, these nationalities lived in the form of compact communities. In the past, life in some remote areas was as quiet and isolated as that described by Tao Yuanming in 'The Land of Peach Blossoms'. People who lived there for generations simply kept going without knowing changes of dynasties. Among the 400-odd names submitted for registration, more than 260 were from Yunnan Province. No situation anywhere else is as complicated and complex as that in Yunnan.

The third characteristic is uneven development in terms of culture and social system among various ethnic groups. The situation
could be described as the 'on-going history of social development'. Having long been under the rule of feudalism and the oppression of the 'three mountains', social development of ethnic peoples has been hampered. The capitalist system had not come into being and most ethnic communities were at a pre-capitalist stage. Up to 1949, more than 4 million people lived under serfdom, and nearly one million in slavery. The number of people who maintained primitive commune ownership was around 600 thousand. Our policy is to uphold equality among all nationalities, no matter how large or small their population, or stage of civilization. The word 'nation' (minzu in Chinese) that we use equally refers to all ethnic groups without making distinctions regarding the stage of their social development or the length of time of their existence in history. The word has broad implications. This is different from the European tradition. In Europe, the notion of 'nation' emerged along with the rise of capitalism. The establishment of nation states in Western Europe marked the beginning of contemporary European history. In the multi-nation states of Eastern Europe, uneven social development occurred among different nations. Therefore, when the word 'nation' was brought into Eastern Europe, some other words had to be found to refer to the ethnic communities which were still at a pre-capitalist stage. For instance, 'clan' or 'tribe' were used to describe those in primitive communities. Because China and the European countries are different in terms of the process of social development, the traditional meaning of the word 'nation' is slightly different when adopted into the Chinese language. I mention this here with a view to avoiding unnecessary theoretical confusion which may be caused by translation. I use the word 'nation' here in the Chinese way.

Taking into considerations the above characteristics and based on Marxism, field work was conducted during the period of 1953-1957 on the ethnic groups to be identified. With the consent of the representatives, as well as the common people, of the ethnic groups in question, we first identified 11 nationalities, and then another 9 nationalities. One nationality was identified as late as 1979, i.e., the Jinuo nation. Up to now, including Han and other well-recognized nationalities such as Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan, 56 nationalities have been formally registered with the Central Government. However, ethnic identification in China is not yet complete because a) the minority nationalities in Taiwan and some areas of southeast Tibet cannot be identified until field work can be conducted in those places; b) some ethnic groups, though their names were registered in the early 1950s, such as Kucong, their identities have not yet been determined; and c) some ethnic groups, though their identities are determined, may need re-examination as to their nationalities, such as the 'Pingwu Tibetan' in Sichuan.

II
In order to illustrate the practice of ethnic identification that has been conducted, I would like to cite the following two examples. The first involves the identification of Han from other nationalities. The second is on the determination of whether an ethnic group is a distinct nation or an offshoot of another nation.

First: whether the Chuanqing in Guizhou (literally 'people in
In 1950, the work panels sent by the Central Government contacted more than 30 communities in Guizhou which identified themselves as non-Han. More than 10 communities among them had language and way of life basically identical to Han Chinese. However, they were discriminated against by the local Han, and thus felt reluctant to be identified as Han. They requested to be identified as minority nationalities. The largest group in this category was the Chuanqing who lived in northwest Guizhou. Their population was more than 200,000. The other groups in this category usually consisted of 20,000-30,000 people, and some were only several thousand. Field work was conducted in 1955 in order to identify the real nationality of the Chuanqing people.

The Chuanqing people raised several reasons for their claim. They used to have a language different from the local Han which was called 'the language of our old generations'. They lived in the countryside in compact communities. They maintained customs which were divergent from the local Han. For instance, their women wore a special costume (ie, with broad sleeves and lace trimmed), kept a special hair style (called 'san-ba-tou') and did not have their feet bound. They did not use sedans for their weddings. They were called 'Chuanqing' by the local Han, while they called the local Han 'Chuanlan' ('people in blue'). Before 1949, the two groups were antagonistic to each other, and the Chuanqing were despised. After the Chuanlan registered themselves as Han, the Chuanqing were reluctant to register themselves as Han because they worried that their unequal social status would remain. They thought that being registered as a minority nationality would allow access to preferential treatment. However, the local non-Han people called them 'the poor Han' or 'the Han who were tenant-peasants', instead of 'Chuanqing'.

At first sight, Chuanqing appeared possibly to be qualified for consideration as a distinct nationality, based on their special language, distinct communities, and the economic and psychological separateness from the local Han community.

We started by examining their language. Only very few Chuanqing people could speak that language. Most Chuanqing people only spoke Han Chinese. Linguistic analysis showed that their 'old language' was pure Han Chinese without any trace of other ethnic languages, though it is another Han dialect different from that in Guizhou. It is not evolved from the Guizhou dialect but could be traced back to the early dialect used in Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan provinces. It appeared that the Chuanqing people did not learn to speak this dialect in Guizhou, but migrated to Guizhou with this dialect. It was only 50-60 years ago that they began to adopt the Guizhou dialect as their daily language.

Linguistic analysis alone could not lead to the conclusion that Chuanqing belonged to the Han nation, because people who spoke Han Chinese were not necessarily of Han nationality. Nevertheless, linguistic analysis had given a clue to their origin. They were migrants who moved into Guizhou at an earlier time from the neighbouring provinces in the east. This conclusion is compatible with records available from local annals, the Chuanqing peoples' genealogy, their epitaphs, the local cultural relics and folklore.

In order to further determine whether the Chuanqing people had
developed into a distinct nation, their history in Guizhou also needed to be examined.

At the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (1381), Zhu Yuanzhang (the first Ming Emperor) dispatched troops to demolish the remaining Yuan military force in Yunnan. The troops passed through Guizhou and many were posted there later as a garrison force, which at the same time was ordered to engage in cultivation. Together with the soldiers remaining in the area were many civilian labourers who were on compulsory labour service. These labourers later formed a local migrant community which settled in the present Qingzhen area of Guizhou, which was the frontier of Han dominion and adjacent to the Shuixi area which was inhabited by the Yi community. These civilian labourers were called 'minjia' in the Ming Dynasty, and were discriminated against compared with those who had military status. Land was only allocated to those whose names were on the army roll, while the minjia had to rent land from the Yi people. Notwithstanding their position as tenants of Yi landlords, they were not entirely under Yi domination for they lived near the Han army. They were not assimilated into the Yi culture either, for their culture was quite distinct in comparison with that of the Yi. During the late Ming when the power of Yi chieftains was crippled, they moved further down into today's Zhijin and Nayung, the centre of the Shuixi area. After Gai-Tu-Gui-Liu 2 was carried out in the Qing Dynasty, the area was incorporated into the Han dominion. This caused the migration of more Han people into the area and the formation of the regions inhabited by them.

Later, Han Chinese continuously came to settle in this area. Among them were family members of the assigned officials and merchants. Most of them chose to live in towns or commercial centres. Thus there were two groups of Han migrants in this area according to their original social status. The early migrant group had been called 'Chuanqing' and the later group called 'Chuanlan'. The later ones lived in town and enjoyed advantageous social and economic status. They despised the Chuanqing people who lived in the remote countryside, were cultivators, and used to be tenants of Yi landlords.

At an early stage, the two groups stood side-by-side in resistance against the residual domination of the Yi chieftains. The gap between them was not obvious. Later, the Chuanlan people benefitted more from the development of the feudal economy. This was shown by the peasant revolt that took place during Emperor Xantong's reign (Qing Dynasty). Some of the Chuanqing people were leaders of the revolt, while the Chuanlan people consisted of the main force of the landlords' camp against the revolt. At the time of the late Qing and early Republic era, the nation-wide market emerged and the modern commercial network began to stretch into the area, replacing the separate local economy. The Chuanlan community took exclusive leadership in this process, while the Chuanqing people, who had lost connections with the outside world, were excluded. The Chuanqing landlords, though few and weak, were unwilling to be crushed and eliminated from the new trends in local economic activities. The hostility between the two communities thus came to the surface. The upper strata of the Chuanqing community incited fighting between the Chuanqing and Chuanlan under the slogan of anti-discrimination by
making use of the traditional feeling of togetherness within the community and the increasing unhappiness of the Chuanqing peasants to the intensifying exploitation and suppression. Up to 1949, a series of armed encounters took place between the two communities in the area. Feelings of estrangement had been aroused between the two.

Gradually, however, economic development integrated this area into the nation-wide market. This brought about the period which saw more integration of the Chuanqing with other Han people. Their distinctive features which had a local (rather than an ethnic) nature had largely vanished. In the recent 50-60 years they became more and more like other Han people in terms of their dress, language and custom. In the region which was linked to the outside by modern communications, ie, the border of their residential area, the differences between the two had become obscured or even vanished. In the hinterland, especially the more remote region, economic and political gaps between the two remained and the Chuanqing people were still despised. We thought that the changes taking place during this period, showing further unification among the Han people, was brought about by the development of capitalism.

The historical facts obtained from the survey tell us that the Chuanqing people are ethnic Han. They had neither been entirely cut off from the Han people, nor did they developed into a distinct nationality of their own since their migration into Guizhou. The special features that they had raised to support their independent identity were of a local nature. The hostility between the two groups resulted from uneven development among the Han people living in different regions under particular historical circumstances. Such gaps and hostility had gradually vanished.

We therefore concluded that the Chuanqing people are ethnic Han. They do not fall into the category of minority nationalities. In order to promote the establishment of fraternal relationship between the two Han communities, proper assistance in both political and economic terms should be given to the Chuanqing people to speed their development and thus to reduce the gap between the two. This would bring fundamental elimination of the enmity between them.

Second: Whether Dahuer (or called Daur) is a distinct nationality?

The population of Dahuer in 1953 was around 50,000, mainly distributed along the Nenjiang River and its tributaries in Heilongjiang province, while a small number lived at Hulun Buir Meng of Inner Mongolia and about one thousand in Tacheng (Qoqek) of Xinjiang. The ethnic identity of Dahuer had attracted special attention and disagreement had existed as early as the 1910s and into the 1940s. The main issue had been ’were Dahuer people Mongols’? Nationality of a particular ethnic group was then usually decided by its origin, therefore the argument was focused on the origin of the Dahuer people.

After the examination of the ideas of the various schools on the origin of Dahuer, we felt that there was not enough evidence to support any of them. From the information available we could only conclude that the Dahuer people in history had encountered certain ethnic groups who used a branch of the Mongolian language or of Tonggus-Manchu language. From reliable historical records on the latest 450 years, we learned that they mainly had relations with the
Suolun (now named Ewenke) nationals and Manchurians who belong to the Tonggusi-Manchu language branch.

Notwithstanding their relations with the Mongols, their language is a special segment of the Mongolian branch which is divergent from the one used by the Mongols. Linguists are of the opinion that it is a distinct language. By inference based on linguistic analysis, the ancestors of Dahuer may have been a segment of the Mongols in ancient times, or they may be of a different ethnic group who have adopted Mongolic as their language. We felt that this issue could be left for future academic studies. The issue that is more relevant to our ethnic identification is to clarify how the Dahuer people who once spoke Mongolic had developed their own language.

At the beginning of the 16th Century, some Dahuers lived in communities along the Jingqilijiang River (a tributary of the Heilongjiang River). At the beginning of the 17th Century, the area which accommodated the largest Dahuer population was at the lower middle reaches of the river, i.e., the area east of today’s Mohe County and on the opposite bank of the Heilongjiang River. By the time of the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the Dahuer people still maintained their dominion of the area stretching from southwest of the Shikele River to Nibuchu. 'Dahulia', the name of this area which was given by Russia in history, reflected this fact. At that time this area was adjacent, on the east, to the domain of the ethnic groups who spoke Tonggusi-Manchu language, and neighbouring on the west the Buliate Mongols. The Russian czar kept expanding his Empire from Siberia to the east. In the period of 1643-1646, the Russian advance troops encountered the Dahuer people at the Heilongjiang River. Fighting between the Dahuer people and Russian soldiers lasted more than forty years until the conclusion of the 1689 Sino-Russian Treaty. The Dahuers, together with the Suoluns, had to abandon their traditional home which was situated on the north bank of the Heilonjing River and resettled on the south bank of the Nenjiang River as the result of the aggression by the Russian czar and the strategy of jianbijingye 4 employed by the Qing army during the resistance. This migration which took place 300 years ago had an important impact on the late development of Dahuer. The south end of their Nenjiang area was then dominated by the Horqin Mongols who were not in a friendly relationship with the Dahuers. After the Dahuer people moved to the Nenjiang basin, the Qing government, with a view to strengthening the military force and grain supply within that area, incorporated the Dahuer (and the Suolun) people into the military system of the 'Eight Banners'. They were forced to become a garrison force. As the result of being administered under different systems, their relationship with the Mongols became further estranged.

This piece of history shows that despite the possibility that Dahuer and Mongol might have the same origin, the Dahuer did not maintain a close relationship with the Mongols, at least for the last 450 years for which reliable historical records are available. They lived in separate areas. They had rather close and amicable contacts with the Suolun community who spoke Tonggusi-Manchu language. Their affairs were administered by the Manchurians whose language was Tonggusi-Manchu, too. All these caused their separation from the Mongols and caused the formation of their distinct language. On the
other hand, they were not assimilated with the units who spoke Tonggusi-Manchu language though they had been surrounded by such units.

We thought these analyses led to the conclusion that the Dahuer people, having undergone this history, had emerged as a distinct nationality. But why did some Dahuer people uphold the notion that they were a branch of the Mongol? Interpretation of this phenomenon should be based upon the particular historical circumstances. During the Qing Dynasty, after the Dahuer people were incorporated into the 'Eight Banners', they attached themselves to the Manchurian elite. Due to their abilities and higher educational level, quite a few of them achieved senior positions and superior social status. After the 1911 Revolution, they lost their political backer and felt they had no future under the oppression of greater-Han chauvinism. The campaign of Da-Mon jiehe (literally 'promotion of solidarity of Dahuer and Mongol') appeared against this background at the beginning of the Chinese Republic, so did the notion that Dahuer was part of the Mongolian nation. During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese imperialists helped intentionally the diffusion of this notion with the view to further their attempted invasion of Inner Mongolia and to enlist support from the Dahuer's upper strata. The impact of this campaign still lasted after 1949. Our ethnic identification involved thorough and systematic research on the history of Dahuer. It helped the Dahuer people to reach understanding based on well-founded facts. The Dahuer people finally unanimously agreed that Dahuer is a distinct nation. The problem was thus solved satisfactorily.

The above two examples illustrate the approach that we have adopted in ethnic identification in the complicated situation. In other words, the above examples show how we make analysis according to the merits of each case and according to Marxist historical materialism.

(end of Section II)
(Social Sciences in China, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue ,’No.1 1980, p.147-162)

III
Before the conduct of ethnic identification, we repeatedly studied Marxism-Leninism, especially Stalin's famous definition of nation, which defines a nation as 'a historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.'5 We accepted this as the scientific definition based on the formation of Western nations during the capitalist era. The definition should be taken as a guideline for ethnic identification. Most important, however, was its proper application to the concrete situation of nationalities in China.

China had maintained its feudal system for very long and was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country before the establishment of the PRC. As a result, most nations in China, all but a very few, were at a pre-capitalist stage, and thus failed to meet the four qualifications raised by Stalin's definition. On the other hand, we had to agree to the fact that contemporary nations are also the outcome of historical
developments and their characteristics have therefore evolved through history. The national communities existing under a pre-capitalist system inevitably possessed these characteristics to a certain degree. As observed by Stalin: 'Of course, the elements of nationhood - language, territory, common culture, etc. - did not fall from the skies, but evolved gradually in the precapitalist period. But these elements were in a rudimentary state and, at least, were only a potentiality, that is, constituted the possibility of the formation of a nation in the future, given certain favourable conditions. The potentiality became a reality only in the period of rising capitalism, with its national market and its economic and culture centres.' Therefore, it would be wrong to simply apply such qualifications as the absolute criteria for our ethnic identification, while it would also be wrong to simply abandon their application, even as a means to help us cross the threshold for this work.

In the above two examples, the important clue was found through the study of languages. However, we did not take language as the only consideration, and did not determine national identity solely on the basis of the language branch to which they belonged. The Chuanqing people were identified as Han, but not only because they spoke Han Chinese. We further asked whether they had been isolated entirely from Han and thus formed a distinct ethnic group after their migration from other provinces hundreds of years ago. There are many examples in the world where different ethnic groups speak one common language. On the other hand, Dahuer was not identified as a Mongol branch, though they speak a kind of Mongolian language. We are of the opinion that language is not an invariant factor. Groups of people with different languages could merge into one nation, while more than one language could co-exist within one nation. Therefore linguistic analysis should be used, but not be taken as the sole criterion, in ethnic identification.

In both cases, we gave special considerations to the geographical factor, especially to the geographical location of their domain and the relationship with their neighbouring ethnic communities. Nationalities in China often moved around and were widely distributed, sharing their areas of habitation. Nearly 70% of the administrative divisions at the county level are inhabited by two or more nationalities. Therefore, it is more important to clarify the relations among the nationalities in one area, rather than focus only on determining the geographical domain of one nation. 'Common economic life', as one of the factors in Stalin's definition, is involved here, too. The situation in China cannot be seen as straightforward. The Han population has penetrated to most parts of China, including areas which were predominantly inhabited by other nationalities. In the economically backward areas, the Han inhabitants often acted as the main economic linkage. The town, which was usually inhabited by Han nationals, constituted the economic and commercial centre for one or more ethnic regions. It appears that the mutual dependency in economic life is the important motive force which causes the formation of nations in contemporary times. Such dependency, however, is comparatively less important at a pre-capitalist stage. At present, all nationalities in China are developing a socialist economy with in cooperation with each other. It is worth considering what role such cooperation could play in the future.
The 'psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' is also very important for ethnic identification. I must admit that we have as yet failed to understand this thoroughly. In some cases of ethnic identification we focused on the characteristics manifested in the people's customs, life style and religious ceremonies, overlooking the national consciousness which is displayed by, and even attached to them and the historical foundation upon which these characteristics were developed. To simply take these characteristics as the decisive criteria is an approach not to be recommended.

I think this factor in Stalin's definition emphasizes the common 'psychological make-up' of a nation. To put it simply, it refers to the feeling, held by people of one nation, of belonging to the same community. This psychological consciousness exists and can be understood by anyone through his or her own experience. This consciousness may be more important than other factors in the process of nation formation and maintenance. For instance, most Manchus today have adopted Han culture in terms of language and life style, though they still consider themselves as Manchu, not Han. Another example is the Gelao nationalities in Guizhou and Ghuangxi. It is shown by many indications that ancestors of the Gelao were once an important ethnic group widely distributed in the area. Today, the population is very small in Guizhou. They live dispersed in other nationalities' domains and have adopted respectively the languages and customs of the local nation. It is hard to find any obvious national feature. However, they themselves, as well as people from other ethnic groups, still identify them as the Gelao people forming a single nation, no matter how dispersed their population may be. The Fan nationalities may be cited as another example. The Fan people have long lived together with the Han community. They are Han Chinese speakers and their customs are deeply influenced by Han culture. It may be the sense of common national self-identification that holds them together as a single nation distinct from Han. The most noteworthy example may be Hmong which has its nationalities distributed over the entire Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, and even in many Southeast Asian countries. The Hmong people in different areas possess a strong consciousness of their ethnic identity, though they speak different dialects and form many segments living far from each other. Before the establishment of the PRC, especially during the Hmong revolt during the last years of the Qing Dynasty, thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of Hmong people responded from hundreds of miles away to the message of revolt.

Such common national consciousness could become stronger or weaker during different period under different circumstances. In order to achieve internal solidarity, a nation often tries to intensify such common consciousness. The nation's customs and life style which are different from others are thus much valued and treated as the mark of identity. Certain national features are intensified and put into arts and performance. All these are an expression of their common national sense. I think this may be the interpretation of the words, included in Stalin's definition, 'manifested in a common culture'.

Our policy always emphasizes that we must respect the customs of every ethnic community, because we consider that through certain customs ethnic people express their sense of national identity. Any behaviour disrespectful to such customs would be taken by the ethnic people as contempt directed towards their nation. Therefore only
reforms initiated by the nationalities themselves will prevent antagonisms between nationalities. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that not all customs involve a sense of common nationality, and customs themselves are variable.

To sum up, our ethnic identification should be conducted under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, in the light of the specific situations in China, being realistic, and in accordance with historical analysis based on the synthesis of various national characteristics.

IV

Through more than twenty years' effort of many anthropologists under the leadership of the Party, achievements and experience have been obtained in the research on ethnic identification. Except the problems which will be dealt with in the following paragraphs, the components of our big multinational family are basically clarified and the identification is agreed and accepted by most nationalities.

The remaining problems may be divided into three categories: a) ethnic minorities in Taiwan and southwest Tibet, where we are not in a position to conduct any field work at present; b) some ethnic groups whose identities have yet to be decided; and c) national identities of some ethnic communities which, though already determined, may need re-identification. The size of the population involved, except in the first category, is no more than several thousands, and only accounts for a very small proportion of all ethnic minorities. Since the downfall of the 'gang of four', the right ethnic policy of the Party has been resumed. As a result, most ethnic groups in the second two categories have requested identification.

The ethnic groups which have requested identification include: the 'Ping-wu Tibetans' in Sichuan, the 'Dreng people' in Zayi County in southeast Tibetan Autonomous Region, the 'Xiaerba people' of Dinggye and Tingri Counties in south Tibet, the Kucong people' living in the Honghe Yi and Hani Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan, and some other ethnic groups, which are hardly known by the outside world, in the same area, such as 'Ben', 'Kuge', 'Sanda', 'Ake', 'Buxia', 'Buguo', 'Chaman', 'Dengjiao', 'Kazhi', 'Bajia', and 'Jieduo'.

In addition, we have found some noteworthy phenomena during the twenty-year process of ethnic identification. For example, there are some 'language islands' in Xinjiang, namely, some ethnic groups maintain languages different from surrounding inhabitants. One such group in Hotan call themselves Aiyinu. People of this group speak two languages. The language which they use for internal communication may be a kind of ancient Eastern Iranian Language. The Tuwa speakers in Altay region who are called Wulianhai people and the group in Aktao County who are called by the Kirgiz nationalities as 'Aoyitakeleke people' have been first identified as Uygur nationality, and later re-identified as belonging to Kirgiz nationality. The old people in these groups call themselves Turkemen, while they speak a language which is similar to the Uygur language and different from the Turkomen in Russia. The 'Jiarong Tibetans' who live in Aba (Ngawa) and Garze areas of Sichuan could be another puzzle. Their language is different from Tibetan in terms of grammar and akin to Qiang and Pumi languages, and thus is called 'the language bridge between Tibetan and Burmese'. The people identified as Tibetans in Muli region of Sichuan and those
identified as Pumi nationalities in Ninglang region of Yunnan originally formed one nation. Their language is different from Tibetan while akin to Qiang and Jiarong languages. The people, living along the Lugu Lake which extends across Yanyuan County of Sichuan and Ninglang County of Yunnan, all regard themselves as being Naxi, while at present those living in Sichuan are identified as Mongols and only those in Yunnan are still called the Naxi people. The single community of these people, though living together, are thus divided into two different nations. The people who are self-identified as Hmong in the Hainan Island are akin to the Guaoxi Yao nationalities who call themselves as 'Jinmen people' in terms of language and life style, while different from the Hmong people in other areas in all respects. More questions of this kind will certainly be encountered through further survey in the process of ethnic identification, and they would be interesting topics of our research.

I would like, briefly, to describe a few cases below to illustrate some of the problems.

A. The 'Pingwu Tibetans'

In Pingwu County of Sichuan and Wen County of Gansu, ie, at the border of Sichuan and Gansu and near the native land of the Chinese pandas, lives an ethnic group with a population of several thousands who are called the 'Pingwu Tibetans' or 'White-Horse Tibetans'. They lived under the oppression of local chieftains. The Red Army passed through their area during the Long March in 1935. Afterwards, the Kuomingtan Army butchered the inhabitants in that area. Only about 500 people of that ethnic group survived the slaughter and they later survived by keeping their identity hidden by attaching themselves to the Songpan (Sungqu) Tibetan tribes. Together with some other ethnic groups in the area, they were all called 'Xifan' (literally 'Ethnic People of the West'). In 1951, the Working Panel, doing field work in the area, identified this group as Tibetans, according to the information provided by some local chieftains. In 1964, Nisu, a woman representative of this group, met Mao Zedong at the national-day celebration. Mao asked her about her nationality, someone said that 'she is from the Sichuan White-Horse Tibetan community'. People of her ethnic group were so happy to see this interview in a documentary film, while at the same time they raised objections to the nationality identity determined in 1951. Both the records passed down from their forefathers and the current information show that they are different from other Tibetans in the same area as well as from the Qiang people. A recent survey establishes that they call themselves Bei. The difference between their language and the Tibetan language is greater than that between the various Tibetan dialects. Their language is similar to Qiang and Pumi languages in terms of grammar. Their religion is rather primitive. They worship spirits of the sun, the moon, mountains, rivers and rocks, without believing in one particular god. Though there is influence of Lamaism in certain segments of this group, there is no general belief in Lamaism.

It is shown by the above facts that possibly the Pingwu Tibetans are not Tibetans in history, but what could be their original nationality? Some historians believe people of this group could be the descendents of the ancient Qi, according to the historical records.
concerning this area. However, historical records after the Wei and Jin Dynasties appear to fail to mention anything about this area, and it is hard to fill such gaps of hundreds of years.

In order to find an answer, it may be necessary to extend the range of the survey, linking all aspects of the research, such as history, geography and language, in the ZayӦ and LuoyӦ regions which begins in the north from Gansu Province and ends in south in Tibet. This corridor, which frequently changed hands in history, constituted the frontier between Tibetan and Han and Tibetan and Yi people. It was dominated by the nations which were called Qiang, Qi and Rong in historical records. Some local regimes appeared to exist in the area. At present this corridor is inhabited by Han at the east end and by Tibetans at the west end. However, it is in the Tibetan area of this corridor that we have found many ethnic groups who are identified as Tibetans speaking languages different from the Tibetan language in Tibet. The Jiarong Tibetan language used in northwest Sichuan is notably very different from today's Tibetan language in Lhasa.

Stretching from Jiarong to the south, along the corridor, signs indicate the existence of a local language which has not yet been totally obliterated. It is still used among family members. There used to be a professor in the Central Institute for Minority Nationalities whose hometown is in Muya, Kangding (Today it is in Shade Prefecture). In the Tibetan language the place is called Minyak). People of the region speak Tibetan with those who do not belong to their community, while they use a different language at home. This language has not yet been studied by linguists. It is noteworthy that the Tibetan names of places in this area are identical to the names given by the Dangxiang Qiang people (called Xixia in Tibetan) in history, which was called Miyao (Mjeiak) in Tang Shu (The Tang Book). It is believed by a number of scholars that the area between the Jinsha River (Jinsha Jiang) and the Dajin River (Dajin Chuan), within the Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, is the place of origin of the Dangxiang Qiangs. The Tang Book relates that after the majority of the Dangxiang Qiangs migrated to the north, the remaining population was subject to the rule of the Tibetans. It could be a worthy topic for research as to whether this language is related to the ancient Dangxiang Qiang language.

Looking towards east from Kangding (Dardo), on the upper course of the Min River (Min Jiang), live the Qiang nationalities who are surrounded by other nationalities. Further east at the upper course of the Fu River (Fu Jiang) there live the people who have been called the Pingwu Tibetans, but who have questioned this identity. Looking south and then turning west, in the area between the Yalong River (Yalong Jiang) and the Jinsha River (Jinsha Jiang), live another ethnic group which used to be called 'Xifan' together with the Pingwu Tibetans. At present, people of this group who live in Sichuan province are regarded as Tibetans, while those in Yunnan are called Pumi. In fact, those who are regarded as Tibetans are Pumi speakers, rather than Tibetan speakers. The Pumi language is akin to Qiang and Jiarong. Further towards the west, crossing the Lancang River (Lancang Jiang) and up to the Nu River (Nu Jiang), live the Nu nationalities, which have been recognized as constituting a distinct nation. The Nu people, however, do not speak one unified language, though all their languages are close to the Jingpo language, while some are also similar to the Dulong language. Both the Jingpo language and Qiang
language now are regarded as being segments (which are parallel to the Yi language) of the Tibetan-Burmese language branch. The relationship between them needs further academic research. Crossing the Dulong River (Dulong He) and the mountains between it and the Nu River, we come to the area inhabited by the Dreng people whose nationality is to be identified.

We could roughly draw a corridor, with Kangding as the centre and stretching towards both east and south. There are always many puzzles along this corridor in linguistic and historical studies. It is like playing weiqi (a Chinese chess game playing on a board), you have to link all your pieces to win the game. This corridor is situated between the Tibetan and the Yi domains. It should be an interesting region for linguistic and historical studies, with many phenomena of historical evolution still going on in the area.

B. The Dreng people in ZayÄ

West of the Nu River and crossing the mountain Hengduan, at the southeast corner of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is the ZayÄ area. An ethnic group lives there with a population of 20,000, which has been called the Dreng people since 1950. Their nationality is still an outstanding issue.

The ZayÄ area is situated at the eastern end of the so-called McMahon Frontier, therefore only part of the area is under the control of Chinese authorities at the moment. Within the ZayÄ county, according to the statistics in 1976, there are 977 Dreng people in seven villages. All other villages in the County are Tibetan villages.

These Dreng people could be further divided into two groups, each has its own language and name, and it is said that the two groups migrated into the ZayÄ area from different places. One group calls themselves Darang, and the other Geman. The former is called Digaru and the latter is called Midzu by the Assam Indians, while they (including the Yidu people living along the Dingba River [Dingba Qu] west of the ZayÄ area) are all called Mishmi by the British. According to their own folklore, the Darang people are a segment of the Yidu people who split off from the Yidus and migrated into this area 7-11 generations ago, and the Geman people moved into this area later from Burma, about nine generations ago. The Geman in ZayÄ county has a smaller population than the Darang (about 1:3). Each of them has its own language, and both are akin to the Dulong language and the Jingpo language in Yunnan. Due to the long period of living together, all Gemans can speak the Darang language, and some Geman children cannot speak their own language. The two languages appear to be under a process of unification. Both groups can speak Tibetan.

It is also worthy of mention that it is said there used to be another ethnic group in the ZayÄ area which was called Shang. They were quite advanced in terms of cultivation skills. The sites of the terraced fields made by them can still be seen today. They were defeated by the Tibetans about 1-2 hundred years ago. Some moved to other places, and some have been Tibetanized. The ethnic identity of this group remains unknown. There is one more group in this area, which is called Zha by the Tibetans. It is said, though it has not yet been determined by linguists, that their language is a mixture of the Geman and the Tibetan languages, probably adding Tibetan words to the original Geman. Their language is called the local language, in order to make a distinction from Tibetan. The Zha people do not believe in
Lamaism, do not marry Tibetans, and have their own customs, but as they are afraid of being discriminated against by the Tibetans, they also introduce themselves as Tibetans or 'the Tibetans who speak the local language'. Such people form five villages in the area, with a total population of 700. The existence of such people indicates that there might have been Dulong-language (or language similar to the Dulong language) speakers, maybe the Geman people, living in this area at an earlier time.

This area is separated from the Nu River valley only by one mountain range, and even as early as in the Tang Dynasty it was mentioned in Man Shu (‘Book of Ethnic Peoples’) that there was a road linking Yunnan and this area. The ethnic groups that live, or lived, in the areas of ZayŶ and LuoyŶ and their ethnic identities have not yet been determined, though they may be the descendants of certain Dulong-language speakers who migrated into these areas along that road in earlier times. The ethnic groups in the LuoyŶ area, according to initial studies, are not Tibetan speakers. Their language is akin to the Jingpo language. Taking into consideration the existence of some Dulong- and Qiang-language-speaking ethnic groups in west Sichuan and south Gansu, it is possible that the corridor is the dividing line between the Tibetan and the Yi territories which may stretch into the areas of ZayŶ and LuoyŶ at its south end. The Piwu Tibetans and the Dreng people, as mentioned above, may have some relations with this corridor in history, and may be the remainders of two ethnic groups that have been assimilated by the Tibetans or Yi nationalities to some degree. It provides the anthropologists an important topic, i.e., to clarify the historical evolution of the ethnic communities in the entire corridor.

C. The Kucong People Living in Honghe, Yunnan

Yunnan presents the most complicated ethnic-distributing patterns in China. The province accommodates the largest number of nationalities, and the situation is complicated further by various different names attached to any one single nation. According to the Account on the Names of the Ethnic Minoritites in Yunnan (first published in 1972 and then in 1978 by the Yunnan Provincial Government), the 21 nations that have their ethnic identities determined altogether have 138 names used by themselves and 157 names used by other nationalities. In addition, there are dozens of names which have not been clarified, or cannot be clarified at present. The population in this category is about 3,000. These groups at the moment are not called 'nations', but 'peoples'. Included in this category, is the Kucong people.

The people who are called Kucong are mainly distributed in mountain area of the Ailao Mountains (Ailao Shan) which are situated between the Zhashe River - the Yuan River and the Babian River - the Muo River. The Kucong people in Jinping, LŶchun and Mengla live in remote, thickly forested mountain areas, with rather primitive cultivation skills. The population of this Kucong segment was about 3,600 in 1971. Another segment of the Kucong people live in northern Xiping and Zhenyuan, with a population of 2-3,000. Their productivity is parallel to the neighbouring Yi and Hani nationalities. They were called Kucong Lolo (Kucong Yi) in the past as well, and they feel more or less as if they belong to the Yi nation at present. The Kucong people who have requested identification are those leading a rather
primitive life in Jinping and Mengla.

Kucong is the name given to this group by the Han. Some of the people in this group call themselves Lahu, and it could be further divided as Lahuxi (called Yellow Lahu by Han) and Lahupu (White Lahu), while some call themselves Guochou (called Black Lahu by Han). In the summary of the survey on ethnic identification of the Hani nation done in 1954, there is a footnote which reads: 'There are two types of Kucong people, one calls themselves Guocuo, and it is said that they are similar to Hani; the other one calls themselves Lafu, and it is said that they are similar to Lahu. Conclusion cannot yet be drawn due to the lack of information.' In 1955, the Working Panel for ethnic identification in Yunnan categorized Kucong as a branch of the Hani nation, and concluded that the Kucong people in Jinping County 'cannot be regarded as forming a distinct nation. Kucong is only a branch of Hani.' This conclusion is mainly based on a brief language survey that was conducted by the Working Panel. They collected 837 words from the local Kucong people in Xingping County, and compared them with the Hani language. Among the 610 words that they studied, 363 words are similar, accounting for 59.51%.

This conclusion is not convincing, because a) it fails to answer the question why there are two types of Kucong people; and b) it fails to explain why the Kucongs, especially those who call themselves Lafu, are not categorized as a branch of the Lahu nation, but as a branch of Hani. In 1961 the Institute of Historical Studies, Yunnan University, made a survey of the Kucongs living in Jinping County, and reached an entirely different conclusion. According to their revised report in 1977, 'The Kucong people are divided into three sections, i.e., Yellow, White and Black. Both the Yellow and the White Kucongs call themselves Lahus. According to our initial research, their language seems to belong to a dialect of the Lahu language in the Lancang area. The Black Kucongs call themselves Gecuo. Their language is similar to the Lahu language, too. Therefore the Kucongs seem to be more like the rather primitive Lahu tribes who have not yet moved out from forests. However, both in the past and at present, some people maintain that the Kucongs form a segment of the Hani nation.'

In the recent report from the Language Department of Yunnan Institute of Nationalities, it is said: 'The language of the Black Kucongs is not that different from that of the Yellow Kucongs. The two can easily communicate with each other. Their languages clearly maintain the basic characteristics of the Yi language sub-branch.'

The report also reports the comparative linguistic study done by the Department between the Kucong language and the Lahu language used in the Lancang region: '50% of the basic vocabulary [of the two languages] are identical, 30% are similar, leaving only 20% different. The basic grammars are the same, though slight divergence of pronunciation may be noticed. Therefore the Kucong language in Jinping County could be regarded as a dialect of Yi-Lahu language sub-branch, Tibetan-Burmese language branch of Sino-Tibetan language family.'

The differences of opinion on the Kucong's ethnic identity may be partly caused by the complexity associated with the Kucong groups. Kucong is the name given to them by the Han, while they have several different names for themselves. It is noteworthy that one
section of Kucong is similar to Hani, and the other to Lahu. Question should be asked on the relationship between these two section (ie, one call themselves Guochou and the other one Lahu, or Lafu) and on what grounds can the two be regarded as forming a unified ethnic group of Kucong? One more point which may be necessary to take into consideration is the diversity of the Lahu nation. Within the Lahu nationalities, there are quite a few branches with dialects very different from each other. According to the survey done by some western linguists of the Lahu people living in North Thailand adjacent to China, the Yellow Lahus and the Black Lahus in this area use two dialects which make them unable to communicate with each other. Guochous are called Black Lahus by Han. Therefore it is possible that the difference between the language of Guochous and the Yellow Lahus may only reflect divergence among dialects. This opinion then is linked to a more general issue, ie, the relationship between the Lahu language and the Hani language. It has been noticed by some people that the difference within one language used by several nations who belong to one language branch, is, in certain cases, smaller than that observed among the dialects used by several sub-units of one nation. The phenomenon is understandable. Identification of nations is not entirely based on the aspect of language. Moreover, as far as language itself is concerned, its classification cannot be determined according to the differences on the surface only, but more according to historical analysis.

The issue of the relationship between Lahu and Hani languages is in fact only one aspects of the classification of the various languages within the Yi language branch. No problem in the ethnic identification could be more puzzling than defining the relationship and distinction of the various ethnic sections among Yi-language speakers. For example, in respect of the names of the Yi-speaking nationalities only, the Account on the Names (as mentioned at the beginning of this Section) listed 64 names which are used by the Yi-speaking groups themselves and 88 names given to them by non-Yi-speaking ethnic units. At present these groups are defined into several nationalities, such as Yi, Hani, Lili, Lahu and Naxi. However, there are still many outstanding issues, including, for instance, the historical process in which these groups evolved into distinct nations, and the relations, with respect to their languages and history, of the various sub-units within these identified nations.

As far as the nationality of the different Kucong sub-units, and whether such sub-units form a single nation are concerned, it would not be correct to determine it solely according to linguistic characteristics, for the reasons illustrated in the above two examples (the Dahuer and the Chuanqing people). The different Kucong sub-units used to be under the rule of chieftains of different nationalities. As a result, they may tend to become assimilated with different nations. This issue can only be solved after thorough research is done on the history of this area.

Ethnic identification, though it is academic, serves the practical purpose of our ethnic work. It provides grounds for the determination of nationalities of people. However, the final determination of nationality of a particular ethnic group should take into consideration the wish of the people themselves and the conclusion should not be in conflict with such wishes or to the
prejudice of their interest and harmony among the nations.

In the context of this paper, the wish of the people means the intention of such a group as to whether they consider themselves Han or non-Han, or a distinct nation or not. It is the consideration of policy that makes us stress the wish of the people. Under the policy of ethnic equality, the ethnic identity of a group should not be determined arbitrarily or grudgingly against the intention of the group nor should they be forced to accept. The final determination depends on their own wishes. Due to the long-term policy of ethnic oppression and discrimination employed by the various former rulers, and the resulting antagonism and isolation associated with inter-ethnic relationships, many ethnic minorities still do not know much of their own history and language, and therefore lack information to make decisions. In such a situation, we must, on the one hand follow the principle of respecting their wishes, and on the other hand be prepared to help the people to clarify their own history in order to enable them to make the right decision. According to our experience, it is helpful to encourage as much as possible the participation of leading figures from the ethnic group, to work closely with the people, to maintain discussion with them and to link academic research with mass education during the whole process of identification.

As we have mentioned before, any nation, as a community of people, may undergo the process of formation, evolution and sometimes dissolution, and may be constantly under threat of disintegration and merger with others. Most issues that need to be dealt with at present are knotty problems involving, or caused by, such processes, i.e., some groups are undergoing a process of splitting but have not yet split completely and some are undergoing merger, but this process may not be complete, either. The analysis should stress the complicated process of splitting and merging, while more consideration should be given to the impact of the decision upon the future development of such a group and its relationship with neighbouring groups when the decision on ethnic identity is to be made. Also, the impact of such decision upon other ethnic groups in similar situation is not to be taken lightly. Any issue in relation to ethnic identity must be treated seriously, conscientiously, and based on facts.

Generally speaking, our ethnic studies have been fruitful under the leadership of the CCP. The studies are characterized by the close connection maintained with the practical necessity generated by the implementation of the ethnic policy and the combination of Marxism as the theoretical guidance and the reality in China. Ethnic identification is only one of the aspects of our ethnic studies. Scholars in China are working, while studying, on some subjects which have not been touched by Chinese scholars in the past. Though mistakes and defects have been made, our purpose is clear and justifiable, i.e., we serve the people with our academic work.

(Author's note: This article is based on the speech I gave at the meeting of the Section of Nations of the Committee of C.P.P.R.C. in September, 1978. During the preparation of that speech, many of my colleagues in the Central Institute of Nationalities and the Institute of Ethnic Studies of the National Academy provided information and suggestions).


'Dehong' is the official Chinese designation not of a political entity but rather of a general area of South-West Yunnan. This renders the argument about typical political unit names in the region irrelevant, whether correct or not. By the way, there is simply no truth in the idea that the falling diphthongs [ia, ua •a] exist in these languages and simply get shortened in fast speech as alloforms. There is a complete sound change from the Siamese, and ia, ua, •a, become, in all the 'Shan' languages (Tai Ta•, Tai Maau, Tai N"), ä, ¹, ¨ respectively. Now, regardless of the 'cock-crow' etymology, and regardless of the fact that the informants, who were not obviously speaking their own language, were probably speaking either in Siamese, which they do not know generally, or via Yunnanese Mandarin, where the final n and r fall together anyhow, there is nothing in the standard reading of Salween in the second word; clearly your informants pronounced in, in a language foreign to them, in the way your report, but I seriously doubt they gave you the etymology you propose. Moreover, the Chinese first syllable De, of Dehong, corresponds regularly, according to the Chinese rules for transcription hereabouts, to the Ta• and not to Tai. Also, the sense of the correct translation is not 'South' of the Salween but rather something like 'Downstream/down in the valley-plain of the Salween'. This disposes of your other objection. Of course Ta• (more properly transcribed as ta÷ ) means South, but it also, by a well-documented and wide spread extension refers to these other, derived senses.

As to M"ng M‡au (properly, please note, MO(ø,¨)ng M‡au), your translation makes little sense, and I can find no entry in any available Shan dictionary for this term for 'cock-crow', however much local folk-etymologisation has taken hold in recent decades. The trouble is that the long-vowelled form, which is the right form, identifies the name of the political domain (this is one, not a mere region-name, of course) with that of its much grander historical ancestor, and that of the language group inhabiting it, on both sides of the Shweli (Ruili) river. This word is waau in the Shan (see Cushing's Dictionary, page 615), save in the Khamti and related dialects over the Indian border, of course (it has a perfectly regular Siamese cognate) for [major] River Plain/Valley and it appears to refer to nothing but the Shweli drainage Ñ not surprisingly, of course. By the way, this Tai M‡au is not even the language of the Dehong, which is Tai N" ('Northern Shan'). Also, as you ought to know, the Dehong's main principality historically is, or was, what used to be known as Tengyueh, and is now more ordinarily known as Tengchong, and this is as distinct as can be from M"ng M‡au over on the Shweli/Ruili.

On Tai Maau, see especially Linda Wai Ling Young's shan chrestomathy: An Introduction to Tai Mau Language and Literature, University of California Center for South & Southeast Asia Studies,
Berkeley (1985). On the relations, historical and other, any standard book on Shan will prove useful, e.g. Cochrane, Colquhoun, etc., or Mrs Milne's book, but most particularly, Sao Saimong Mangrai's the shan states & british annexation. All the references you may need to follow up on the claims of the present petty state of MO(ø,¨)ng M‡au to be the successor to the great historical state (first an adjunct principality of Tali toward the end of that latter state's history, later the jumping-off area, or staging area, for the Ahom, then the Shan invaders of Pagan-Burma, then from the Khamti and relatives) you can find the references, oddly enough, in Leach's political systems of highland burma, owing to the fact he had to refer to the old 'Mšng Mao Succession Case'.

The editor is very glad to have this comment by Professor Lehman and invites further correspondence on this issue. Readers may recall that Acharn Thawi has raised the subject in Silpawatthanatham (Bangkok), and we will report on any correspondence that appears there.

As the writer of the original piece on Dehong (No. 9: 9-13 and the note No. 10: 27, which is the focus of Professor Lehman's comments) I will reserve detailed comment for a future occasion. I would, however, like to make four brief points.

1. I did write 'mŸang names', and I apologize if this was interpreted as implying 'political'. My intention was to place emphasis on 'place' rather than 'political unit'.

2. Regarding the question of allophones, I have no linguistic training and an admittedly bad ear; nevertheless, I am satisfied that I did hear the two sets of sounds used by local Tai speakers. I accept the view that 'the falling diphthongs' undergo change in all the 'Shan' languages into å, ¹, ¨. My point is that they are sometimes allophonically realized, perhaps below the level of consciousness, as something very like the Siamese diphthongs.

3. I assure Professor Lehman that local Tai speakers did give me the etymology I reported. I do not have sufficient background knowledge to have invented it.

4. Further on the question of etymology, Professor Lehman has transposed the meaning I gave MŸang Khorn with that for MŸang Mao (my spelling of both names in original). It is likely, however, that his comments could apply to the gloss 'stillness of dawn'.

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Lehman further comments on Christian Bauer's note 'The Mon and the ethnonyms of their neighbours' (No. 8: 8),

One other issue I want to raise with you, concerning a reference that was made by someone in an earlier issue of the Newsletter to something I wrote. Not unnaturally, the issue once again involves etymology, though this time not Tai. In Newsletter No. 8, Christian Bauer writes of Mon sources for exonyms used by themselves and others, e.g., Tai and Burmese, for some of their respective neighbours (p.5). He deals at one point with words referring to various Karen, and in his footnote 5 makes some reference to etymologies I have proposed elsewhere for some of these words for Karen. But at page 229 of my 'Who are the Karen, and If So, Why?' (pp.215-263 of C.F. Keyes (ed.), ethnic adaptation & identity karens
of the Thai frontier) I merely point out some of the apparent phonological problems associated with the derivation of the various forms of the word; I propose no etymology save for accepting the Mon derivation, which Bauer proposes, agreeing with Keyes and many others. Moreover, the very phonological question (about the source of the r + diphthong ialea in Burmese and/or Siamese Kariang) I raise are raised by Bauer himself (loc. cit.). I suppose Bauer is objecting to what I say about the possible source of the root of the Mon term, ultimately in the Karen languages themselves, but on that score Bauer is simply not correct and arguing on the basis of no better an acquaintance with Karen linguistics than I have with Mon (of which he is certainly a master). Then, in my note 24, at pages 251-52, I raise certain very real questions about how one is going to derive the Burmese expression (for Pwo Karen), written as Karyang Tanlui²n and pronounced kayiN talaing (viz. 'Mon Karen') by way of the old Yule-Burnell suggestion, from a word (talaing) referring to the Mon derived from an oblique pseudo-historical reference to the Telengana/Kalinga (of the eastern coast of the Indian peninsula). In the text proper of the paper, not proposing any etymology at all, but frankly speculating, I point out that there is a Karen etymon, recoverable in Red Karen (Kaya), and meaning roughly 'South', or (once again) 'downstream/valley' (see above, regarding Shan/Tai maau/waau). This word is, in Western Kayah, t’lia, arguable reconstructable for *Karen as something like taliang/taleng; and that this source makes as much sense ('downcountry Karen', hence, for the Mon, with an historically far from impossible Karen borrowing, 'Southerners/plains-dwellers'. The connexion with the Karen early on in the Burman occupation of Upper Burma is documented in early inscriptions (see pages 24-25 of G.H. Luce's phases of pre-pagan burma, Volume 1, oup, 1985) and not controversial, and is not altogether unlikely that the early Burmans may have encountered the Karen before the Mon, though it is not especially probable either. I point out also that the nasal final of the Written Burmese first syllable remains a puzzle on any proposed etymology, however, and I probably go quite wrong in stating my reasons for thinking that the Burmese vowel written -ui- and pronounced -ai- could not have come, e.g., via Old or Middle Mon, from either the i of Telengana, or the e of Telengana (both forms attested historically). Maybe that is what disturbs Bauer, and I have got to defer to him on this point, if so, since he is perhaps the leading Mon-ist linguist of the present day, and I am a Tibeto-Burmanist and Tai-ist, and in no way a specialist in anything Austroasiatic. Still, that is the only point at which I touch upon his own speciality, the rest being well within my own competence, and, having in fact not proposed any actual etymologies for anything, I do not see the basis for Bauer's peremptory dismissal of what I have pointed out. He may not like the idea that Old Burmese written -ui- is to be reconstructed as having the pronunciation -ai- in closed syllables, -ou- [ʽu] in open syllables, since that goes against the grain of any Mon specialist in making it hard to account for the fact that this digraph, in the Mong alphabet from which the Burmese is ultimately derived, is reconstructed as ə and renders a in Indian loanwords; for that would make the vowel of the initial syllable of Written Old Burmese tanlui²n somewhat easier to account for than I indicated in my note. However, as I have shown elsewhere in print, we are not able to
reconstruct a back-unrounded vocalic series in Lolo-Burmese, and that is pretty much that!

* The Masters degree program in Lanna language and literature of the department of Thai in the Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai University is now in its fifth year under the direction of Professor Udom Runruangsri, who was the initiator of the Lanna-Thai Dictionary (Queen Mother's Project). The Masters program teaches Tai writing such as Tai KhÝn, Tai LÝ (old and new writing systems), Tai Jai and Tai MÝang Khorn under the supervision of Acharn Thawi Swangpanyangkoon. The textbook used for the teaching of these writing systems has not been printed due to a lack of funds, but is xeroxed for the use of students. The program began teaching the Dehong Tai script (MÝang Khorn) in 1988 for the first time in Thailand and published a text on the writing system - also the first in the Kingdom.

* Professor Wu Lingyun of the Yunnan Institute of Nationalities writes,

The discussion about Mang Shi, Meng Si and Meng Kh'n, as included in the last Newsletter, is very interesting. It seems quite clear to me that
a) Meng Si (or Xi) is a Tai word;
b) Meng Kh'n is a Tai word; and
c) Mang Shi is also Tai.

a) Originally the place was not at the present location of Mang Shi, but at a place 8 km from Mang Shi, which is still called Meng Xi. The place used to be chief's temporary dwelling. (In the Tai area, any place which is called Meng must have a chief - called Zhao Meng (Tsau Meng) in the Tai language. The place otherwise would not be qualified to be called Meng). b) The name (Mang Shi or Meng Si, etc.) should be interpreted as meaning 'valley', while Mang Shi is the Han-Chinese transliteration of meng xi.
Translated by Jiang Ren

* Book news
A hundred of years of opium cultivation in the Lisu village 'See-the-tiger' in north Thailand saw the establishment of a society in which a woman had the repute of an elephant and a man that of a dog. The suppression of opium and the introduction of new crops with differences in relations of production and trade have seen the emergence of sexual stratification in which 'though women having to act like dogs are not allowed to enjoy the privileges of dog-outgoing behaviour'.

* Louis Gabaude - Ecole Francaise d'Extrme-orient - is preparing a "Bibliography on religion in Thailand" to be issued annually with as many references as possible in Thai and other languages.
The first trial issue will begin with the year 1989. To help in making the Bibliography as complete as possible, those, individuals or organizations, who have published or produced any materials dealing, even partly, with any religion in Thailand in 1989 and 1990 are kindly invited to send precise references or a copy of the work. If the materials are not well known, and if they are unpublished, a copy would be greatly appreciated. A copy would also make sure that a short abstract would be included in the Bibliography.

Information and copy should be sent as soon as possible to

Louis Gabaude-Birethai
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Thailand

who thanks everybody in advance.

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China's Population
(Volume of Yunnan Province)
Chief Editors: Zou Qiyu, Miao Wenzun
   Deputy Chief Editors: Li Hongguo, Chen Xuguang

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Two new publications, in French, should be of interest to readers of the Newsletter. They are reviewed by Martin Stuart-Fox (Asian Studies Review 13 (3) April 1990: 121-28).

[Stuart-Fox writes, 'Overall, Taillard's study is a welcome addition to the meagre literature on modern Laos. It is well-argued and beautifully produced, with a spread of sixteen multicoloured maps which are probably the best and most informative set ever produced for Laos.]

[Stuart-Fox writes, 'Particularly welcome in this treatment of Vietnam's frontiers is the inclusion of two studies by Professor Lafont on Vietnam's maritime frontier and the conflict over sovereignty claims to the Spratley and Paracel Islands ... The most serious deficiency ... is undoubtedly the lack of maps. ...] Volumes on Laos and Cambodia are expected in the series.

* 
Mr. Shi Kun, who is now a research student at Ohio State University and the author of many papers on the minority nationalities of Yunnan, writes with critical comments on the Newsletter. He comments on the misspellings and errors, and with reference to Li Xiang Yang's article in No. 5 he says, 
He should be consistent in using the pinyin or Wade-Gile system; he should not leave out the information about the Lahu, Kemu and Hui peoples; he should have referred to Prof. Ma Yao's article in Minzu Tuanjie (Unity of Nationalities, 1989: 6). Shi continues,
In recent years a large number of books and monographs in Chinese have been published - some are good scholarly works and many are valuable resource books. The Newsletter should provide more space for introducing more books and important articles. I am just citing a few titles here: 1. Hu Ba Meng, On the Dai Poetry ([Chinese title in

Editors note: We are always happy to publish information of this kind as well as to publish translations which readers think are important and send to us. However, we do not have the resources to provide the kind of service implied here. Our funding has now run out, and our translator ceases work at the end of December. The editor takes responsibility for most misspellings and errors. This, again, is largely a consequence of limited resources.

The editor takes the opportunity to correct a misleading footnote in Number 10: 15. The English equivalent of the Pinyin 'Keqing' is, of course, 'Kachin' and not 'Kokang'. The usual Chinese name for the Kachin is 'Jingpo'. Kokang is a place name and when the Thai sources refer to the Kokang people, they appear to mean ethnic Chinese from that place.

From Lawa to Mon, from Saa' to Thai
Historical and anthropological aspects of Southeast Asian social spaces
by
GEORGES CONDOMINAS

Two essays translated from L'espace social " propos de l'Asie du sud-est.
Notes on Lawa history concerning a place named Lua' (Lawa) in Karen country & Essay on the evolution of Thai political systems

These two papers are indispensable for an understanding of the history of the peoples of the region and because of the extensive source material surveyed by Condominas, together form an excellent introduction to Tai and Mon-Khmer ethnography.

Because of new restrictive rules imposed by our university bankers please pay in Australian currency only $15 or $18 air mail.

Occasional Paper of the
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Research School of Pacific Studies
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Canberra, ACT 2601
This is the first section of the Scripture in Naxi pictographs for the ceremony of sky worship. The sacrifice, by the letting of the animal's blood, of a black pig with four white trotters is made to the Sky God, the Earth God and the God Xu (the Maternal Uncle of the Sky) at the beginning of the ceremony. Section of the Scripture will then be chanted by the Dongba, who handles the sacrificial rites.

2 Dongba originally means the wise (in the Naxi language). Here it refers to the professional priests of the Naxi original religion. They are the people who pass the Naxi pictograph generation by generation till today. (Translator's note)

3 In the ceremony of sky worship, the pig's shoulder blade is used for divination by the Dongba. There are volumes focused on divination in the Dongba Scripture.

4 Mei means the sky in Naxi language. During the ceremony, an oak tree of about 3.33 m high and with two branches is erected at the left of the altar, symbolizing the sky.

5 Da in Naxi language means the earth. During the ceremony, another oak tree of about 3.33 m high and with two branches will be erected at the right of the altar, symbolizing the earth.

6 Xu in Naxi language means cypress tree. Cypress tree is the symbol of the Maternal Uncle of the Sky, who lives in between of the sky and the earth and is also called the Central Master (or Emperor).

7 In the original Naxi language the fire here refers to that produced by steel, and it is sometimes called 'the steel fire'.

8 The paragraphs from the beginning to the end of this section appear in many scriptures in Naxi pictograph. Differences in interpretations given by the Dongbas from different areas exist. The Han version adopted here is based on He Kaixiao's interpretation.

9 Sibubanyu is the name of the Sky God. His daughter Cuihongbaobai later married Chareli'en, the first ancestor of the Naxi nation.

10 Zhelao'apu is the other name of the Sky God Sibubanyu.

11 These three sentences describe the sky with a male image, i.e., the image of Zhelao'apu.

12 Dong and Sai are the two patron saints very sacred to the Naxi people. Dong is the Saint of yang, the masculine principle in nature, and Sai is the Saint of yin, the feminine principle. There is one special volume in the Naxi Scripture which is called Dong-Sai-Cou-Shou ('Dong and Sai expel the filthy air'). Before the beginning of many sacrificial rites, Dong and Sai should be invited to the ceremony, and two stones should be set on the altar to indicate their presence. Usually, the Naxi people also set up two magical stones to indicate the two Saints in front of their houses.

13 Luomandan is the Naxi term for the ceremony of burning the Big Incense for the Mountain God and the Dragon King. The word originally means 'closing the back gate of the Great Valley.' It is said that when Charelien and Cuihongbaobai came down from the sky, thick fog blurred their way. The sky and the earth cleared only after they burned incense at the end of the Great Valley. This then became a ceremony in Naxi custom.

14 The Big Incense is the incense specially made respectively for the Sky God, the Earth God and the God Xu. Usually a bamboo or pine tree,
2-3 metres high, will be used as the base of the incense. A paper bag of about one metre height will be attached on the top of this base, filled with all kinds of incense collected from the bush. Paper flowers will be used to decorate this Big Incense.

15 Literally, it means the column that can reach the sky. The Column is about 0.3 metres high. It is set up behind the Sacrificial Board indicating the God Xu. Its top is split in order to hold an egg.

16 Pudu is the name of one of the communities within the Naxi nation. The main communities are Pudu, Guxu and Guchan. Each community has its own schedule for the sacrificial rite. The Pudu people hold the rite on the fifth day of the New Year, the Guxu on the eleventh day, and the Guchan on the eighth. Within each community, some people prefer a collective ceremony, while others prefer to perform the rite in each individual household. Among the three communities, the rules and procedures applied for such ceremony are basically the same, and the scriptures used are identical.

17 Meimeixuraodui is the name of a place. According to legend, it is the place for beauties.

18 Cuihengcuizi is Zhelao'apu (the Sky God)'s wife and Cuihongbaobai's mother.

19 From here onwards, the earth is described as a woman. Some people think it is the image of Cuihengcuizi.

20 Sanduo is the Patron Saint of the Naxi nationalities. According to myth, he lives at the Snow Mountain of Yulong (the Jade Dragon Mountain), with his temple built at the foot of the Mountain. Shiri is the Mountain God and the Dragon King.

21 This is to show that they still remember the hard life of the Naxi ancestors.

22 Cypress tree is the symbol of the God Xu because the word is pronounced the same as that of the God Xu in the Naxi language.

23 According to Naxi myth, before Charilien (the first ancestor of the Naxi people) went to the Sky God to ask to marry his daughter, the God had planned to marry his daughter to Meirukexikele, his uncle (ie, the God Xu)'s son. After that, Meirukexikele often brought hardship and suffering on mankind. In order to relieve the suffering, the Naxi people offer sacrifices to the God Xu (the Uncle) as well as to two other Gods. The Dingtian Column is believed to mean keep back hardship and suffering.

24 Xuraodui stands for Meimeixuraodui. (See above, fn. 16).

1 For a detailed account, see Fei Xiaotong and Wang Jingru, Report on the Nationality of the Chuanging People in Guizhou, given at the seminar held at the Central Institute on Ethnic Studies, 1957.

2 Gai-Tu-Gui-Liu is the Chinese pronunciation. Literally it indicates an ethnic policy which was employed in Ming and Qing. The Central government sent officials (called 'liu-guan' in Chinese) nominated by the Emperor to the areas of the minority nationalities to replace their cheiftains (called 'tu-si' in Chinese) and established administrative organs identical with those in China proper. In this way the Emperor of China expanded his dominion gradually to the ethnic areas. (Translator's note).


4 'jianbiqingye' is a Chinese word which may be translated as
'Scotched-earth policy.'
5 Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (1912-1913), included in the Collected Works of Stalin (Sidalin Quanji), Vol.II, p.294-295
6 Stalin, The National Question and Leninism (1929), included in the Collected Works of Stalin (Sidalin Quanji), Vol.XI, p.289
7 For the terms used here in English for classification of the ethnic groups, see Li Xiang Yang, Ethnic Identification and Ethnic Groups in Yunnan, Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter, No.5, June 1989, p.8
* Professor F.K. Lehman, Department of Anthropology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA

 ecstatic Qianji, V o.11, p.1289
 5.  For the terms used here in English for classification of the ethnic groups, see Li Xiang Yang, "Ethnic Identification and Ethnic Groups in Yunnan," Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter, No.5, June 1989, p.8.
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